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Currently we are in an International Polar Year (“IPY”) and the timing could not be better. The Polar Regions 
are taking the first and hardest hit from anthropogenic 
climate change. Almost all predictions for climate stability in 
the Polar Regions have recently been shattered. Temperature 
increases have exceeded expectations, the tree line has pushed 
farther north than expected, and ice is melting faster than antici-
pated. As a result of this IPY and the immediate needs of Polar 
people, ecosystems, and environment, Sustainable Development 
Law & Policy (“SDLP”) felt it was necessary to have this issue. 
Environmental change is happening, and the Polar Regions 
are among the least equipped to handle the new stresses. Due 
to wind patterns and ocean currents across the globe, the Polar 
Regions are acting as repositories for soot and many hazardous 
chemicals. This soot is darker than the ice and snow and attracts 
heat, thus increasing the speed at which the poles are thawing. 
The chemicals funneled to the Arctic are being accumulated over 
time in various species; these concentrations of chemicals would 
normally qualify as hazardous waste under Environmental Pro-
tection Agency regulations. Furthermore, changes in the Polar 
Regions may speed up global warming and cause abrupt climate 
change events as a result of ice melt raising sea levels or perma-
frost disappearing and releasing in massive methane emissions. 
In this issue we hope to provide information and publicity 
to important polar issues. Articles include the effects of climate 
change on indigenous populations, possibilities for the creation 
of an Arctic treaty system, the global complications of efforts by 
Australia to fight whaling, species issues, and growing resource 
extraction and shipping in the Arctic. With this issue we hope 
SDLP can assist the IPY to move beyond research and debate 
to encourage actions that will protect our planet for all future 
generations.  
Marcel De Armas Maria Vanko
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One need only to look at a comparison of summer Arctic ice extent from 1979 to 2007 to understand something significant is happening. In the span of a generation, the 
millennia-old Arctic has shrunk by roughly two-thirds and could 
easily be ice free in the summer within a decade. Or if that is not 
enough, consider that in the winter of 2008, a massive chunk 
of ice broke off from the Antarctic Peninsula, and another ice 
sheet the size of Northern Ireland (or Connecticut, if you prefer) 
hangs on by a thread. Over the past fifty years, the Arctic and 
Antarctic have warmed by around 3 degrees Celsius, roughly 
double the rest of the world. The goal, simply put, is to prevent 
this harbinger. 
While there are still a few oil industry funded naysayers, 
all scientific experts now agree that global warming is here and 
Overview: radical envirOnmental change in the POlar regiOns  
is the glObe’s wake-uP call
By William J. Snape, III*
impacting our planet. The impacts are occurring far faster than we 
thought just over a decade ago, when the Kyoto Protocol to the 
Framework Climate Convention was ratified by most world gov-
ernments except those such as the United States, Iraq, Afghani-
stan, and Zimbabwe. Coastal communities, island nation-states, 
high-altitude ecosystems, and arid regions are already feeling 
the impacts of global warming. But it is on and near our globe’s 
two poles that change is occurring most acutely. 
Why should we care? There are many reasons. While 
much of the polar ice that has melted thus far has rested upon 
the ocean already, an increasing proportion of melting ice will 
come from land (e.g., Greenland ice caps or the Antarctic con-
tinent), meaning that ocean levels could soon rapidly rise to 
disastrous levels; this would impact at least hundreds of millions 
of coastal-dwelling human beings throughout the world. Flood-
ing, erosion, and contamination of freshwater drinking supplies 
would vastly increase from Miami to Shanghai and many places 
in between. Further, invasive pests are now proliferating due to 
global warming and global warming’s causes, negatively affect-
ing forests, farms, rangelands, and pollination cycles across the 
globe. Canada’s great boreal forest, the lungs of North America 
that includes part of the Arctic, is in clear decline.
The poles’ snow and ice also form a protective cooling layer 
for the rest of the Earth. When the poles melt, particularly in the 
Arctic, the rest of the planet absorbs more sunlight and gets hot-
ter. This warming trend, in turn, increases the intense weather 
variability events that the entire globe has already experienced 
over the past decade or so. Aside from the direct destruction 
these storms engender, sectors as diverse as agriculture, trans-
portation, and services suffer billions, if not trillions, of dollars 
of losses annually from nature’s increased unpredictability. As 
just one of many examples, a recent study on a warming Arctic 
predicted that wheat farming in Kansas would be devastated as 
winter planting that needs freezing temperatures and summer soil 
that needs moisture would both dissipate without Arctic ice. 
Biological diversity in the wild is also taking a potentially 
permanent hit around our poles. Despite unconscionable foot 
dragging by the Bush Administration that has forced repeated 
litigation in federal courts, the United States will eventually 
list the polar bear under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) 
because of accelerated global warming, triggering a concerted 
effort to save this great iconic beast. However, even the ESA 
apparently cannot stop the proliferation of oil and gas projects 
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pending or ongoing throughout 
the Arctic. Unfortunately, the 
polar bear is not alone. Many 
other species, from whales and 
walrus to seals and migratory 
birds, are losing their homes, 
prey, or breeding grounds to 
global warming. In the Ant-
arctic, as a result of a petition 
by the Center for Biological 
Diversity, federal scientists 
acknowledge the perilous 
plight of many species of pen-
guin but this Administration, 
again, does nothing. As the 
now cliché goes, the patter of 
“happy feet” grows dimmer. 
Our polar ecosystems are in literal collapse.
The good news is that all three remaining U.S. presidential 
candidates (from both major parties) acknowledge the threat and 
challenge of global warming. The Arctic Council—made up of 
the United States, Canada, Russia, Iceland, native groups, and 
the Scandinavian countries—is beginning to focus on the myriad 
threats facing the North Pole and its surrounding ecosystem. To 
the south, the Antarctic Treaty, an effective relic of the Cold 
War, could become a basis to address global warming. Yet, we 
are really only at the starting line of our effort. 
The bevy of articles in this edition of SDLP recognizes the 
legal and policy opportunities for positive change. This is excit-
ing. Today’s law students, particularly those with a public inter-
est bent like many at the Washington College of Law, have a 
true chance to “save the world.” Thus, the varied international 
and domestic legal strategies available to combat global warm-
ing and its impacts are far more than an academic exercise. For 
many, the ideas contained in this edition are quite directly about 
life and death.
How, then, to summarize the road map available to us in our 
complex and inter-connected world? First, most clearly, we need 
a binding multi-lateral agreement on reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions that includes all nations, including the United States, 
China, and India. The capital and technologies exist to make our 
energy transition a smooth and constructive one, but we lack 
political will. Second, to the extent recalcitrant governments and 
corporations do want to play ball on global warming, lawyers 
should and will do what they have done for years: sue them. And 
this is happening in the United States under novel statutory and 
common law theories that will grace future legal text books.1 
Finally, we need creative lawyers to use existing international 
tools under agreements such as the Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, the Convention on Biological Diversity, various human 
rights conventions, the Polar Bear Treaty, and even the World 
Trade Organization (historically a bit hostile toward the envi-
ronment) to tilt the playing field back in favor of conservation, 
equity, and the sustainable use of our limited natural resources. 
As I tell my athletes before a big competition, the choice 
is ours: we can prepare diligently and rise to the challenge, or 
we can take the easy way out through apathy or fear. The dif-
ference, of course, is that amateur athletic competition is but 
practice for the real world. If the Arctic and Antarctic are indeed 
the “canaries in the coal mine” for the rest of the world that sci-
entific experts tell us they are, we may soon lose luxuries we 
have deluded ourselves into thinking are necessities. Clean air, 
available water, healthy landscapes and public health are all 
diminishing from many factors, and global warming is the most 
powerful common denominator.2
We can do better. We need political conservatives to 
remember that Biblical (or Koran-like) change to our natural 
heritage is not conservative but mere cow-towing to Big Oil. We 
need political liberals to more aggressively identify the avail-
able solutions without fear of appearing “regulatory” (ending 
massive subsidies to carbon pollution activities would be a great 
start). We need independent entrepreneurs to be empowered to 
find energy solutions that work in the short term market-place, as 
well as the long-term sustainable health of the planet. We need 
the developing world to recognize there are real opportunities to 
think in new ways that do not repeat past mistakes. We need the 
developed world to pony up its wealth, if not for altruism then 
because it will maintain prosperity in the long term. No one is 
left off Team Planet. We are truly all in this together. 
Endnotes:  Radical Environmental Change in  the Polar Regions Is the Globe’s Wake-up Call
1 See, e.g., David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in Climate Change Litigation, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1741 (2007).  
2 See, e.g., Donald Burke, et al., Under the Weather: Climate, Ecosystems, and Infectious Disease, National Research Council (Washington, DC), June 2001.
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InternatIonal Polar Year as a  
CatalYst for sustaInIng arCtIC researCh
by Karen Kraft Sloan & David Hik*
introduction
The Arctic covers an area of more than thirty million km
2, 
and is home to a population of about four million, includ-
ing over thirty different indigenous peoples. The Arctic 
is also a region experiencing rapid environmental, economic, 
social, and political change. The health and well-being of north-
ern people and their environments, the sustainability of northern 
communities, and the future development of northern resources, 
will increasingly define global issues in this cen tury.1 The suc-
cess and sustainability of an Arctic-focused agenda requires 
meaningful and sustained engagement, and leadership from 
indigenous and non-indigenous northern peoples, governments 
and institutions, in partnership with a wide variety of national 
and international interests. This concept has been affirmed, 
although not always embraced, by indigenous organizations, 
many regional and national governments, the Arctic Council, 
and other intergovernmental bodies.2
One important role of science and research is to assist gov-
ernments in effectively discharging their responsibilities and 
mandates.3 In the Arctic, these mandates are necessarily far 
reaching, diverse and include a broad range of disciplines, from 
the natural sciences, the human behavioral, social and historical 
sciences, medical sciences, engineering and applied sciences, 
and research in the managerial, economic, and legal fields. This 
research is characterized by an abundance of cross-cutting issues 
that require interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary approaches, 
and the knowledge provided by research must address questions 
on a wide range of scales from local to global, and from immedi-
ate to long-term. It is also recognized that advanced techno-
logical knowledge and fundamental or theoretical research must 
be combined with the holistic observations and knowledge of 
indigenous northern peoples.4 
Some of the most compelling examples of scientific cooper-
ation in the Arctic have been the diverse scientific activities con-
ducted under the banner of the International Polar Year (“IPY”) 
on four occasions during the past 125 years.5 The present Inter-
national Polar Year runs from March 2007 to March 2009, 
and involves approximately fifty thousand participants from 
over sixty nations, engaged in about two hundred international 
research projects in the Arctic and Antarctic regions. The major 
objectives of IPY include efforts to obtain a ‘snapshot’ of the 
state of the Polar Regions, to explore new frontiers of science, 
and to promote scientific cooperation, training, and outreach.6 
Recently, there has been increased discussion of the leg-
acy of this IPY,7 and promotion of the notion that IPY will be 
a “catalyst” for sustaining future Arctic and Antarctic research 
efforts. History would suggest this outcome is possible, but what 
efforts are required to secure a legacy of sustained interest and 
investment in Arctic research?
LeSSonS from the  
internationaL geophySicaL year
The scientific outcomes of the International Geophysical 
Year (“IGY”) of 1957–1958 (which began as the third IPY) are 
remarkable and have been summarized elsewhere.8 But IGY 
catalyzed more than just innovative research. Halfway through 
the IGY, Dr. Laurence M. Gould, while delivering the Ameri-
can Geographical Society Bowman lecture, declared: “The IGY 
may turn out to be a brilliant new approach toward international 
understanding and organization.”9 Indeed, a few days after 
Gould delivered his address, the Special Committee on Antarc-
tic Research (“SCAR”) was officially organized in The Hague 
and became a permanent committee of the International Council 
for Science. SCAR then prepared a plan of Antarctic research 
that went beyond the original IGY program. 
Subsequently, the United Kingdom, followed by other gov-
ernments, expressed interest in finding an international solu-
tion to competing Antarctic territorial claims. This quest led 
to the creation of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959.10 The Treaty 
is a remarkable document. It was signed by the twelve nations 
active in Antarctica at the time, all of which participated in IGY 
and nine of which had made territorial claims in Antarctica or 
reserved the right to do so. At the present time, 46 countries 
are signatories to this treaty.11 In a preamble and fourteen short 
articles, the signatories agreed, among other considerations, that 
Antarctica should be used “exclusively for peaceful purposes;”12 
to “promote international cooperation in scientific investigation 
in Antarctica;”13 and to “the establishment of a firm foundation 
for the continuation and development of such cooperation . . . as 
applied during the International Geophysical Year accords with 
the interests of science and the progress of all mankind.”14
* Karen Kraft Sloan is the former Canadian Ambassador for the Environment. 
Before serving as a diplomat, she was a Member of Parliament for eleven years, 
where she was active with the Arctic Parliamentarians and chaired the Northern 
Science and Research Caucus. Karen is currently special advisor to the Vice-Presi-
dent, Research and Innovation at York University in Toronto, and consults widely 
on environmental and science policy issues. 
David Hik is a Professor and Canada Research Chair in Northern Ecology in the 
Department of Biological Sciences at the University of Alberta in Edmonton. Since 
2004 he has served as the Executive Director of the Canadian International Polar 
Year Secretariat.
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All of this was agreed to in the shadow of the Cold War “in 
a remarkably short time, by disparate, thinly acquainted, mutu-
ally wary cultures—military, scientific, and diplomatic,”15 and 
in the language of the preamble, “shall continue forever.”16 In 
1958, Gould hypothesized that the IGY approach “could provide 
a pattern that will move over into other areas and result in fur-
ther working together of all nations.”17 The Treaty proves him 
prescient, by serving as an apt example of how the IGY’s legacy 
was both broadened and sustained beyond the immediate scien-
tific program. By inspiring a multinational diplomatic conversa-
tion about the future of a continent, and the security for scientific 
activity conducted within its borders, the IGY continues to influ-
ence the world.18 
towarD an arctic 
treaty?
Given this, what promise 
does the current International 
Polar Year hold for formalizing 
international support for Arctic 
science cooperation? What kind 
of practical measures are needed 
to ensure this? Many of the rel-
evant issues have already been 
clearly articulated, including 
reviews of the options that should 
be considered to develop a com-
prehensive Arctic legal regime.19 
More recently, a 2006 editorial 
in Nature argued for G8 leaders to commit to improving links 
between Arctic research communities, “on the model that has 
been tried and tested in the Antarctic.”20 The editorial under-
lined the value of IPY, noting that it too provides an opportu-
nity for a case to be made for a “more concerted, international 
effort” to support research in the Arctic. The authors asserted 
that “scientists working in the Arctic are well connected with 
each other,” and goes on to say that while an Antarctic treaty 
exists that “obliges its signatories to collaborate in scientific 
research,” no formal or political framework exists for collabora-
tion on Arctic science.
Nevertheless, what worked in the context of the Antarc-
tic is not directly applicable to the Arctic. The physical, polit-
ical, economic, ecological, and historical realities of the poles 
and their occupation and traditional use by indigenous peoples 
and national governments are very different. Gould reminded 
us in 1958 that the poles “are distinguished by their dissimilar-
ities rather than by any common characteristics.”21 In a recent 
issue of Foreign Affairs, Scott Borgeson agreed: “Although it 
is tempting to look to the past for solutions to the Arctic conun-
drum, no perfect analogy exists. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty . . . 
provides some lessons, but it concerns a continent rather than 
an ocean.”22  He goes on to say, “there is simply no compar-
able historical example of a saltwater space with such ambigu-
ous ownership, such a dramatically mutating seascape, and such 
extraordinary economic promise.”23 In this context, it is unsur-
prising that there is so much attention on the seabed mapping 
and claims process laid out under the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, whereby nations bordering the Arctic 
Ocean may be able to extend their sovereignty beyond the usual 
200-nautical mile limit recognized in international law, if the 
seabed is an extension of the continental shelf.24
Given the unique contexts of the two poles, a different 
institutional arrangement to support international Arctic science 
cooperation is needed. It should be pointed out that the Circum-
polar North is not without efforts to increase international coop-
eration. In fact, there has been a “recent proliferation of efforts 
to enhance international cooperation,”25 reflecting the mix of 
institutions and organizations 
in the region. However, solu-
tions that will be acceptable to 
most stakeholders, especially 
Arctic nations, and that will 
strengthen and support research 
and monitoring, regulatory 
arrangements, and adaptation 
to rapid climate change will 
require ingenuity and commit-
ment over the long-term.
Along with regional 
efforts to provide opportunities 
for bi-lateral and multi-lateral 
cooperation, is the maze of 
global multi-national environ-
mental agreements (“MEAs”) 
that affect the Arctic. Attempts have been made to better under-
stand how various global agreements impact the region. Oran 
Young suggested that due consideration should be given to how 
“nesting of regional arrangements” could fit with existing global 
MEAs; for example the programs of the Arctic Council’s Work-
ing Group on the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna could 
operate within the larger framework provided by the Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity.26 There has also been discussion of 
establishing the Arctic Ocean as a Marine Protected Area.27
IPY has added to this mix by promoting a Circumpolar Bio-
diversity Monitoring Program.28 Other international conserva-
tion non-governmental organizations, like the World Wildlife 
Fund have also called for a “new approach, which includes 
thinking about a solid Arctic Treaty and a multilateral gover-
nance body.”29 And last year an editorial in the New Scientist 
concluded, “What more fitting conclusion could there be to this 
event [IPY] than for scientists to call for the same protection in 
the north—for an Arctic Treaty? Or have scientists lost the nerve 
to make such grand demands?”30
In 2006, United Nations Environment Program (“UNEP”)/
Global Resource International Database-Arendal and the Stand-
ing Committee for Parliamentarians of the Arctic Regions spon-
sored a seminar to investigate the implications of global MEAs 
for the Arctic in order to better understand the “fit” of current 
circum-arctic initiatives with these global agreements. Key rec-
ommendations include the need to: undertake an audit of the 
Given the unique  
contexts of the two poles, 
a different institutional 
arrangement to  
support international 
Arctic science cooperation 
is needed. 
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effectiveness and relevance of current MEAs; identify gaps in 
coverage; evaluate whether or not a unified legal regime, such 
as a treaty or a framework convention would be appropriate for 
the Arctic region; and explore mechanisms to enhance institu-
tional cooperation such as a per-
manent Arctic secretariat, Arctic 
MEA implementation strategy.31 
The seminar report and its rec-
ommendations were submitted 
to the UNEP, the Arctic Parlia-
mentarians, the Arctic Council, 
the Nordic Council of Ministers, 
and the governing bodies and 
secretariats of MEAs, along 
with being distributed to Arctic 
stakeholders.
Despite this discussion and 
activity, the idea of an Arctic 
Treaty may be unattainable. 
Timo Koivurova has recently warned that there are potential 
down-sides to negotiating an Arctic treaty, including lengthy and 
costly preparatory and negotiation processes, the risk of legal-
izing lowest common denominator standards, and contributing 
another layer of complexity to the already fragmented array of 
multilateral environmental agreements.32 There is also a grow-
ing recognition that indigenous peoples organizations, such as 
the Inuit Circumpolar Council, have legitimate interests in these 
discussions that have not been fully recognized.33 However, all 
of the recent attempts to provide for greater cooperation in the 
Circumpolar region bode well for enhancing international sup-
port for Arctic science and research. Countless individuals from 
many polar and non-polar nations have exerted tremendous 
energy in securing scientific, political, and financial support 
for IPY. But since these are not easily garnered, the question 
remains—how will activity be sustained in the long-term? 
A roAdmAp for SuStAining Arctic Science  
And reSeArch?
The Arctic research community and northern residents can-
not act alone. Governments have significant responsibilities for 
improving international Arctic science cooperation, and there-
fore the support of governments is required. The Arctic Council 
has most notably advanced cooperation for broader collaboration 
in the Circumpolar North. Within the Arctic Council, indigenous 
peoples of the Arctic have representation as Permanent Partici-
pants, for active engagement, and full consultation on Council 
activities. Under the leadership of the Arctic Council, seminal 
work has been produced including the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment34 and the Arctic Human Development Report.35 
Both featured excellent research work, including traditional and 
local knowledge and peer-reviewed science.36 A high level of 
international cooperation and a commitment to extend this work 
continues.
More recently, emphasis has been placed on the need for a 
well coordinated and sustained Arctic Observing Network that 
meets scientific and societal needs.37 In November 2006, Arc-
tic Council Ministers urged all member nations to maintain and 
extend long-term monitoring of change in the Arctic, with a view 
to building a lasting legacy of the International Polar Year.38 
There is a strong consensus that 
scientific understanding of the 
changing Arctic system and its 
global connections and conse-
quences requires improved Arc-
tic observing capabilities that 
are linked to global observing 
activities. Numerous observing 
sites, systems, and networks 
already exist in the Arctic, and 
more are being initiated during 
IPY. In order to maximize the 
likelihood that these disparate 
activities can be integrated into 
a sustained network for long-
term observation that will support the scientific study of Arctic 
system change in a global context, there is, among other things, 
a vital need to: 
•  Improve coordination to avoid repetition, duplication and 
overlap, and promote synergies; 
•  Assess user needs, and identify and fill gaps in spatial, 
temporal and disciplinary coverage to achieve a circum-
Arctic observing network; 
•  Guarantee access to data and information in an easy, free, 
open and timely fashion, and in standard, internationally 
accepted formats, to the broadest possible community of 
users; 
•  Ensure sustainability through long-term funding and 
commitments; and 
•  Establish links to global observing activities, networks, 
and systems. 
Additionally, many non-Arctic nations have strong Arctic 
science programs and interests, yet are restricted from full mem-
bership within the Arctic Council. Capturing the enthusiasm and 
interest of these nations could contribute greatly to strengthening 
international collaboration on Arctic science. Indeed, this is the 
intended role of the International Arctic Science Committee.39
the LegAcy of ipy 2007
Some of the legacies of IPY 2007–2008 may transpire 
regardless of whether efforts are made to secure them, and some 
may only come about with some exertion. Collectively, how-
ever, they would undoubtedly result in a significant, broad, and 
far-reaching impact for IPY, for example:
•  Establish permanent observation and monitoring net-
works; 
•  Improve the link between observation and monitoring to 
modelling; 
•  Manage the explosion of data that IPY will create, and 
ensure access to it; 
•  Raise the public profile of the polar regions; 
The success and 
sustainability of an  
Arctic-focused agenda 
requires meaningful  
and sustained engagement, 
and leadership.
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•  Link science and policy more effectively;
•  Improve opportunities for northerners by increasing link-
ages to higher education; 
•  Ensure that there is a “critical mass” of northerners in the 
next generation of Arctic science researchers; and 
•  Share logistical information more broadly and more 
efficiently.
There is still a need to define and pursue the next steps in 
securing a broad legacy for IPY, as envisioned by so many of the 
scientific and governmental participants. These efforts to secure 
the IPY legacy could include:
1.  Making the IPY legacy part of the IPY process itself, 
like the efforts to secure Sustained Arctic Observing 
Networks.40
2.  Identifying partners in order to link with and build upon 
other efforts, through Arctic Council and other organiza-
tions, including national governments. 
3.  Learning from other efforts to formalise international 
polar science cooperation, especially from the imple-
mentation of the Antarctic Treaty System and from the 
first fifteen years of the evolution of the Arctic Council.
4.  Being opportunistic and identifying fora to engage gov-
ernments and other potential partners and supporters. 
5.  Identifying champions and providing them with resources 
to promote the global and local value of enhancing Arc-
tic science, research, and knowledge capacity.
concluSion
In many ways, IPY has already succeeded in inspiring a dis-
cussion about the future of Arctic research. The Arctic research 
agenda has been dynamic and full over the past couple of years, 
with a number of parallel processes occurring that collectively 
have provided space for exploring the future of science and 
research in the Circumpolar North. We are well into the fourth 
IPY; we must ensure that the opportunity IPY provides as a cata-
lyst to sustain international cooperation for Arctic science and 
research is not lost. In doing so, we should remember that those 
of us calling to formalize international support for Arctic science 
are not the first to do so. That honor belongs to Karl Weyprecht 
and his contemporaries in the challenge they made to convene 
the first polar year of 1882.41 
We should be mindful that like its predecessors, Inter-
national Polar Year 2007–2008 can serve to advance science, 
and to focus the attention of the world on the Polar Regions. 
IPY honors the dedication and affirms the contribution to polar 
research of so many, past and present. If we are diligent and act 
to use the opportunity that International Polar Year provides by 
demonstrating to humanity how international science can create 
broader societal benefits, then as Dr. Gould put it, competing 
interests can be addressed “by the friendliest kind of cooperation 
from all of the nations involved.” 42 
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Snow, Sand, Ice, and Sun: clImate change  
and equIty In the arctIc and Small ISland developIng StateS
by John Crump*
The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is 
dying and the new cannot be born. 
—Antonio Gramsci1
When we unite for a moral purpose that is manifestly 
good and true, the spiritual energy unleashed can trans-
form us.
—Al Gore2
introduction
United Nations (“UN”) Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has called climate change “the moral challenge of our generation.” At the plenary session of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) Con-
ference of the Parties (“COP”) XIII 
meeting in Bali, Ban told assem-
bled delegates that “the situation 
is so desperately serious that any 
delay could push us past the tip-
ping point, beyond which the eco-
logical, financial, and human costs 
would increase dramatically.”3 
Ban Ki-moon, Al Gore, and 
many others argue that unless the 
world embraces this moral chal-
lenge, the burden of climate change 
will fall on the most vulnerable 
regions: areas like the Arctic and 
Small Island Developing States 
(“SIDS”). Their call for moral clar-
ity echoes what people in some of the world’s most vulnerable 
regions have been saying for some time, that there needs to be a 
recognition that the impacts of climate change are being felt by 
parts of the world that currently lack the resources to cope with 
the rapid change they are experiencing. 
This Article explores some of the similarities between 
the Arctic and SIDS as they confront the challenge of climate 
change. Both regions have been identified as among the most 
vulnerable to climate change effects yet they have contributed 
least to global greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions. Responses 
to the effects of climate change in these regions raise import-
ant questions of equity. The Article examines how this issue of 
equity is being addressed, both legally and politically, through 
an example of a human rights challenge in the Arctic and the 
development of an alliance between the Arctic and SIDS called 
Many Strong Voices (“MSV”). 
LinkS between the Arctic And SmALL iSLAnd 
deveLoping StAteS
At first glance, the Arctic and SIDS appear to have little in 
common. One is cold, the other is mostly hot. One is seen as an 
empty and pristine wilderness, untouched by human activities 
or, alternatively, as a storehouse for vast mineral wealth, ripe 
for exploitation. The other is portrayed in vacation posters as a 
gentle, tropical paradise where the living is easy, the sun always 
shines, and the beaches are endless. 
But look more closely and you find some interesting simi-
larities. Both regions are homelands to a diverse number of 
Indigenous Peoples who, to varying degrees, have been colo-
nized over the last several centuries. People in both regions 
continue to rely on natural 
resources—animals, fish, 
and plants—and the environ-
ment. In both regions, tradi-
tional knowledge continues 
to inform decision-making 
and many people retain a con-
nection to the environment 
through a body of traditional 
knowledge developed over 
the centuries. 
Another more unfor-
tunate similarity is that the 
effects of climate change 
are greater and more notice-
able in the Arctic and SIDS 
than elsewhere around the globe. The 2005 Arctic Climate 
Impact Assessment (“ACIA”) predicted that the Arctic will feel 
the effects of climate change sooner and more severely than 
other regions of the earth.4 It also emphasized the relationship 
between Arctic climate change and Arctic biophysical processes 
to global climate. The 2007 Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) echoed and amplified the 
ACIA findings: 
Arctic human communities are already adapting to 
 climate change, but both external and internal stres-
sors challenge their adaptive capacities. Despite the 
* John Crump is the Polar Issue Co-ordinator for UNEP/GRID-Arendal (www.
grida.no).  His work focuses on climate change adaptation in the Arctic and Small 
Island Developing States, as well as human security, co-management, and other 
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 resilience shown historically by Arctic indigenous com-
munities, some traditional ways of life are being threat-
ened and substantial investments are needed to adapt or 
re-locate physical structures and communities.5
The report also identified similar effects on small islands:
Small islands, whether located in the tropics or higher 
latitudes, have characteristics which make them espe-
cially vulnerable to the effects of climate change, sea-
level rise and extreme events. Sea-level rise is expected 
to exacerbate inundation, storm surge, erosion and 
other coastal hazards, thus threatening vital infrastruc-
ture, settlements and facilities that support the liveli-
hood of island communities.6
In the SIDS, the adverse effects of sea level rise and contin-
ued climate change seriously threaten sustainable development. 
Many small islands are already confronting risks from environ-
mental hazards including coastal flooding, cyclones, and storm 
surges. 
voiceS from vulnerable regionS:  
obServing climate change in the arctic  
anD SiDS
While the scientific consensus on the impacts of climate 
change on vulnerable7 regions like the Arctic and SIDS has been 
building over the last few years, people who live there have long 
observed environmental changes. 
In the Arctic, many of these observations are recorded in the 
groundbreaking study, “Voices from the Bay,” published by the 
Canadian Arctic Resources Committee and the Community of 
Sanikiluaq in 1996. That study looked at Inuit and Cree experi-
ences in the huge watershed of Hudson Bay. It found that Indig-
enous Peoples had been noticing “highly variable” weather in 
the northwest corner of the bay since the 1940s. 
There used to be more clear, calm days, winters were 
colder, and low temperatures persisted longer. By the 
early 1990s, weather changes were quick, unexpected, 
and difficult to predict. Blizzards, for example, would 
occur on clear days in the Chesterfield Inlet area, but on 
days when environmental indicators suggested a bliz-
zard, it would not materialize.8
The dilemma of traditional knowledge failing in light of 
changing environmental conditions was summed up by Helen 
Atkinson from the Cree community of Chisasibi, Québec:
We cannot make predictions anymore. We don’t know 
if the water is going to freeze or not. We used to know 
what was going to happen at certain seasons but, with 
all the changes in the climate and different qualities of 
water, we can’t make those predictions anymore.9
SIDS have always been vulnerable to extreme weather 
events and other environmental disasters, however there has been 
increasing recognition of the threat posed by climate change.10 
And like Arctic residents, people in the South Pacific know that 
climate change is not a future event but a present reality. 
The effect of global warming is now being felt in every 
aspect of the lives of people who live in the Pacific. 
Reliable statistics now show that the western Pacific is 
becoming progressively drier while the eastern Pacific 
is becoming progressively wetter. Where once we 
could expect steady rainfall throughout the year, we 
now receive most of our rainfall in a short period often 
resulting in floods. These floods, followed by droughts, 
ruin our food supplies and hurricanes leave us without 
crops for up to three months. They also cause sedimen-
tation in our lagoons.11
Ben Namakin is in his mid-20s, works for the Conservation 
Society of Pohnpei in Micronesia, and observes: 
During my childhood days in Kiribati, we never expe-
rienced severe sea flooding. There were storms, but 
they weren’t that bad. As the sea levels continue to rise 
in Kiribati, several king tides hit the island. Saltwater 
intrusion affects the quality of water in wells, floods 
taro patches, gardens, and puts stress on plants/trees 
which are very important to the life and culture of an 
I-Kiribati. . . . Serious storm surges cause coastal ero-
sion, floods grave yards, and in 2006, led to the col-
lapse of the beautiful Dai Nippon causeway. This 
incident bore huge costs on the people of Kiribati. They 
had to build new homes with their own finance, and dig 
up their deceased relatives from their graves and bury 
them further inland.12
This kind of local knowledge and observation is impor-
tant to developing a complete picture of what is happening in 
vulnerable regions. The ACIA report, sponsored by the Arctic 
Council, is groundbreaking in two significant ways. First, it 
brought together the latest scientific research and analysis and 
looked at the implications of climate change on a single region 
of the Earth. Second, it incorporated the observations and tradi-
tional knowledge of the Arctic’s Indigenous Peoples. The ACIA 
showed clearly that the rate of climate induced change in the 
Arctic was twice that of the rest of the world.13 While the Arctic 
has the lowest GHG emissions of just about anywhere in the 
world, the report indicated that the highest price will be paid 
by the Arctic’s Indigenous Peoples, many of whose cultures are 
directly threatened by these rapid climatic changes.14 
Indigenous Peoples’ observations were systematically inte-
grated into the ACIA, making it the first such study to recog-
nize the value of indigenous knowledge. The report’s authors 
ensured that local voices were heard and local information 
was incorporated in the final results. From northern Russia to 
Alaska to the Canadian Arctic, Greenland and Sapmi, where the 
indigenous Saami have traditionally herded reindeer throughout 
the northern parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the Kola 
Peninsula in Russia, people were reporting changes that were 
affecting the very structure of their lives and threatening their 
economic and cultural survival. A reindeer herder talked about 
the uncertainty.
Our income diminishes because of climate change, of 
course, and in a very drastic way. Even my wife has 
said that it would be time to forget the reindeer. But I 
tell her always: ‘Tamara, we depend on these  reindeer. 
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If there are no reindeer, we have nothing to do here 
either.’15
Uusaqqak Qujaukitsoq is a hunter in northern Greenland. 
He described the changes in his region:
Sea-ice conditions have changed over the last five to six 
years. The ice is generally thinner and is slower to form 
off the smaller forelands. The appearance of  aakkarneq 
(“ice thinned by sea currents”) happens earlier in the 
year than normal. Also, sea ice, which previously 
broke up gradually 
from the floe-edge 
towards land, now 
breaks off all at once. 
Glaciers are very nota-
bly receding and the 
place names are no 
longer consistent with 
the appearance of the 
land. For example, 
 Sermiarsussuaq (“the 
smaller large gla-
cier”), which previ-
ously stretched out 
to the sea, no longer 
exists.16
Since Inuit throughout the Arctic use winter ice for travel 
and hunting, the issue of thickness can be a matter of life and 
death. Most Canadian Arctic communities have lost hunters 
whose snow machines have crashed through thin ice where there 
always used to be thick ice. In the Canadian Arctic, a pilot proj-
ect employing remote observation satellite technology is being 
used to supplement hunters’ environmental knowledge.17
Ethical conSidErationS
This question of imbalance between regional contribution 
and regional impact is supposed to be addressed in the UNFCCC, 
Article 3, which states that “[t]he Parties should protect the cli-
mate systems for the benefit of the present and future generations 
of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with 
their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities.”18 However, current disparities are stark:
The imbalance of responsibility for global warming 
is striking when comparing across nations. Average 
global carbon emissions approximate one metric ton 
per year (tC/yr) per person. In 2004, U.S. per capita 
emissions neared 6 tC/yr (with Canada and Australia 
not far behind), and Japan and Western European coun-
tries range from 2 to 5 tC/yr per capita. Yet developing 
countries’ per capita emissions approximate 0.6 tC/yr, 
and more than 50 countries are below 0.2 tC/yr.19
Another dramatic example of the striking inequities 
between contributors and impact is highlighted in the 2007 
United Nations Environment Programme report “Global Out-
look for Ice and Snow” that looked at the relationship between 
melting ice and snow and its effects on the major rivers of the 
Himalayas-Hindu Kush-Tian Shan-Tibet region and concluded 
that “1.3 billion people could be exposed to risk of increased 
water shortages.”20
Because developing countries (and the Arctic) have had the 
lowest emissions, the fewest resources available to tackle the 
problems created by climate change, and are most vulnerable 
to impacts, Article 3 of the UNFCCC contains another import-
ant principle to guide global decision-making. It states that the 
“specific needs and special circumstances of developing coun-
try Parties, especially 
those that are particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse 
effects of climate change 
. . . should be given full 
consideration.”21
Professor John C. 
Dernbach echoes the 
views of many people in 
the SIDS and Arctic when 
he writes that “equity 
for developing and vul-
nerable countries would 
counsel for stabilizing 
and reducing atmospheric 
GHG levels as soon as 
possible. That would, after all, reduce or avoid negative impacts 
to the most vulnerable (e.g. Inuit peoples [sic], Africa, small 
island states).”22
There are questions of equity involved not only in the dis-
cussion of how the effects of climate change are distributed, but 
how responses and solutions will be developed. Not everyone 
will be affected equally and not everyone will have the same 
resources to manage effects and adapt. 
If all humans were contributing equally to climate 
change, the emergence of winners and losers might 
be considered an inevitable outcome of human devel-
opment. However, all humans are not contributing 
equally. The drivers of global environmental change—
such as fossil fuel consumption, urban and coastal 
development, industrialization, deforestation, and other 
land use changes—are also inequitable and can be dis-
proportionately attributed to some nations, regions, and 
social groups. In general, higher consumers of energy 
are making a more substantial contribution to climate 
change than are lower energy consumers. Moreover, all 
humans do not have an equal voice—or in some cases 
any form of representation—in key decisions about 
energy usage patterns, land use changes, industrial 
emissions, and so forth even though these decisions 
affect the integrity of the ecological systems on which 
all humans and all other species depend. Equity is thus 
at the heart of the climate change issue.23
This question of equity is being addressed in several ways. 
Two of these ways, involving the Arctic and SIDS, are discussed 
below.
The petition requested  
“relief from human rights 
violations resulting from  
the impacts of global warming 
and climate change caused  
by acts and omissions of  
the United States.”
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the inuit anD human RightS
In 2005, sixty-two Inuit in the Canadian and Alaskan Arc-
tic regions filed a petition with the Organization of American 
States Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Led by 
Sheila Watt-Cloutier, the petition requested “relief from human 
rights violations resulting from the impacts of global warming 
and climate change caused by acts and omissions of the United 
States.”24 Erroneously reported in the media as a lawsuit, the 
Inuit were not seeking financial compensation but wished to 
demonstrate the link between global warming and its impact on 
their human rights. The petition requested a hearing, which took 
place on March 1, 2007, and asked for the commission to make 
an “onsite visit to investigate and confirm the harms suffered” 
by the people it named. The petition singled out the United 
States, the world’s largest GHG emitter, because it has “repeat-
edly declined to take steps to regulate and reduce its emissions 
of the gases responsible for climate change.”25
The petition argued that United States is in breach of both 
human rights law and its international environmental obliga-
tions. The impacts of climate change—“caused by acts and 
omissions”—by the United States 
violate the Inuit’s fundamental human rights protected 
by the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man and other international instruments. These include 
their rights to the benefits of culture, to property, to the 
preservation of health, life, physical integrity, security, 
and a means of subsistence, and to residence, move-
ment, and inviolability of the home.26
As redress, the Inuit requested that the Commission prepare 
a report “declaring that the United States of America is interna-
tionally responsible for violations of rights affirmed in the Amer-
ican Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and in other 
instruments of international law.”27 They called for the United 
States to adopt “mandatory measures to limit its emissions of 
greenhouse gases”28 and work towards global limits. The peti-
tion also called for the United States to “take into account” the 
impact on the Inuit “before approving all major government 
actions” and to work with the Inuit on “a plan to protect Inuit 
culture and resources.”29 Finally, it called for “a plan to provide 
assistance necessary for Inuit to adapt to the impacts of climate 
change that cannot be avoided.”30
To date, other than holding a hearing, the Commission has 
taken no action. However, the very fact that the Inuit filed a peti-
tion garnered enormous attention in the United States and around 
the world. As a tool to publicize the situation facing one of the 
world’s most vulnerable regions, the petition was a success. 
More recently, lawyers for the Alaskan Native coastal vil-
lage of Kivalina, which is being forced to relocate because of 
flooding caused by the changing Arctic climate, filed suit in U.S. 
federal court “arguing that 5 oil companies, 14 electric utilities 
and the country’s largest coal company were responsible for the 
village’s woes.”31
The human rights implications of climate change are being 
explored in a number of different fora outside the Arctic and 
SIDS context. In January 2007, the African Union issued a dec-
laration on climate change and development that called on the 
international community to meet its obligations to cut green-
house gases and strengthen African institutions to help them 
address impacts and adaptation.32 
In November 2007, just prior to the UNFCCC meeting 
in Bali, members of the Association of Small Island States 
(“AOSIS”) meeting in the Maldives signed the Male’ Dec-
laration on the Human Dimensions of Climate Change. The 
declaration calls for the UNFCCC to assess the human rights 
implications of climate change, asks the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights to “conduct a detailed study into the effects 
of climate change on the full enjoyment of human rights, which 
includes relevant conclusions and recommendations” and for the 
UN Human Rights Council to hold a special debate on climate 
change and human rights.33
In March 2008, the Advisory Council of Jurists of the Asia 
Pacific Forum released a study that said climate change will have 
“‘catastrophic’ effects on the physical and social landscape of 
the Asia Pacific” and recommended that “the right to a healthy 
environment be protected by human rights law.”34
many StRong voiceS – the aRctic anD Small 
iSlanD Developing StateS woRking togetheR
Our rights, our human rights that we share with all of 
you—to live as we do and to enjoy our unique culture 
as part of the globe’s cultural heritage, are at issue. 
The Arctic dimension and Inuit perspectives on global 
climate change need to be heard in the corridors of 
power.35
There are voices always heard, and voices seldom heard, 
in the discussions about climate change. People in vulnerable 
regions are usually among the latter. However, as this Article 
has shown, there are ways for these voices to be heard—in the 
scientific research and in political lobbying. “Given the similar 
levels of impact, peoples of the Arctic are working together with 
people in the small islands of the South Pacific, Caribbean and 
elsewhere to cooperate on ensuring that the moral imperative of 
taking action on climate change is heard.”36
In 2004, representatives of the Inuit Circumpolar Confer-
ence, SIDS, and UNEP/GRID-Arendal began discussing the 
need for a joint effort to raise awareness about the effects of Cli-
mate Change in the world’s most vulnerable regions. Although 
small in number, the people of the Arctic and SIDS had partici-
pated vigorously in a number of international negotiating pro-
cesses, including the UNFCCC. 
In August 2005, Premier Hans Enoksen of Greenland urged 
Environment Ministers from twenty-five countries meeting in 
Ilulissat to “bring vulnerable regions of the globe together so 
that we may learn from each other and work with each other 
internationally.”37 Premier Enoksen went on to say that “the 
Arctic, the Small Island Developing States, low lying states, and 
sub-Sahara states in Africa need to help each other.”38
These discussions led to the development of the Many 
Strong Voices programme.39 With support from the government 
of Norway, the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation in Can-
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ada, the UN Foundation, the U.S. National Science Foundation, 
and The Christensen Fund, the MSV programme focuses on the 
similar concerns and needs of the Arctic and SIDS. MSV is a 
consortium of Indigenous Peoples Organizations, researchers, 
policy-makers, and community organizations.40 Over the next 
five years it will:
•  Carry out comparative climate change vulnerability and 
adaptation research in the SIDS; 
•  Exchange knowledge to help develop regionally-appro-
priate climate change adaptation strategies;
•  Produce communications, outreach, and education tools 
that will raise the profile of their regions, highlight their 
concerns, and enable communities to outline their own 
solutions; and
•  Combine regional research, the design of adaptation strat-
egies, and communications efforts to increase the vis-
ibility of these regions, enhance their influence on global 
dialogues on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and 
facilitate the articulation of their adaptation needs.
An important focus of attention, though not the only one, 
is on negotiations leading to a post-2012 climate change accord 
to replace the Kyoto Protocol. Participants in the Many Strong 
Voices are working together to ensure that their voices are heard 
in discussions on emissions reduction and adaptation in the pro-
cess outlined in the Bali Action Plan, which was produced at the 
December 2007 COP. MSV produced a common message and 
position for the last COP and called for: 
•  Agreement to achieve a peak in global GHG emissions 
by no later than 2020, and an eighty percent reduction in 
global emissions by 2050. 
•  Ways to ensure that indigenous and other people from 
vulnerable regions can provide meaningful input into the 
UNFCCC’s ongoing work on adaptation. 
•  Adequate funding from major emitting nations to provide 
the resources necessary for adaptation at regional and 
local levels in vulnerable areas. 
ConCluSion
MSV participants agree with one of the key conclusions 
of the 2006 Stern Review: “An effective response to climate 
change will depend on creating the conditions for international 
collective action.”41 
This action must happen on a number of fronts. For vul-
nerable regions and peoples, it means lobbying at the UNFCCC 
negotiations, focusing on the equity and human rights impli-
cations of climate change. It means pushing for a post-Kyoto 
agreement that recognizes the special circumstances and needs 
of the people in the Arctic and SIDS. The Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment was referring to the people of the Arctic, but the 
words can be applied to all vulnerable regions. For people 
“whose future is at stake, having the ability to make choices and 
changes is a matter of survival, to which all available resources 
must be applied.”42
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Managing arctic Fish stocks
by Michael Distefano*
* Michael Distefano is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University, 
Washington College of Law.
Humans depend on marine fish stocks for economic and nutritional purposes throughout the world. Conse-quently, commercial fleets and super-trawlers are noth-
ing new and many countries have found ways to regulate fleet 
sizes and catch limits within their territorial waters. But some-
thing new is happening in the Arctic Circle. As sea ice begins 
to disappear during summer months, a previously inaccessible 
fishing ground is emerging, and like all fishing grounds, it will 
be susceptible to mismanagement and exploitation.
Those who understand the 
danger have already begun to 
take action. On August 3, 2007, 
Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) 
introduced a joint resolution, 
Senate Joint Resolution 17, that 
calls on the United States to ini-
tiate international discussions 
and take necessary steps with 
other Arctic nations to negoti-
ate an agreement for managing 
migratory and transboundary 
fish stocks.1 The resolution 
passed the Senate on October 4, 
2007 and is currently pending in 
the House.2 The resolution is an attempt to meet the changing 
Arctic environment with an orderly and sustainable framework 
to manage regional fisheries.
Gradually warming ocean temperatures have caused many 
species of fish to migrate north in search of cold-water habitats. 
At the same time, changes in Arctic sea ice have made the north-
ern seas increasingly more navigable. Last summer, for the first 
time since satellite measurements began, a fully navigable route 
opened between the Atlantic and Pacific.3 This “Northwest Pas-
sage” was widely covered in the media and some scientists pre-
dict that an iceless Arctic Ocean could be the norm by 2040.4
The concurrence of receding Arctic ice and north-bound 
fish stocks is already creating an environment favorable to com-
mercial fishing, and Senator Stevens’ proposed legislation is an 
attempt to make sure this transition is handled in an effective 
and responsible way. The resolution calls for the creation of a 
new international fisheries management organization for the 
region and seeks a halt in the expansion of Arctic commercial 
fishing activities until this is achieved.5 
Successful fishery management programs employ “science-
based limits on harvest, timely and accurate reporting of catch 
data, equitable allocation and access systems, and effective 
monitoring and enforcement.”6 This approach protects not only 
fish species, but also billions of dollars in commerce and tens 
of thousands of jobs. Iceland, for example, relies on commer-
cial fishing for nearly seventy percent of its income.7 When a 
particular stock is overfished, smaller and immature fish make 
up a greater percentage of the catch, and the stock’s regenera-
tive capabilities may be seriously undermined. The result is a 
reduction in overall fishing hauls and a negative ripple effect on 
the food chain. Simply put, all countries and all people have a 
marked interest in ensuring global fish stocks remain healthy and 
sustainable over the long term.
This is by no means the first 
attempt at regulating regional 
fish stocks. Successful catch-
share programs are already 
employed in nations such as 
Iceland, New Zealand, and the 
United States. Observers hail 
Alaska as a world leader in man-
aging commercial and recre-
ational fish stocks—as the state 
harvests over fifty percent of 
U.S. seafood without overfish-
ing any of its stocks.8 Alaska’s 
marine fisheries are managed by 
the North Pacific Fishery Man-
agement Council (“NPFMC”), a federally mandated council that 
is lending its support to S.J. Res. 17 and actually preempted the 
resolution by calling for a ban on Arctic fishing until a sustain-
able management scheme is developed. 
Former chairman of the NPFMC, David Benton, points out 
that even the most competent fishery regulation will be unsuc-
cessful without the support of other Arctic nations such as 
Canada, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Russia, and the European 
Union.9 When nations perceive the opportunity to claim a stra-
tegic resource, they may end up in a scramble for the first foot-
hold, or worse yet, attempt to gather as much of that resource as 
they can before others get the opportunity. 
In the past, management schemes were afterthoughts—they 
developed around marine regions that were heavily fished, and 
in many cases, there was already damage that would take genera-
tions to mend.10 In this case, however, there is an opportunity to 
get things right at the beginning. Senator Stevens’ resolution is a 
welcome move, but it is merely a start. With any luck, the House 
will pass the resolution soon, and the real work can begin. 
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Climate Change and Biodiversity  
in Polar regions 
by Dr. Ahmed Djoghlaf*
introduction
Polar ecosystems are home to an array of plants and ani-mals that survive in some of the most extreme condi-tions in the world. For example, the seas surrounding the 
Antarctic are rich in plankton, which support a rich marine food 
chain, while the Arctic itself sup-
ports many mammals and plays 
an important role in the annual 
cycle of migratory birds. The 
scientific studies carried out at 
the occasion of the celebration 
of the International Polar Year 
have provided additional evi-
dence of the rich, unique nature 
of the marine Arctic environ-
ment. Indeed the biodiversity of 
the Arctic is fundamental to the 
livelihoods of Arctic peoples. 
However, the Millennium Eco-
system Assessment, along with recent reports from the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change, have made us aware that 
climate change negatively impacts existing ecosystems and is 
one of the main drivers of biodiversity loss.1 Particular atten-
tion is now being paid to Polar Regions, where evidence of 
the impacts of climate change have been observed and widely 
reported. Indeed, Polar Regions are currently experiencing some 
of the most rapid and severe climate change on Earth, which 
will contribute to environmental and socio-economic changes, 
many of which have already begun. During the twentieth cen-
tury, Arctic air temperatures increased by approximately five 
degrees Celsius, which is an increase that is ten times faster than 
the observed global-mean surface temperature.2 An additional 
warming of about four to seven degrees Celsius in the Arctic is 
predicted over the next hundred years.3 Moreover, Polar Regions 
are particularly threatened by climate change since Polar species 
and societies have developed very specialized adaptations to the 
harsh conditions found at the poles, thus making them extremely 
vulnerable to dramatic changes in these conditions.
obServed and projected impactS
Walruses, polar bears, seals, and other marine mammals that 
rely on sea ice for resting, feeding, hunting, and breeding are 
particularly threatened by climate change. For example, studies 
reveal that in 1980, the average weight of female polar bears in 
western Hudson Bay, Canada, was 650 pounds. While in 2004, 
their average weight was only 507 pounds.4 It is believed that the 
progressively earlier breakup of the Arctic sea ice is responsible 
for the decrease in the polar bears’ average weight,5 as this ice 
loss reduces their hunting season and food intake. Although for 
a different reason, reduced sea-ice extent is also believed to have 
caused a fifty percent decline in 
emperor penguin populations in 
Terre Adélie.6 Populations of 
krill and other small organisms 
may also decline as ice recedes.7 
Due to the high importance of 
krill in various food chains, the 
entire marine food web could 
be adversely affected.8
Climate change is already 
affecting the livelihood of 
indigenous peoples in the Arc-
tic. Losses in biodiversity affect 
the traditional practices of 
indigenous people, particularly fishing and hunting. For exam-
ple, the Saami people have observed changes in reindeer grazing 
pastures, while the Inuit people of Canada have observed reduc-
tions in the ringed seal population, their single most important 
source of food.9
climate change and indigenouS and 
 local communitieS in the arctic
Due to its unique nature, climate, and sensitivity to climate 
changes, the Arctic is an important early warning system as far 
as climate change is concerned. The findings of the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change show that eleven of the last 
twelve years (1995–2006) rank among the twelve warmest years 
in the instrumental record of global surface temperatures since 
1850.10 In the past one hundred years, average temperatures in 
the Arctic increased by almost twice the global average rate.11 
Consequently, the annual average Arctic sea ice extent has 
shrunk by 2.1 to 3.1 percent per decade. Further, temperatures 
at the top of the permafrost layer have generally increased up 
to three degrees Celsius since the 1980s.12 It is projected that 
higher temperatures will contribute to continuing snow contrac-
tion and widespread increases in thaw depth over permafrost 
regions. Also, the gradual melting of the Greenland ice sheet is 
* Dr. Ahmed Djoghlaf is the Executive Secretary of the  Convention on Biological 
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projected to contribute to sea level rise, even beyond the year 
2100.13 
The consequences of climate change are becoming more 
visible in the Arctic, and are greatly influencing the environ-
ment, animals, and living conditions of humans, especially the 
indigenous peoples who strongly depend on the Arctic eco-
system and natural resources. The Arctic indigenous peoples, 
their life, culture, and traditional knowledge, are adapted to and 
largely dependent on the cold and extreme physical conditions 
of the region. Over the years, they have adapted to the chal-
lenges brought about by the 
Arctic geography and climate. 
Although the Arctic climate 
has always undergone change, 
the ongoing changes in the cli-
mate are taking place at such 
an alarming speed that indige-
nous communities are having 
severe difficulties coping. 
The Arctic Climate 
Im pact Assessment (“ACIA”), 
commissioned by the Arctic 
Council,14 provides impor-
tant insight into the impacts 
of climate change in the Arctic region.15 Over a period of five 
years, an international team of over three hundred scientists, oth-
ers experts, and members of indigenous communities prepared 
this assessment. The ACIA Report identifies a range of climate 
change impacts including: rising temperatures in the Arctic 
with worldwide implications; shifts in Arctic vegetation zones; 
changes in animal species’ diversity, ranges, and distribution; 
and increased exposure to storms by coastal communities.16
The ACIA Report devotes a separate chapter to address 
matters concerning the changing Arctic from an indigenous 
perspective. Indigenous peoples have provided case studies 
addressing the situation in Kotzebue, the Aleutian and Pribilof 
Islands Region, the Yukon Territory, Denendeh, Nunavut, 
Greenland, Sápmi, and Kola. An important common theme or 
observation in the case studies is that the weather in the Arctic 
region has become more variable and less predictable by tradi-
tional means.17
The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment recognizes that fur-
ther research is required to understand environmental changes 
occurring in the Arctic, as well as the ways in which people view 
these changes. It states that in both cases, there is a growing, but 
still insufficient, body of research to draw on, in particular in 
those Arctic areas where few or no current records of indigenous 
observations are available. The assessment concludes that fur-
ther research needs to detect and interpret climate change, and to 
determine appropriate response strategies.
aDaptation optionS
Through the adoption of biodiversity-friendly adaptive and 
mitigative strategies, the resilience of ecosystems to the impacts 
of climate change can be enhanced, and the risk of damage to 
human and natural ecosystems reduced. Biodiversity is essen-
tial to the maintenance and delivery of many ecosystem services 
including the provision of food and fodder, nutrient cycling, and 
the maintenance of hydrological flows. As such, maintaining 
biodiversity is an important component of adaptation planning. 
Maintaining the ability of resilient species to adapt is critical 
because climate change will favour species that are better able 
to adapt to changing climatic conditions. In addition, the reduc-
tion of other stressors, such as permafrost degradation, chemical 
pollution, over-fishing, land-use changes (including unsustain-
able development), and habitat 
fragmentation could improve 
polar ecosystems’ resilience to 
climate change. 
Adaptation activities can 
and should make use of local 
and indigenous knowledge, and 
include their full and effective 
participation. Indeed, indigenous 
peoples can contribute to the 
understanding of changes in the 
Arctic through their observations 
and perspectives on changes 
in biodiversity and ecosystem 
functioning. For example, the Inuvialuit Hunters and Trappers in 
Canada’s High Arctic, along with the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (“IISD”), initiated a year-long project 
to document Arctic climate change and communicate it to Cana-
dian and international audiences. During the initiative, a video 
and several scientific journal articles were produced to commu-
nicate the negative impacts of climate change observed in the 
Arctic and to understand the adaptive strategies that local people 
are using in response.18 
the path aheaD
The Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”) estab-
lishes the international framework for biodiversity conserva-
tion, and very early on looked into the relationship between 
biodiversity and climate change. The CBD integrated climate 
change components within all of the programmes of work of 
the Convention, with the exception of technology transfer and 
cooperation. The Convention has also built synergies with the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
and convened an Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on climate 
change and biodiversity. The Secretariat of the Convention has 
also initiated an exhibition of indigneous and local communities 
highly vulnerable to climate change, as well as calling for the 
“International Expert Meeting on Responses to Climate Change 
for Indigenous and Local Communities and the Impact on Their 
Traditional Knowledge related to Biological Diversity—The 
Arctic Region,” which was held in Helsinki, Finland, March 
25–28, 2008.
There remains, however, a number of challenges and oppor-
tunities for the further development of interlinkages between 
biodiversity and climate change. These include capacity bulid-
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ing, mainstreaming, communication and awareness raising, and 
research and technology.
Indigenous and local communities’ traditional knowledge, 
innovations, and practices are an inseparable part of their cul-
ture, social structures, economy, livelihoods, beliefs, tradi-
tions, customs, customary law, health, and relationship to the 
local environment. The totality of all such elements makes their 
knowledge, innovations, and practices vital in relation to bio-
logical diversity and sustainable development. Consequently, 
serious adverse climate change impacts on indigenous and local 
communities, in particular the multiple impacts, will also have 
adverse consequences on the elements that the Convention on 
Biological Diversity identifies as their “knowledge, innovations, 
and practices.” Indeed, Article 8(j) of the Convention acknowl-
edges the knowledge, innovation, and practices of indigenous 
and local communities, and promotes its wider application in the 
context of conservation and sustainable use of biological diver-
sity. The Convention established specific obligations for State 
parties to respect, preserve, and maintain such knowledge, inno-
vations, and practices, as far as this is possible, and as appropri-
ate within the framework of their respective national legislation 
and subject to the approval of the knowledge holders.19 In light 
of the accelerated threats caused by climate change, it is neces-
sary for Party States to adopt political, administrative, and legal 
measures to protect and maintain the knowledge, innovations, 
and practices of indigenous and local communities. Such mea-
sures should be developed with full and effective participation 
of the representatives of indigenous and local communities. 
ConCluSion
Recent scientific assessments have provided clear evidence 
of the impacts of climate change on the biodiversity of Polar 
Regions, and how this in turn affects indigenous and local com-
munities. A number of reports also illustrate the contribution of 
biodiversity to adaptation to climate change. Therefore, through 
its various programmes and cross-cutting issues, the Conven-
tion seeks to address all threats to biodiversity and ecosystem 
services including threats from climate change through sci-
entific assessments, the development of tools, incentives and 
processes, the transfer of technologies and good practices, and 
the full and active involvement of relevant partners including 
Governments, Parties, indigenous and local communities, youth, 
NGOs, and Women. It is also for this reason that the interna-
tional community celebrated the International Day on Biological 
Diversity on May 22, 2007 under the theme “Biodiversity and 
Climate Change.” In his message delivered for this occasion, the 
United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, reminded 
the international community that the conservation and sustain-
able use of biodiversity is an essential element of any strategy to 
adapt to climate change. He also stated:
Through the Convention on Biological Diversity and 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, the international community is committed to 
conserving biodiversity and combating climate change. 
The global response to these challenges needs to move 
much more rapidly, and with more determination at all 
levels—global, national and local. For the sake of cur-
rent and future generations, we must achieve the goals 
of these landmark instruments.20 
Therefore, because every person on this planet, whether 
they know it or not, draws on biodiversity for their daily lives, 
and because climate change is a global problem, protecting 
the biodiversity of Polar Regions from the impacts of climate 
change requires a multi-layered web of intersecting initiatives 
involving all stakeholders and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity has to play a crucial role. The international community 
is called upon to redouble its effort to achieve the Johannesburg 
Bio diversity Target, which is aimed at substantially reducing the 
rate of biodiversity decline by 2010. The celebration in 2010 of 
the International Year on Biodiversity will offer a unique oppor-
tunity to keep the momentum generated by the International 
Polar Year going. 
1 See Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-
 being: Current State and Trends, Vol. 1, 2005; see also Intergovernmental 
Panel on ClImate Change, ClImate Change 2007: SyntheSIS rePort, 2007.
2 Convention on Biological Diversity, Booklet for International Day for 
 Biological Diversity, Biodiversity and Climate Change, 12 (2007), available at 
http://www.cbd.int/doc/bioday/2007/ibd-2007-booklet-01-en.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2008) [hereinafter CBD Booklet].
3 arCtIC ClImate ImPaCt aSSeSSment [aCIa], ImPaCtS of a WarmIng arCtIC: 
arCtIC ClImate ImPaCt aSSeSSment (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004). 
4 NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, Warming Climate May Put Chill on 
Arctic Polar Bear Population (Sept. 13, 2006), available at http://www.nasa.
gov/centers/goddard/news/topstory/2006/polar_bears.html (last visited Apr. 13, 
2008).
5 NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, id.
6 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, CBD Technical Series 
No. 10, Interlinkages between biological diversity and climate change: Advice 
on the integration of biodiversity considerations into the implementation of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto 
protocol (2003), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-ts-10.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2008). 
7 U.N. Env’t Program [UNEP], How Will Global Warming Affect my World? 
(2003).
8 See Virginia Gascón & Rodolfo Werner, CCAMLR and Antarctic Krill: 
 Ecosystem Management Around the Great White Continent, SuStaInable Dev. 
l. & Pol’y, Fall 2006, at 14.
9 CBD Booklet, supra note 2, at 13.
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False sanctuary: the australian antarctic  
Whale sanctuary and long-term stability in antarctica
by Donald K. Anton*
introDuction
The 1959 Antarctic Treaty
1 and the subsequent allied 
international legal agreements (and related measures) 
that comprise the Antarctic Treaty System (“ATS”),2 
is fast approaching its golden 
anniversary.3 From a contem-
porary perspective, it is hard to 
imagine Antarctica without some 
established form of legal gov-
ernance—a non-juridical Ant-
arctica. Like a number of other 
perceived essentials, it seems 
certain if the ATS did not exist, 
“it would have to be invented.”4 
This is especially true today when 
global contact with Antarctica in 
terms of science, exploration, 
exploitation of marine resources, 
and tourism continues to expand 
and grow in importance.5 In these circumstances, the presence 
of effective regulation which serves as a driver of international 
cooperation is more and more imperative.
As attention to Antarctica has increased over the past 
 forty-nine years, the ATS has been subject to periodic pressures 
and tensions, but especially so since the end of the 1970s. From 
at least 1975, differences (sometimes acrimonious) concern-
ing Antarctic resources, access, and governance began to make 
themselves felt between and across groups of claimant and non-
claimant states,6 parties and non-parties,7 and developed and 
developing states.8 The ATS, however, has proved remarkably 
resilient. As an early example of a “framework” treaty,9 it has 
withstood some formidable challenges to both its legitimacy 
and effectiveness.10 In contemporary international environmen-
tal law circles, the ATS is one of the two treaty regimes11 most 
often cited as an example of success.12 Its collective value is 
rightly viewed as much “greater than just the sum of its various 
parts.”13 Given the underlying stakes in Antarctica—including 
contentious issues tied to: (1) latent (but certainly not forgot-
ten) territorial claims; (2) the exercise of jurisdiction; and (3) 
governance decision-making—the ability of the ATS to adapt 
and retain currency has been remarkable and holds a number of 
lessons in normativity and diplomacy.14
The ATS though, like everything else, has vulnerabilities.15 
Given the right set of circumstances, the equilibrium of the ATS 
could be upset, with resulting turmoil within the system and 
increasing pressures from outside. Over the life of the ATS, dif-
ficult political circumstances have occasioned others to sound 
the alarm at times of increased tensions.16 It is not difficult to see 
why. It seems hard to argue that the failure of the ATS would be 
anything but bad; not least because there is no existing alternative 
vehicle for international coop-
eration and governance in Ant-
arctica.17 Among other things, 
the failure of the ATS would 
create international instabil-
ity, uncertainty, and increased 
tensions in relation to Antarc-
tic activities and resources. It 
would no doubt see the revival 
of competing, conflicting, and 
unrecognized claims that have 
been “frozen” for nearly fifty 
years.18 Today’s claims, how-
ever, would be pressed in a 
world where increasing popula-
tion and resource scarcity are much greater than when the claims 
were “frozen.” It is easy to imagine the heightened instability, 
competition, and tension this would create. Accordingly, threats 
to the ATS pose serious risks and ought to be avoided. 
While the ATS is not near collapse, or even nearing cri-
sis, the recent assertion of maritime jurisdiction by Australian 
courts over a Japanese whaling company for acts contrary to 
Australian law in the Antarctic Southern Ocean is alarming.19 
The exercise of jurisdiction by Australia over non-nationals in 
this way makes its claim of territorial sovereignty in Antarctica 
real again. As Professor Bilder noted, “so long as jurisdictional 
rights are restricted [to nationals in Antarctica,] the issues of ter-
ritorial claims remain largely theoretical.”20 Once the genie is 
out of the bottle, it has the potential to excite in other states a 
new “territorial temptation”21 seaward in Antarctica, and with it, 
the potential for a fundamental destabilization of the ATS. 
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The humane SocieTy  
inTernaTional liTigaTion22
On January 15, 2008, the Federal Court of Australia issued 
declaratory relief and an injunction against Kyodo Senpaku 
Kaisha Ltd. (“Kyodo”), a Japanese whaling company operat-
ing in the Southern Ocean, including in the Australian Whale 
Sanctuary (“AWS”) within a claimed Exclusive Economic Zone 
(“EEZ”) off the Australian Antarctic Territory (“AAT”). The 
court declared that Kyodo had breached sections 229–232 and 
238 of the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conserva-
tion Act 1999 (Cth) (“EPBC Act”) by killing, treating, and pos-
sessing whales in the AWS in the EEZ adjacent to the AAT.23 It 
also enjoined Kyodo from the further killing, injuring, taking, or 
interfering with any Antarctic minke whale, fin whale, or hump-
back whale in the AWS adjacent to the AAT.24
ApplicAtion for leAve to Serve proceSS in JApAn
The case was brought in 2004 by Humane Society Interna-
tional (“HSI”), which sued Kyodo for alleged illegal whaling 
under Australian federal law, seeking the declaration and injunc-
tion ultimately granted.25 The law giving rise to the action, 
including legal standing for HSI,26 is found in the EPBC Act.27 
The AWS is established under section 225, Part 13, Division 3, 
Subdivision B of the Act. By virtue of sections 5(1), 5(4), and 
5(5) of the EPBC Act, section 8 of the Australian Antarctic Ter-
ritory Act 1954 (Cth), section 10 of the Seas and Submerged 
Lands Act 1973 (Cth) and the 1994 Proclamation of the EEZ 
adjacent to the AAT,28 the AWS applies to the declared AAT 
EEZ. Sections 229 and 230 of the EPBC Act make it unlawful to 
kill, injure, take, interfere with, treat, or possess whales without 
an Australian permit, within the AWS.29 The offence provisions 
expressly apply to both Australian nationals and non-nationals 
within the AWS, but only to non-nationals beyond the outer lim-
its of the AWS.30
One of the elements that the applicant had to satisfy in order 
to be granted leave to serve process in Japan was that the viola-
tion complained of took place “in the Commonwealth.”31 Such 
an investigation, while dictated by Australian law, is also neces-
sary in determining the international legality of the exercise of 
Australian prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction in relation 
to the AAT EEZ. Initially, Justice Allsop was prepared to treat 
as conclusive the determination of the boundaries of the Com-
monwealth by the Executive Branch of government, including 
the EEZ.32 
Before denying the initial application for leave to serve pro-
cess, Justice Allsop took the extraordinary step of inviting the 
amicus curiae intervention of the Attorney-General to provide 
the government’s views on the application of “legislation and 
treaties involved . . . in light of what might be seen to be Austra-
lia’s national interest, including . . . relations between Australia 
and Japan.”33 The Attorney-General stated that “an assertion of 
jurisdiction by an Australian court over claims concerning rights 
and obligations in the [EEZ of the AAT] would or may pro-
voke an international disagreement with Japan, undermine the 
status quo attending the Antarctic Treaty, and ‘be contrary to 
Australia’s long term national interests.’”34 According to Justice 
Allsop, this view was based on the recognition of three reali-
ties by the government. First, Japan would regard enforcement 
of the EPBC Act against Japanese vessels and its nationals in 
the AAT EEZ as a breach of international law.35 Second, the 
exercise of enforcement jurisdiction against foreigners gener-
ally in the AAT EEZ, based on the Australian territorial claim, 
would “prompt a significant adverse reaction from other Antarc-
tic Treaty Parties.”36 Third, the Australian government has not 
enforced the Australian law in Antarctica against the nationals 
of other state parties, except where there has been voluntary sub-
mission to Australian law.37
In accepting that exercising jurisdiction might upset dip-
lomatic concord under the Antarctic Treaty and be contrary to 
Australia’s national interest, Justice Allsop also stated that any 
injunctive relief granted would ultimately be futile because of 
“the difficulty, if not impossibility, of enforcement of any court 
order”38 and could place the Federal Court “at the centre of an 
international dispute . . . between Australia and friendly foreign 
power.”39 As a result, Allsop ruled that he “should not exercise 
a discretion to place the Court in such a position” and denied the 
application for leave to serve process in Japan.40
Significantly, following the intervention of the Attorney-
General, Allsop appeared prepared to return to consider the mer-
its of the validity of the Australian claim to jurisdiction in the 
AAT EEZ as a predicate to granting or denying leave to serve 
process related to an event occurring “in the Commonwealth.” 
Allsop raised the issue of whether all “the area” of Southern 
Ocean south of 60º South Latitude, in which the AAT EEZ is 
claimed, is high seas (in which an EEZ may not exist) because 
Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty protects “the rights . . . of any 
State under international law with regard to the high seas within 
that area.” 41 In fact, however, it seems that Allsop was really 
interested in how Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty and its pro-
hibition on making any “new claim, or enlargement of an exist-
ing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica” might bear on 
the proclamation of Australia to an Antarctic EEZ in 1994. 
In particular, Allsop noted the submission by the Attorney-
General that there is a distinction between the “enlargement of 
an existing claim to territorial sovereignty” and the claim of 
Australia to an Antarctic EEZ:
it was submitted on behalf of the Attorney-General, 
[that] the claim of Australia to the Antarctic EEZ is 
not one of sovereignty in the full sense over the waters 
adjacent to the Antarctic Territory (except for the ter-
ritorial sea), but of claims . . . to exercise the rights of 
exploitation, conservation, management and control, 
and enforcement thereof, given to coastal States by 
UNCLOS. . . . The recognition of the limitations (short 
of full claims to sovereignty) of Australia’s claims to the 
Antarctic EEZ becomes important in assessing whether 
. . . the acts of the respondent and the contraventions 
of the EPBC Act took place “in the Commonwealth.”42
In the end, however, Allsop did not decide on the operative 
effect of Article IV of the Treaty in relation to the declared AAT 
19 SuStainable Development law & policy
EEZ. Instead, he used the submission by the Attorney-General 
to contrast it with the contrary position of Japan (and most of 
the rest of the world). Allsop noted that “[a]s far as Japan is 
concerned, the Australian Antarctic EEZ is the high seas which 
is not subject to any legitimate control by Australia under 
UNCLOS and domestic legislation provided for thereby (such 
as the EPBC Act).”43 The conflicting positions thus contrasted, 
Allsop accepted the Attor-
ney-General’s position that 
international discord that 
would follow by granting 
leave to serve process and 
it became “unnecessary to 
decide whether the Antarctic 
EEZ is, or can be seen as, ‘in 
the Commonwealth.’ ” 44 
Significantly too, Allsop 
noted cultural differences 
with respect to whaling and 
hinted that the current stigma 
attached to whaling might 
signal a move away from 
conservation and sustainable 
utilization to a wish by some 
to preserve charismatic mega-
fauna at all costs.45 Allsop 
explained:
The whales being killed . . . are seen by some as not 
merely a natural resource that is important to con-
serve, but as living creatures of intelligence and of 
great importance not only for the animal world, but 
for humankind and that to slaughter them . . . is deeply 
wrong. These views are not shared by all. . . . They 
are views which, at an international level, are mediated 
through the Whaling Commission and its procedures, 
by reference to the Whaling Convention and the views 
of nation States. They are views . . . that contain a num-
ber of normative and judgmental premises . . . which 
do not arise in any simple application of domestic law, 
but which do, or may, arise in a wider international 
context.46
The AppeAl
On appeal, a Full Bench of the Federal Court reversed Jus-
tice Allsop. Taking a more dualistic, traditional approach to the 
underlying legal and international relations issues, none of the 
appellate judges gave any weight to the international political 
considerations raised by the Attorney-General. Even the dissent 
was in agreement on this point, stating that:
[c]ourts must be prepared to hear and determine matters 
whatever their political sensitivity either domestically 
or internationally. To approach the matter otherwise, 
is to compromise the role of the courts as a forum in 
which rights can be vindicated whatever the subject 
matter of the proceedings.47
The majority held that the action was made clearly justi-
ciable by the Australian Parliament under the EPBC Act and 
related authority. The court had clear jurisdiction. The applicant 
had clear standing. Accordingly, jurisdiction could be assumed 
by service or submission and questions of futility would arise, 
if at all, at the time of the issuance of injunctive or declaratory 
relief. 
The TriAl
On remand, the matter was 
heard in September 2007. Kyodo, 
as expected, did not appear. Instead 
of relying on a default, HSI pro-
ceeded to prove the facts support-
ing its claim for declarative and 
injunctive relief. Following the 
guidance provided by the majority 
of the Full Federal Court on Appeal 
regarding public interest injunc-
tions, Allsop granted the declara-
tion and injunction sought by HSI. 
This, of course, raises the prospect 
of contempt proceedings in Austra-
lian courts if Kyodo does not com-
ply with the injunction in future 
whaling seasons.48 It also raises 
the question of whether the Federal government is prepared to 
enforce the injunction in the event of violation by intercepting 
and seizing Kyodo ships operating in the AAT EEZ. Indeed, it 
has the potential to bring the unilateral exercise of Australia pre-
scriptive, adjudicative, and enforcement jurisdiction to bear on 
ships and individuals in an area that almost all other states view 
as the high seas and, if they are correct, are thus subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state.49 
Expanding jurisdiction this dramatically is clearly inconsis-
tent with uniform past Australian practice not to enforce Austra-
lian laws against non-nationals in Antarctica.50 Yet, in the 2007 
national election campaign, the newly elected Labor govern-
ment pledged to “enforce Australian law banning the slaughter 
of whales in the Australian Whale Sanctuary.”51 Additionally, 
the Australian Government Solicitor wrote to Justice Allsop in 
December 2007 during the trial of the HSI case on instructions 
from the new Attorney-General. The letter stated that the court 
should not rely on the views of the Attorney-General of the pre-
vious government. Instead, the letter highlighted that the new 
“Government believes that the matter would best be considered 
by the Court without the Government expressing its view.”52 
During the 2007–2008 Southern Hemisphere summer whal-
ing season that has just ended, the Australian government dis-
patched the Oceanic Viking to monitor whaling in the Southern 
Ocean, but it neither intercepted nor seized any Japanese whaler 
operating in the AAT EEZ. The government claimed that the 
Oceanic Viking was being used to collect evidence that might 
be used in international litigation challenging the lawfulness of 
Japanese whaling for “scientific purposes” under the Interna-
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tional Convention for the Regulation of Whaling.53 But, given 
the current government’s position, one is still left to wonder if 
it is only a matter of time before the Australian government will 
act against Japanese ships and Japanese nationals in the AAT 
EEZ. This makes it opportune, for the remainder of this Article, 
to consider the implications of such a possibility for stability in 
Antarctic governance.
implicationS for atS Stability
The HSI case establishes that the application and enforce-
ment of the AWS provisions as applied to the AAT under the 
EPBC Act in a private action, against Australian non-nationals, 
by Australian courts, is not barred by Australian law.54 From 
an international law perspective, this is unfortunate. It is even 
more so when one considers the 
ramifications for the stability of 
the ATS. 
In thinking about the use of 
jurisdiction established under 
Antarctic claims to territory and 
maritime zones as a way to pro-
vide protection to whales in the 
Southern Ocean, it is necessary 
to consider the nature of that 
jurisdiction. In turn, this requires 
a consideration of the ways in 
which both sovereignty and juris-
diction have been addressed by 
the ATS. In relation to the sov-
ereignty issue, it is important to recognize that Article IV of the 
Antarctic Treaty55 has not solved the conflict so much as it has 
structured a form of words that allow all parties to ambiguously 
look past the issue of territorial claims in order to identify with 
each other on agreed objectives.56 The admonition of Professor 
Watts is worth repeating here:
It does not overstate the case to say that Article IV is 
the cornerstone of the Antarctic Treaty and thus of the 
whole system that has grown up around it. The effec-
tiveness of that article has . . . kept Antarctica free of 
the conflicts to which its complex territorial situation 
would have been most likely to lead and generally has 
removed it from the usual range of international politi-
cal tensions.
 Yet, however satisfactory the results of Article IV 
have been so far, there are certain limits to its operation 
and effectiveness. These limits are sometimes obscured 
by the very success that Article IV has so far had and 
the tendency to get around its complex drafting by sum-
marizing its broad effect by some such phrase as that it 
“suspends sovereignty claims” in Antarctica or that it 
has put “sovereignty in abeyance.”
 What is important to always bear in mind is that 
the various national claims to and rights of sover-
eignty in Antarctica are still very much alive – as is 
equally the opposition to them of those states that do 
not recognize them. The underlying differences of view 
remain. In that sense, Article IV has not “solved” the 
problem. What it has done is provide a basis on which 
conflicts arising out of those continuing differences can 
be avoided.
 . . . Take Article IV away, and sovereignty rights 
and claims, and opposition to them, will immediately 
re-emerge, undiminished in vigor. In an extreme case, 
involving in some way the Antarctic Treaty or at least 
Article IV ceasing to be in force, the consequential pos-
sibility of a resurgence of conflicts over sovereignty is 
readily apparent.57
It is precisely this situation that the HSI case threatens. 
Absent agreement of the parties to introduce positive rules 
related to the exercise of juris-
diction in the Treaty Area over 
non-nationals,58 it seems almost 
certain that Australia’s asser-
tion of maritime jurisdiction 
over non-nationals will at the 
least create conditions for dis-
pute and discord. If other states 
were to follow Australia’s 
lead, in a worst case scenario, 
it might mean the end of the 
ATS altogether and the revival 
of old claims and assertion of a 
host of new claims. As Gillian 
Triggs observed in 1985:
Were Australia or any other claimant state to give effect 
to their views of Article IV of [Antarctic] Convention 
by, for example, exercising the customary jurisdiction 
of a coastal state in relation to waters adjacent to its 
sectoral claim in Antarctica, it is likely that the Con-
vention would break down.59
It is important to note that the ATS does not seek to regulate 
Antarctica and its marine environment in its entirety. Indeed, 
whales are expressly excluded from the ATS in a number of 
places and it is important to bear in mind that there are exist-
ing multilateral agreements that are both consistent with the 
ATS and do apply to whales in the seas adjacent to Antarctica. 
The purpose of this Article is not to identify all of these agree-
ments.60 Rather, the argument here is that the contentious and 
almost entirely unrecognized exercise of jurisdiction within the 
ATS over non-nationals in waters adjacent to Antarctica for the 
purpose of regulating whaling is unsound. It is likely to lead to 
less overall environmental protection in Antarctica if it engen-
ders conflict and competition. 
The crux of the HSI dispute (and any progeny it brings 
forth) is whaling. The long-running battle between the anti-
whaling forces and whalers is being played out in Australian 
courts because of the failure to address the issues within what 
is seen as a “dysfunctional” whaling regime.61 However, the 
Australian litigation involves what most other states will view 
as the unlawful exercise of Australian jurisdiction (based on its 
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Endnotes: False Sanctuary continued on page 61
Antarctic claim) in the Southern Ocean. This raises the very real 
prospect that the ongoing whaling dispute will have a detrimen-
tal “ripple effect” on the ATS (and perhaps even beyond).62 
Whaling is largely comprised of politics revolving around 
a single issue. The danger is that the issue of whales and whal-
ing might distort and obscure the larger environmental picture 
in Antarctica. This is especially true when contemporary inter-
national negotiations on whales and whaling within the Inter-
national Whaling Commission (“IWC”) often appear in many 
ways to be meant for consumption of domestic political con-
stituencies.63 Fundamental tensions will be created within the 
ATS if the battle over the whaling issue is brought within. By 
disrupting set patterns of jurisdiction that provide a fundamental 
cornerstone for the ATS, the whaling issue will reverberate, and 
not likely to the good, in the system.
I want to emphasize that most of my sympathy lies with the 
plaintiff’s reasonable objectives in the litigation we are consid-
ering.64 It is certain that ensuring the perpetuation of whales in 
the Southern Ocean is important. However, this worthy goal is 
only a small part of the common interest of all humankind in the 
protection and sustainable use of the wider Antarctic environ-
ment (marine and terrestrial). Because of this broader common 
interest, I depart with HSI and its lawyers when we look at the 
means employed to reach the specific objective of perpetuation. 
My departure is not so much driven by HSI and its lawyers as it 
is by the legal tools put at their disposal by the Commonwealth 
Parliament of Australia in form of the Environment Protection 
Biodiversity Conservation Act of 1998.
Private litigation, based on an internationally disputed claim 
to sovereignty over Antarctic territory and a further contested 
claim to an EEZ appurtenant to that territory, ought not to serve 
as a proxy for cooperative (and hopefully effective) international 
management of the Antarctic environment. The negative incen-
tives presented by such an extreme unilateral measure are just 
too dangerous. That is not to say other, less provocative unilat-
eral measures need to be avoided. Indeed, in the appropriate cir-
cumstances unilateral measures can be viewed as international 
leadership.65 Lower level, less contentious, unilateral measures 
might present a possible way forward in the establishment of 
effective international management.
Instead of a unilateral Australian approach, what is required 
is a more concerted multilateral attempt to address the issue of 
whales and whaling through the whaling regime established by 
the 1946 International Convention on the Regulation of Whal-
ing. Even if such an attempt involves a difficult and long drawn 
out process, or even if the deadlock remains, a continuing inter-
regnum of uncertainty and contest within the whaling regime66 
is better than destabilizing the ATS—an extremely important 
regime of broader scope and objective. 
concluSion
It is a truism that good faith cooperation between states is 
required to successfully tackle environmental and resource prob-
lems which are international in scope.67 In the case of whale 
stocks, a res nullius common property resource,68 cooperation is 
required on account of the externalities that have driven unsus-
tainable exploitation. 
It is well-known that over the past ten years or so, the strug-
gle between the conservation and utilisation camps within the 
IWC has intensified as stocks (at least minke whale stocks) have 
apparently been gradually replenished since the whaling morato-
rium.69 This increasingly acrimonious struggle seriously threat-
ens the normative effectiveness of the Whaling Convention and 
the IWC. By comparison to the IWC, the ATS has been rela-
tively stable since controversy raged around the issue of miner-
als exploration and exploitation in the 1980s. 
The recent HSI case, and the broader context in which it 
arises, has the potential to dangerously destabilize the ATS. At 
the bottom, this potential is driven by the somewhat jaded, but 
I believe basically accurate perspective expressed by Wilbert 
Chapman in 1969. Chapman said:
The nature of [humans] abhors something of value not 
being owned by an individual, or by groups of individ-
uals organized into states or business entities.70
This acquisitive view of human nature frames, in large part, 
the centuries old argument about open and closed seas that all 
lawyers of the sea are familiar with. This acquisitive habit lies 
behind the capture and use of whales by the nationals of whaling 
states, just as much as lies behind claims to sovereign rights in 
natural resources in an EEZ off Antarctica. Indeed, the drive to 
acquisition applies to all common Antarctic marine biological 
resources and helps explain why states have entered into agree-
ments that seek to frame principles for sharing these marine 
resources. More troubling though, is that in what appears to be 
coming times of increasing scarcity, this acquisitive habit will 
apply with equal force to oil and mineral resources (and even 
genetic material) found off-shore in Antarctica.71 For many, this 
explains why the 1991 Madrid Protocol contains the Article 25 
“escape clause” built around disagreement concerning mineral 
resource activities. 
This habit of acquisition, and the tendency to exclusive use 
of what is thus acquired, highlights the great failing of Austra-
lia’s unilateral approach to the protection of the Antarctic marine 
environment in this case; an approach predicated on a claim to 
exclusive sovereign rights and the projection of Australian pre-
scriptive, adjudicative, and enforcement jurisdiction in the zone. 
The big danger is that if other states follow Australia’s lead in 
claiming sovereign rights and exercising attendant jurisdiction 
the chances of natural resource over-exploitation and environ-
mental harm in the Antarctic is increased. It will, I believe, in the 
long run exacerbate the likelihood of a scramble for important, 
scarce and economically viable resources. 
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in the long run exacerbate the likelihood of a scramble for impor-
tant, scarce and economically viable resources. 
Using th  Polar B ar Framework to Protect 
the arctic haBitat  by Tim P. Shields*
* Tim P. Shields is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University, Wash-
ington College of Law.
Listing the polar bear as a threatened species is the pre-dominant manner in which protection and preservation of the Arctic habitat might be achieved. The U.S. Geo-
logical Survey issued a final report on the status of the polar 
bear on September 7, 2007.1 The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 
however, has missed its deadline to list the polar bear as a threat-
ened animal.2 As a result, three non-profit conservation groups 
sued the Bush Administration on March 10, 2008,3 requesting 
that the court require the agency to comply with the timeline for 
completing the listing process.4
If finally implemented, the protections granted to the polar 
bear could be used to initiate protection of Arctic habitat. Listing 
the polar bear would require the federal government to ensure 
that its actions and policies do not harm or jeopardize the bears. 
It would also prevent habitat modification where there is a show-
ing of actual injury to wildlife. Further precautions protecting 
the polar bear would be the designation of a critical habitat zone 
and the preparation of a recovery plan.5
While the regulatory process could potentially provide 
much protection from future habitat loss and contamination, 
concentrating on the polar bear as the primary protection mecha-
nism simplifies the situation and ignores major factors currently 
contributing to habitat loss. Among the most pertinent hazards 
facing the Arctic are global warming, traveling chemical pollu-
tion, and encroaching human activities. 
Greenhouse gases in the Arctic have led to an annual tem-
perature increase nearly twice that observed in other regions of 
the Earth.6 One major result of this increased temperature man-
ifested itself further during the 2007 annual summer ice melt 
when the ice coverage reached a new low of 1.59 million square 
miles, which constituted a loss of nearly 460,000 square miles.7 
The loss of ice compounds the problem by reducing the amount 
of light that is reflected from the Earth back into space, which 
results in a greater absorption of heat, contributing to further ice 
loss.8 The loss of ice has also led to an increase in coastal ero-
sion throughout the region,9 which has even resulted in calling 
for the costly move of entire towns in Alaska.10 The ice loss 
is especially pertinent to polar bears, whose main habitat con-
sists of coastal polar ice caps.11 For the polar bear framework to 
stem global warming, the federal government would also have 
to effect a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
Global warming, however, is not the only threat to the 
region. In the 1950s, researchers first came to believe that a wide 
array of chemical pollutants, which originated outside the Arctic, 
arrived to the Arctic via several pathways, including air, water, 
ice, and migratory animals. While some of the pathways result 
in quick delivery to the Arctic, others take years and decades to 
transport the chemical pollutants to their destination.12 The vari-
ous routes and protracted delay in chemicals arriving to the Arc-
tic makes preventing contamination difficult in the short run.
The Arctic habitat is further threatened by human encroach-
ment related to mineral exploration and development, logging, 
and rural expansion.13 Expansions in human activity led to further 
construction of roads, trails, pipelines, and other developments 
that fragment and isolate habitats.14 The continued reduction in 
ice coverage and increasing demand for oil has already begun 
to yield an increase in commercial exploration throughout the 
area,15 which could further exacerbate the diminishing polar 
habitat, depending on the expanse of the polar bear habitat.
The effects of global warming and human interaction com-
bine to affect regional land ecosystems. Trees and shrubs are 
currently expanding into what was once the tundra at a rate that 
far exceeds previous predictions.16 This northward advancement 
of the forest results in both a trend in movement of animal spe-
cies and an increased risk for other species that have not adapted 
as readily.17 Specifically, millions of migratory birds that use the 
tundra as a breeding ground are affected.18 
While it is possible that listing the polar bear as a threatened 
species could result in protection of parts of the Arctic, the spe-
cific location of the polar bears’ habitats could leave other areas 
of the Arctic open to further commercialization and to additional 
encroachment of human settlements, destroying habitat that is 
vital to polar bears and other species upon which it depends for 
sustenance. Working within the polar bear framework could 
provide for substantial protection to the entire Arctic if inter-
preted broadly enough; however, further protections would still 
be needed to truly protect the Arctic from both global warming 
and expanding trade routes in the area.
Endnotes: Using the Polar Bear Framework continued on page 63
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mental harm in the Antarctic is increased. It will, I believe, 
in the long run exacerbate the likelihood of a scramble for impor-
tant, scarce and economically viable resources. 
Ca  Climate Ch nge Be good for greenland? 
an arCtiC island’s response to new development opportunities
by James Mitchell*
* James Mitchell is a J.D. Candidate, May 2008, at American University, Wash-
ington College of Law.
Worldwide, Greenland is viewed as an indicator of global climate change—like Earth’s monitoring sta-tion. The world’s largest island consists of eighty-
one percent ice,1 and its melting 
ice contributes to about twenty-
eight percent of current global 
sea-level rise.2 News coverage of 
Greenland centers upon the cur-
rent melting rate of its ice sheets 
and scientists’ predictions of how 
much global sea level would rise 
if all of the ice sheets were to 
melt. However, little is written 
about how climate change will 
affect those who live there.
Despite its location, Green-
land shares some similarities 
with the global south. Many of 
its 60,000 inhabitants subsist at least in part on nature, and its 
governance status is akin to a colony of a European nation.3 The 
government has welcomed the opportunity to establish greater 
economic independence from Denmark by “developing” Green-
land. However, given that black carbon, in the form of soot-laden 
snow, accounts for about a third of the warming in the Arctic 
regions,4 is heavy industry, most of which is foreign-owned, a 
viable development path?
Greenland has seen rising temperatures at a more acceler-
ated pace than the global rate. From 1991 to 2003 average winter 
temperatures rose eleven degrees Fahrenheit.5 However, many 
in Greenland embrace rising temperatures, as it opens up new 
opportunities across the island. For now, tourism is receiving a 
boost due to “discoveries” of new islands, previously inacces-
sible because of the ice, and these islands are now becoming 
vacation sites for cruise liners.6 Because of the warming tem-
peratures, farmers can now plant vegetables that a few decades 
ago would have never survived, and raise fatter livestock.7 
The cod industry was once the greatest asset of Greenland, 
but in the 1960s it collapsed due to over-fishing and shifting sea 
currents. Now that the sea temperatures are the highest since 
the 1960s, the cod have returned, as evidenced by government 
inspectors, who in 2007 made a “biblical catch” of twenty-five 
tons of cod in one hour.8 Finally, the seasonal snowmelt contin-
ues to open up previously impassible areas.9
Of course, not all benefit from the rising temperatures. Cli-
mate change harms the Inuit peoples’ way of life, particularly in 
the realm of hunting.10 The effects are devastating; “[r]etreat-
ing sea ice has exposed Inuit villages to the eroding forces of 
wind and waves, causing their homes to topple into the sea . . . 
Experienced hunters have fallen through ice that appeared safe, 
resulting in injury and death. 
The [animals] upon which 
the Inuit depend . . . could go 
extinct before the end of this 
century.”11 Despite these nega-
tive impacts on Inuit culture, 
Greenland’s Home Rule Gov-
ernment remains interested in 
attracting heavy industry to the 
region.
The sector most excited 
over Greenland’s warming is 
also the one whose activities 
intensify climate change—
heavy industry. British-based 
firm Angus & Ross (“Angus”) used to operate the Black Angel 
Mine, a zinc and lead mine on Greenland’s west coast. The mine 
had to be closed in 1990 due to declining global zinc prices and 
the difficulty of operating in an area often frozen over.12 Now, 
with rising commodity prices and milder temperatures that have 
allowed for operators to work for eight months per year instead 
of only six,13 Angus is scheduled to re-open in late 2008, pending 
approval of its mining license from the Greenland government.14 
Angus is not alone. By 2007, Greenland’s Bureau of Minerals 
and Petroleum tripled the number of exploration licenses it had 
issued since 2002.15 
U.S. firm Alcoa plans to create an aluminum smelting 
plant along the western coast, powered by a nearby hydroelec-
tric power plant.16 Ironically, the hydroelectric power plant’s 
“renewable,” zero-greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions source of 
energy is the melting ice and snow. The smelter’s operations, 
however, would boost Greenland’s GHG emissions by seventy-
five percent from their current levels.17
Despite regional economic benefits from climate change, 
local inhabitants who live near these industries will have to pay 
the costs from the local pollution that results from heavy indus-
try. A 1997 site assessment of the Black Angel mine revealed 
heavy metal contamination within a thirty-mile radius of the 
mine.18 There is no reason to expect better prospects once it is 
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re-opened. Indeed, Alcoa has faced considerable controversy in 
Yarloop, Australia for seeking to double its aluminum smelt-
ing operations, despite allegations by locals that fumes are con-
tributing to “nosebleeds . . . skin ulcers and rashes, nausea . . . 
impaired speech, blackouts and palpitations.”19
The challenge is how to establish greater economic sover-
eignty, now that climate change has introduced more opportu-
nities. Greenland stands at a crossroads. It can simply imitate 
the old model, or it can decide to be a model for other nations 
currently facing the moral dilemma of what to do when climate 
change actually presents beneficial development opportunities. 
Greenland should embrace the positive climate-induced changes 
of increased fish yields and better farming/grazing land, yet sus-
tainably manage these resources. Otherwise, Greenland will yet 
again witness the effects of over-fishing its cod stocks, and the 
impacts of soil depletion and overgrazing. Instead of resorting to 
industry, there are excellent opportunities in further developing 
eco-tourism of Greenland; several tropical countries have seen 
the economic and ecologic value in preserving their biodiver-
sity. Finally, Greenland should consult with its own inhabitants, 
and heed Rio Declaration’s Principle 22, which recognizes the 
value that indigenous peoples have in environmental manage-
ment and development due to their unique knowledge.20
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Supporting AdAptAtion:  
A priority for Action on climAte chAnge for cAnAdiAn inuit
by Dr. James D. Ford*
introDuction
Climate change is having profound impacts in the Cana-dian Arctic. Temperatures are increasing at twice the global average, recent years have witnessed a dra-
matic reduction in summer sea ice cover, and extreme weather 
conditions appear to be increasing in both magnitude and fre-
quency.1 Widely believed to be at least partially attributed to 
human emissions of greenhouse gases, climate change is hav-
ing dramatic implications for Canada’s Inuit population who are 
dependant on the biophysical environment and the resources it 
provides.2 With future climate change projected to be greatest in 
the Arctic,3 communities, governments, and Inuit organizations 
have expressed concern. Inuit political leaders have even argued 
that climate change is a fundamental human rights issue, violat-
ing the ability of Inuit to practice and enjoy the benefits of their 
culture.4 Clearly, action on climate change is urgent for Arctic 
regions; failure to act could threaten the very existence of the 
Inuit way of life. 
This Article reviews the evolution of climate change policy 
in an international context in general and Canada in particu-
lar. The review provides a basis for asking the question: what 
constitutes appropriate action on climate change for Inuit in the 
Canadian Arctic? The central argument is that while reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions is an important goal globally, adapta-
tion to reduce vulnerability to climate change should be a prior-
ity for Inuit regions. The paper finishes by identifying key action 
areas at a Canadian and international level to help Inuit adapt. 
While this Article focuses specifically on the Canadian Inuit 
experience, the arguments developed are generally applicable 
for Inuit across the circumpolar north. 
canaDa’S inuit population
Inuit are indigenous peoples inhabiting Arctic and sub-
Arctic regions of Canada, Alaska, Greenland, and Chukotka 
(Russia), numbering approximately 155,000 people. The 2001 
Canadian census found 45,070 people who define themselves as 
being Inuit; 22,560 of whom live in Canada’s newest territory 
of Nunavut—see the table and figure below. The other 22,510 
live in three Inuit settlement regions: the Inuvialuit Settlement 
Region of the Northwest Territories, Nunavik in the province 
of Quebec, and Nunatsiavut in the province of Newfoundland 
& Labrador.5 Together, Inuit administered regions cover thirty 
percent of the Canadian landmass, and have a climate charac-
terized by very cold, long winters, and short, cool summers.6 
Sea ice is an integral part of Inuit life, providing a transportation 
link between communities and a hunting platform for over seven 
months of the year in most areas. 
Figure 1: inuit regionS oF canaDa with locationS  
oF inuit communitieS7
 
The majority of Inuit in the Canadian north live in small, 
remote coastal communities only accessible by air or winter ice 
roads, with economies composed of waged employment and 
subsistence hunting.8 Many Inuit retain a close relationship with 
the environment and a strong knowledge base of their regional 
surroundings, with traditional foods derived from hunting hav-
ing social and cultural importance.9 Hunting also continues to 
supply the principal elements of the Inuit diet. In recent surveys 
in Nunavut, for instance, forty-one percent of Inuit respondents 
identified that more than half of the meat and fish they consumed 
was locally harvested.10 Other studies have demonstrated that 
the economic value of the traditional food sector is at least equal 
to the cost of food imports from Southern Canada.11 
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Many Inuit communities in Canada are challenged by lim-
ited access to health services, low socio-economic status, high 
unemployment, crowded and poor-quality housing, and con-
cerns regarding basic services such as drinking water quality.12 
Consequently, Inuit generally experience low indicators of well-
being compared to the Canadian population in general. Inuit 
men, for example, can expect to live 64.4 years compared to a 
Canadian average of 77.0; the figures for women are 69.8 years 
and 82.0 years respectively.13 Moreover, Inuit have experienced 
sweeping socio-cultural changes in the second half of the twen-
tieth century, as former semi-nomadic hunting groups moved to 
permanent settlements beginning in the 1950s. Inuit livelihoods 
were transformed in a matter of decades with the introduction 
of the waged economy, imposition of hunting regulations, com-
pulsory schooling, rapid population growth, and imposition of 
Western governance and legal system.14 
Climate Change and inuit:  
a human rightS iSSue?
As a hunting people dependent on sea ice and other envi-
ronmental conditions, Canadian Inuit have been particularly 
susceptible to changing climatic conditions documented in the 
last decade.15 Unusual sea ice and weather conditions have dis-
rupted livelihoods and households through the associated loss 
and damage to hunting equipment. Increasing danger of hunt-
ing and travel has forced some Inuit to avoid engaging in tra-
ditional activities all together, while life-threatening accidents 
are increasing because of rapid changes in ice, snow, and land. 
Weather and sea ice conditions are becoming more difficult to 
forecast using traditional knowledge, thereby affecting the cred-
ibility of elders among younger generations. There is also evi-
dence that warming temperatures are affecting the quality of 
some traditional foods and animal skins. 
With the impacts of climate change becoming increasingly 
apparent in Arctic regions, many Inuit political leaders have 
situated climate change as a fundamental human rights issue. 
For example, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference—on behalf of 
the Inuit population of Canada and the United States—lodged a 
“petition” at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
in 2005 seeking relief from human rights violations resulting 
from the impacts of climate change caused by acts and omis-
sions of the United States with respect to greenhouse gas emis-
sions.16 The petition appealed to aspects of international law 
established under the Organization of American States (“OAS”), 
arguing that subsistence culture is central to Inuit identity and 
is being damaged by climate change, thereby violating the right 
of Inuit to practice and enjoy the benefits of their culture, use 
and enjoy their traditional lands, enjoy personal property, lead 
healthy lives, and compromising intellectual property. While 
the petition was rejected without prejudice,17 it likely represents 
the first of many legal actions as nations and groups adversely 
affected by climate change seek legal redress for a problem they 
did not cause.  
To date, Inuit have not lodged similar proceedings against the 
respective countries in which they live. However, legal grounds 
for such action exist. In Canada, climate change compromises 
the rights of Inuit—as Canadians—as stated in the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.18 Section 25(b) of the Charter 
states “any rights or freedoms that now exist by way of land 
claims agreements or may be so acquired,” are to be upheld.19 
Several land claims have been signed between the Canadian gov-
ernment and Inuit: Nunavut Land Claim Agreement, Inuvialuit 
Final Agreement, James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, 
and the Nunatsiavut Agreement.20 Key principles enshrined in 
these agreements include the rights of Inuit to use of the land 
and resources, harvesting rights, and the enhancement of cul-
tural and social well-being. The ability to uphold these rights is 
being challenged by climate change, which compromises access 
to resources and traditional hunting locations.21 Moreover, cli-
mate change threatens to undermine the very traditional cultural 
practices that land claim agreements have sought to uphold. 
Climate Change poliCy: international and 
Canadian Context
If, as this Article argues, climate change is a fundamental 
human right, Inuit have recourse to international human rights 
law and legal obligations governing the citizen-state relation-
ship. Moreover, all states with Inuit populations are parties to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(“UNFCCC”)22 which establishes legal obligations of parties 
Table 1: Selected Characteristics of Inuit Regions of Canada 
Inuit Region Province/Territory Relevant  
Land Claim 
Inuit Population  
(% of total)
Average  
Community Size
Territory of Nunavut Nunavut Nunavut Land Claim 
 Agreement (1993) 
24,635 (84%) 1,063
Inuvialuit Settlement 
Region 
Northwest Territories Inuvialuit Final Agreement 
(1984)
3,115 (55%)  876
Nunavik Québec James Bay and Northern  
Quebec Agreement (1975)
9,565 (90%)  688
Nunatsiavut Newfoundland &  
Labrador
Nunatsiavut Agreement (2005) 2,169 (89%) 1,767
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to take action on climate change. The UNFCCC outlines two 
key areas for climate policy, mitigation and adaptation, both of 
which have relevance to Canadian Inuit. 
Firstly, the UNFCCC and its principal update, the Kyoto 
Protocol, legally obligate parties to “achieve, in accordance with 
the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of green-
house gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropo-
genic interference with the cli-
mate system;”23 a policy option 
known as mitigation. The proto-
col legally binds Annex 1 (indus-
trialized) countries to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by an 
average of five percent by the 
first commitment period (2008–
2012) compared to the baseline 
of 1990. In Canada, a six per-
cent reduction in emissions was 
negotiated by the federal gov-
ernment in Kyoto, although the 
government has indicated it will 
not achieve these targets. Territorial and provincial governments 
in Canada have also established their own programs to reduce 
emissions. Mitigation is central to global efforts to tackle cli-
mate change: unless action is taken to reduce emissions, global 
temperatures are likely to exceed the threshold of 2°C warm-
ing above pre-industrial levels that scientists have indicated will 
result in “dangerous climate change.”24 Such a scenario would 
cause irreversible change to globally important biophysical sys-
tems25 and stress the ability of human systems to cope. 
Secondly, adaptation, which seeks to develop measures to 
reduce or moderate the negative effects of climate change and 
take advantage of new opportunities, is an important component 
of the Framework Convention.26 Article 4.1b, for example, com-
mits parties to “formulate, implement . . . national and where 
appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to . . . 
facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change.”27 Article 4e 
states that parties must “cooperate in preparing for adaptation 
to the impacts of climate change . . . .”28 Article 11 of the Kyoto 
Protocol also commits parties to promote and facilitate adapta-
tion to address climate change.29
As a response to climate change, adaptation has traditionally 
has been overshadowed by mitigation, although this is beginning 
to change. The UNFCCC, for example, recently re-affirmed the 
importance of adaptation on the policy agenda, establishing sev-
eral programs of support.30 The Action Plan from the Confer-
ence of the Parties (“CoP”) to the UNFCCC meeting in Bali, 
December 2007, likewise calls for “enhanced action on adapta-
tion,” including the provision of financial resources to support 
adaptation and assessment of adaptation needs.31 Adaptation 
is also being recognized as essential at the federal, provincial, 
and territorial levels in Canada.32 The Canadian position at the 
UNFCCC talks in Bonn, which occurred on May 16, 2006, for 
example, stated: “In Canada’s arctic region, the changes noted 
by the Inuit community . . . has raised the need to address adap-
tation measures.”33 Moreover, the federal government has made 
commitments to support adaptation, including the recent provi-
sion of CN$86 million to help Canadian communities deal with 
the effects of climate change. In Arctic Canada, policy makers 
have been proactive in pushing adaptation onto the agenda.34 The 
federal department of Indian and Northern Affairs, for example, 
made a commitment to develop 
an Impacts and Adaptation 
Strategy, and the Government 
of Nunavut is currently devel-
oping an adaptation plan. 
mitigate we might, 
aDapt we muSt
Stabilizing and reduc-
ing greenhouse gas emissions 
responsible for climate change 
should be a priority for Cana-
dian and international efforts 
to tackle climate change. One 
could argue that dangerous cli-
mate change is already occurring in the Arctic, or will happen 
soon, thereby compelling parties to the UNFCCC to act imme-
diately through mitigation to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system.”35 Inuit political leaders 
should continue to press for action on greenhouse gas emissions, 
as unabated or “runaway” climate change could prove disastrous 
for Inuit. However, this Article argues that adaptation should 
be the central focus of climate change policy in Inuit regions 
of Canada, and a priority for Inuit political negotiations both 
domestically and internationally. Legal obligations favor sup-
port to help Inuit adapt: the UNFCCC legally obligates parties 
to act on adaptation, the Canadian Charter establishes rights for 
Inuit vis-à-vis the state that can only be upheld through adapta-
tion, and in many instances adaptation is required to help prevent 
internationally recognized human rights from being violated. 
Two further arguments in support of prioritizing adaptation are 
offered. 
Firstly, it is now accepted that some degree of climate change 
is inevitable, even if atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse 
gases were dramatically curtailed.36 Communities, regions, and 
economic sectors will therefore have to adapt to some degree 
of climate change. This is particularly pertinent in the Canadian 
Arctic, where even small changes in future climatic conditions 
could force social and physical systems to cross tipping points 
due to the significant changes in climate already experienced.37 
Moreover, it is widely recognized that climate change is already 
occurring in the Arctic and that Inuit populations are vulnerable. 
Adaptation can bring immediate benefits in the form of reduced 
sensitivity to climatic risks and increased adaptability.
Secondly, it can be argued that focusing on mitigation in 
Arctic climate change policy is misplaced on account of low 
populations, the absence of a sizable industrial base, and limited 
consumption levels in Northern Canada.38 Reducing emissions 
Forty-one percent of  
Inuit respondents 
identified that more  
than half of the meat and 
fish they consumed was 
locally harvested.
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in Inuit regions, while symbolically important, will have limited 
impact on the speed, magnitude, or effects of climate change. 
Adaptation offers a tangible way in which the impacts of current 
and future climate change can be reduced. 
promoting AdAptAtion
This Article identifies key areas in which national and 
international climate policy can support Inuit adaptation. These 
policy opportunities are organized according to how they can 
serve to uphold internationally recognized human rights for Inuit 
within a changing climate. 
The RighT To PRacTice and enjoy The BenefiTs of 
one’s culTuRe 
This Inuit right is violated as climate change reduces access 
to traditional hunting areas. Inuit are not passive in the face of 
such change, however. Across Northern Canada, hunters are 
adopting new technology to maintain access to hunting areas. 
More ice-free open water in the summer, for instance, is con-
sidered a benefit in many communities and Inuit are using boats 
to take advantage of the new hunting opportunities.39 At other 
times of the year when the ice is unsafe, All Terrain Vehicles 
(“ATVs”) are being used to bypass the frozen ocean. New trails 
which detour unsafe and impassable areas are also being devel-
oped to access hunting areas.40 Such adaptations, involving 
changing resource use patterns in response to environmental cir-
cumstances, have defined the very nature of Inuit survival in the 
Arctic for millennia.41 
In the modern world, however, such responses are not acces-
sible to all Inuit. ATVs and boats are often too expensive for 
hunters, and the costs of having to travel further can not always 
be afforded. Support programs for harvesters are offered in all 
the Inuit regions of Canada by regional governments and land 
claim institutions and help hunters access climate adaptations. 
However, there are significant shortfalls in resources available 
and this will no doubt increase as the impacts of climate change 
become pronounced.42 Financial support for harvester programs, 
targeted at helping Inuit communities afford to adapt, is one 
way in which Canadian and international support can help Inuit 
maintain their ability to practice culturally important activities in 
a changing climate. 
The RighT To healTh and life 
Climate change violates this right by increasing the danger 
of using traditional lands. Inuit are responding to such risks by 
taking along safety equipment such as satellite phones, global 
positioning systems, emergency beacons, immersion suits, and 
are utilizing available weather and ice forecasts to assess safety 
of using the land at certain times of the year. Harvester support, 
similar to the programs noted above, is required to help Inuit 
access these important but expensive technologies, along with 
the provision of training to help local people make full use of 
these technologies. Improved hazard forecasting is also required: 
at present only four meteorologists cover Canada’s Arctic region 
and are unable to provide regularly updated weather forecasts 
that hunters need in a changing climate.43 Moreover, there is a 
need to develop key traditional skills among younger genera-
tion Inuit. Across Inuit regions, research has noted that many of 
today’s youth do not have the detailed knowledge of environ-
mental conditions necessary for safe hunting and travel.44 Cli-
mate change is exacerbating this trend, increasing the danger for 
young people and reducing opportunities for youth to engage in 
traditional activities. Addressing the erosion of traditional skills 
through the creation of cultural schools and land skills programs 
is a priority across the Canadian north, as land skills and knowl-
edge become even more essential with climate change.45 
The RighT To enjoy PeRsonal PRoPeRTy 
Across Inuit regions of Canada, research has documented a 
trend of increasing damage and loss of expensive hunting equip-
ment with climate change, violating the right to enjoy personal 
property.46 For many Inuit, loss or damage to equipment means 
temporary or permanent loss of livelihood as many hunters do 
not have the financial means to repair or replace equipment. Fur-
thermore, very few, if any, Inuit have insurance on their equip-
ment due to cost and the fact that most Inuit do not have bank 
accounts. Regional governments offer disaster compensation 
in some instances but this is widely regarded as insufficient, 
and claims can expect to increase with climate change.47 In the 
future, Inuit leaders will likely push for compensation for lost 
and damaged equipment from the Canadian government and 
internationally. 
inviolaBiliTy of The home 
The majority of Inuit cultural sites (graveyards, hunting 
camps, etc.) and current settlements are located on the coast and/
or on permanently frozen land (i.e. permafrost). Climate change 
threatens to violate Inuit rights to their homelands through sea 
level rise, coastal erosion, permafrost thaw, and more active 
slope processes. Physical interventions are being considered in 
vulnerable communities across the Arctic to protect infrastruc-
ture. These include moving buildings, raising buildings, and 
installing engineering structures to provide protection from wave 
action and permafrost thaw. Any engineering-based measures, 
however, will be costly. Recently-announced federal funding 
under the government’s Building Canada long-term infrastruc-
ture fund will help climate proof key infrastructure, although 
cultural sites are not covered by this fund. Documenting cultural 
sites at risk with climate change, identifying adaptation options 
and needs, and establishing funds to help protect them should all 
be a priority to support Inuit adaptation and protect the inviola-
bility of the home. 
As all these points make clear, adaptation can help Inuit 
manage climate change. Many adaptations, however, are costly 
and exceed the financial abilities of Inuit households, regional 
governments, and land claims institutions. Establishing com-
pensation funds and procedures accessible by Inuit and regional 
governments in advance of future climate change is essential to 
helping Inuit maintain their livelihoods and culture in a chang-
ing climate. Such action is supported by the human rights law, 
the Canadian Charter, and the UNFCCC, which commits parties 
to formulate policies to facilitate adequate adaptation. 
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DiScuSSion
The need and opportunities for adaptation support outlined 
above are by no means exhaustive or fully formulated. They are 
intended to outline—based on current understanding—key areas 
where support is required to help Inuit adapt to a changing cli-
mate. Moreover, they focus on policy needs to help Inuit cope 
with changes they are already experiencing and to which they 
may be vulnerable in the future. Future climate change brings 
the potential for conditions Inuit have not previously experi-
enced, and these risks and response options need to be system-
atically assessed. Indeed, to address what some have called the 
“adaptation deficit” in Inuit regions,48 further understanding of 
current and future vulnerability, needs assessment, and priori-
tization of actions is required. The UNFCCC establishes legal 
obligations for Canada to prepare for adaptation in this manner, 
an obligation recently reaffirmed in the Bali Action Plan to the 
Conference of the Parties.49 
It is clear that Inuit have legal recourse both in Canada and 
internationally for action to support adaptation. Despite this, for-
midable barriers exist to achieving support at a Canadian and 
international level. Firstly, as non-state actors, Inuit do not have 
recourse to international legal institutions that enforce interna-
tional treaties. For example, only parties to the UNFCCC have 
recourse against other signatory states, and the Canadian gov-
ernment has been reluctant to press for significant action on cli-
mate change, despite the fact that Article 2 has, or will soon be, 
violated in Inuit regions of Canada. 
Secondly, adaptation funds available through the UNFCCC 
are for developing countries only.50 While socio-economic indi-
cators in Inuit regions of Canada often mirror those in developing 
nations, as non-state actors Inuit cannot apply. As a party to the 
UNFCCC, however, Canada is legally obliged to “cooperate in 
preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change . . . .”51 
Notwithstanding, Budreau and McBean52 note that a state’s legal 
obligation to adaptation remains vague and is largely limited to 
publishing policy documents and official statements. Moreover, 
the very concept of adaptation in the UNFCCC as actions taken 
in response to climate change impacts resulting from anthropo-
genic emissions is a barrier to meaningful action.53 Adaptive 
responses under the UNFCCC have to demonstrate that they 
address the marginal impacts of future climate change. Yet in 
many cases it is not possible to separate climate change impacts 
from social-economic drivers of climate change vulnerability.54
concluSion
It is now widely accepted that climate change is occur-
ring in the Arctic and that dramatic changes can be expected 
in the future. For Inuit, climate change is a fundamental human 
rights issue. As such, it is essential to find a way to tackle 
 climate change in Arctic regions. Inuit political leaders should 
 continue to push for aggressive efforts globally to curb green-
house gas emissions. However, mitigation can only offset the 
worst impacts of climate change and will not prevent climate 
change that is happening today and to which we are commit-
ted. Efforts to support Inuit adaptation are therefore of particular 
importance in helping maintain livelihoods and the fundamental 
right to  culture. The majority of Canadian Inuit will be able to 
adapt to climate change only if support is provided to implement 
adaptation options. Examining how to support adaptation, iden-
tifying high risk areas, and establishing funds and procedures 
to facilitate adaptation at both a Canadian and international 
level, should be priorities for domestic and international climate 
policymakers. 
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mental harm in the Antarctic is increased. It will, I believe, 
in the long run exacerbate the likelihood of a scramble for impor-
tant, scarce and economically viable resources. 
S a ching for a Voice: The indigenouS PeoPle in Polar regionS
by Eunjung Park*
* Eunjung Park is a J.D Candidate, May 2009, at American University, Washing-
ton College of Law.
Despite the perception of outsiders that it is a frozen land, the Arctic is home to over 3.5 million indigenous peo-ple, including the Inuits, the Saami, the Chukchi, and 
many more.1 Interestingly, one of 
the main differences between the 
two Polar Regions is the absence 
of indigenous people in the Ant-
arctic and the presence of them in 
the Arctic.
These indigenous people’s 
lives are affected by environmen-
tal changes, including climate 
change, chemical contaminants 
from their diet of sea-mam-
mals, and over-fishing.2 Climate 
change, especially, has impacts on food accessibility, availabil-
ity, and personal safety. Thawing of permafrost brings instabil-
ity to the community infrastructure, and substantial investment 
will be required to adapt the community structure, or relocate the 
community. Coastal indigenous communities are threatened by 
erosion because of melting sea ice, and up to eighty percent of 
Alaskan communities, comprised mainly of indigenous peoples, 
are at risk of coastal erosion.3 Coastal erosion impacts the resi-
dents and structures, as waves eat away sea walls and barriers that 
the indigenous people have used to build their communities.4 
Indigenous people in Arctic observe and experience climate 
change first-hand.5 They notice the change in weather and gla-
ciers and notice the changes in the group size or migration routes 
of certain species affected by climate change. Indigenous people 
are also a source of traditional knowledge as they have responded 
to major climatic and environmental changes by altering group 
sizes, relocating, and being flexible with seasonal cycles in hunt-
ing or employment.6 For example, the Inuit hunters have proved 
to be capable of identifying the new travel routes of species such 
as geese and caribou as they shift their migration in response to 
the climate change.7 However, the indigenous people have very 
limited opportunity to effectively voice their opinions in interna-
tional dialogue on environment.
The Arctic Council, since its establishment, has become a 
forum for “circum-Arctic co-operation” where indigenous peo-
ple are able to contribute to the discussions and cooperation on 
sustainable development and environmental protection in the 
Arctic.8 In 1991, eight arctic states signed the Declaration on 
the Protection of the Arctic Environment and the Arctic Envi-
ronmental Protection Strategy (“AEPS”) to establish the Arc-
tic Council in 1996.9 In addition to the member countries, the 
Arctic Council welcomes the equal participation of indigenous 
communities for full consultation with and participation of the 
indigenous people who reside in the Arctic, yet do not have a 
voice otherwise. The Arctic Council is considered a soft-law 
organization essentially operating outside of international law, 
and the outcomes of the Coun-
cil are not considered binding. 
Beyond the Arctic Council, 
however, indigenous peoples 
in the Arctic have no other 
opportunity to participate in 
the international community’s 
decision-making process on 
environmental changes, which 
affects their daily lives. 
The international commu-
nity should recognize the need 
for indigenous people in the Arctic to participate in international 
dialogue on environmental issues, like climate change, through 
means such as the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change.10 Indigenous people should be given a status 
equivalent to the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indig-
enous Issues as they have the mandate to “discuss indigenous 
issues within the mandate of the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council.” Without the indigenous people to provide input, 
the Conference of Parties has taken adaptive and mitigating 
measure against climate change that have adverse impacts on the 
indigenous people in Polar regions and elsewhere.11 Addition-
ally, this lack of platform for the indigenous people results in 
disproportionate emphasis on certain issues. For example, pro-
tection of polar bears has been emphasized greatly, while pre-
serving the long-standing Inuit culture and source of subsistence 
of hunting polar bears failed to receive sufficient attention.12 
The Arctic states should also empower the indigenous 
people in the Arctic so that they can participate in international 
dialogue, and support them as they make efforts for economic 
development. Canada has granted a semi-autonomy plan for a 
mainly Inuit region of Quebec in 2007 in order to promote the 
socioeconomic development that meets the need of the Inuit.13 
Canada also has designated a federal funding for the Canadian 
Arctic Indigenous Peoples Against POPs to assist the indigenous 
people to participate in the international dialogue.14 Actions 
taken to affirmatively support indigenous people in each Arctic 
state will contribute to the overall elevation of indigenous status 
in environmental dialogue in the Arctic. 
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mental harm in the Antarctic is increased. It will, I believe, 
in the long run exacerbate the likelihood of a scramble for impor-
tant, scarce and economically viable resources. 
P rsist n Org nic POllutant accumulatiOn 
in the arctic  by Rachel T. Kirby*
* Rachel T. Kirby is a J.D./M.A. candidate, May 2010, at American University, 
Washington College of Law.  
The Arctic is one of the last regions of the world that remains seemingly untouched by modern human existence. A closer look, however, reveals the effects of pollutants 
on the human and animal populations in the Arctic. Persistent 
Organic Pollutants (“POPs”) are toxic chemicals such as pesti-
cides and industrial by-products 
that break down very slowly in 
the environment.1 POPs reach 
the Arctic from smokestacks and 
factories all over the world and 
then accumulate within the tis-
sues of each animal in the food 
chain. The higher on the food 
chain, the higher the concentra-
tion of POPs in the animal.
The nature of the Arctic 
environment causes POPs to 
break down more slowly and accumulate in the food chain with 
more potency than they would in other environments.2 POPs 
arrive in the Arctic via atmospheric and ocean circulation pat-
terns which bring pollution from human sources to the Arctic.3 
There, POPs typically enter the food chain through plankton in 
sea water. When the plankton is eaten by fish, POPs accumu-
late in the fish, which are then eaten by larger fish or mammals 
which accumulate more POPs in their fatty tissues. Each step in 
the food chain creates a more concentrated reservoir of POPs.4 
The result of this cycle is that at the top of the food chain, 
humans, polar bears, and other large predators have chemical 
levels high enough to cause health effects5 even though the near-
est source of contamination might be thousands of miles away.6 
Reduced immune system function, reproductive effects, and 
behavior changes have been observed in many predators.7 The 
levels of POPs in some Inuit tribes in Greenland are so high that 
their breast milk and tissues could be classified as hazardous 
waste.8 As a consequence, their infants show altered brain devel-
opment and suffer greater infection rates because of reduced 
immune system function.9 
While the eight countries with territory in the Arctic have 
established an Arctic Council to provide a forum to discuss 
environmental and other issues,10 the very nature of pollution 
in the Arctic requires a worldwide solution. In 2001, countries 
around the world adopted the Stockholm Convention on Persis-
tent Organic Pollutants11 to reduce or eliminate twelve POPs 
(the “dirty dozen”), with provisions to include other substances 
in the future.12 The Stockholm Convention, which the United 
States has yet to ratify,13 is a step towards a real reduction or 
elimination of toxic chemicals from the environment in the Arc-
tic and elsewhere.14 
The Convention follows the precautionary principle and 
allows parties to regulate additional chemicals even if complete 
scientific certainty of their adverse effects is lacking.15 Nonethe-
less, the positive effects of regulated POPs will not yield imme-
diate positive effects in the Arctic due to the large reservoir of 
POPs remaining in the Arctic 
Ocean. 
The Arctic environment is 
unique and serves as a warning 
sign of the pressures humans 
place on the natural world. The 
Arctic Council is a forum for 
discussing issues facing the Arc-
tic as a whole, especially issues 
of environmental protection and 
sustainable development.16 The 
Stockholm Convention provides 
a worldwide framework and channel for countries to limit the 
harmful affects from accumulating POPs in the Arctic.17 In order 
to provide the special protection that the Arctic requires, parties 
to the Stockholm Convention should be ultra “precautious” and 
add additional POPs to the banned “dirty dozen.” More chemi-
cals should be added to the Stockholm Convention before accu-
mulation of yet-to-be-banned POPs reaches dangerous levels in 
the Arctic.
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A TAle of Two Poles: A ComPArATive look  
AT The legAl regimes in The ArCTiC And The AnTArCTiC  by Erika Lennon* 
introduction
The Polar Regions are often linked together due to their parallel physical location, frigid temperatures, and lim-ited accessibility. However, when compared by environ-
mental protections and governance, the Arctic and the Antarctic 
greatly differ. While the Antarctic has been pro-
tected by a binding legal regime since the 
mid-twentieth century, the Arctic 
has yet to receive the same treat-
ment. Now, with global warm-
ing wreaking havoc on both 
regions, the need for envi-
ronmental protections seems 
more imminent. The rapidly 
melting ice cap will likely 
have a dramatic effect on 
the world. A warming Arctic 
could result in changing global 
weather patterns, a rise in sea lev-
els, and the extinction of both wildlife 
species and indigenous peoples. Thus, it is 
in the best interest of humanity to encourage action 
designed to prevent harm to the Arctic due to global warming. 
Currently, the world is in the midst of the International Polar 
Year, a project to conduct research in the Polar Regions, which 
has increased focus on the poles.1 Given the physical mani-
festations of climate change, for example melting glaciers and 
ice caps, it appears as though the Antarctic and the Arctic will 
continue to be regions of concentration and concern. While the 
Antarctic has a treaty in place to protect it, the Arctic remains 
vulnerable due to its lack of comprehensive laws to determine 
a uniform governance system and environmental protections. 
Moreover, in the Arctic, competition between nations in the race 
to stake claims for resources threatens to further harm the envi-
ronment, as well as to overtake the debate on stewardship of the 
fragile environment. This Article examines the legal regimes in 
the Polar Regions in an effort to inform how existing regimes 
may aid in developing Arctic governance and environmental 
protections.
WorldS ApArt: geogrAphy
Geographically, the Antarctic and the Arctic differ greatly. 
Antarctica is a continent, a large, isolated land mass surrounded 
by water. In contrast, the Arctic is predominantly composed of 
the Arctic Ocean, which is surrounded by numerous countries, 
and covered with an ice cap. The Antarctic is more isolated both 
geographically and politically than the Arctic, which contains 
territories and pieces of land belonging to a number of differ-
ent sovereign countries. The Arctic’s geographic make-up poses 
difficulties in trying to determine the law governing it, unlike in 
the Antarctic. Further, the isolated nature of the Antarctic has 
resulted in no permanent population, which is not true of the 
Arctic, an area home to various peoples, including entire indig-
enous communities.2 The presence of a permanent 
population makes the Arctic dramatically 
different from the Antarctic since it 
means subsistence is an issue. So 
while the Antarctic has been 
deemed a “nature reserve,” 
the Arctic is unlikely to 
be deemed as such due to 
both the need for the Arctic 
peoples to survive and func-
tion economically, as well as 
rights that nations currently 
holding interests in the Arctic 
are unlikely to relinquish.3
Despite these physical, legal, and 
political differences, both the Antarctic 
and the Arctic are areas highly vulnerable to the 
impacts of climate change and their reactions to this will drive 
changes in the rest of the world.4 Though separated by the rest 
of the world, the two Polar Regions are inextricably linked, and 
thus one may help serve as a governance model for the other.  
legAl regimeS
The AnTArCTiC TreATy sysTem
The Antarctic Treaty System provides for the gover-
nance of Antarctica. At its core is the Antarctic Treaty, but it 
also includes the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the 
Antarctic Treaty (“Madrid Protocol”), the Convention for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Seals, and Convention of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources. Further, the Antarctic Treaty System 
incorporates the decisions made at the Meetings of the Parties of 
the Antarctic Treaty, as well as other decisions adopted by vari-
ous groups within it. Thus, the Antarctic Treaty System provides 
a legal regime with hard law, but it is also flexible and can adapt 
to change.
In the middle of the twentieth century, twelve nations, 
including countries from Europe, Asia, North America, and 
South America, created the Antarctic Treaty. Designed to pro-
mote peace and international cooperation in the region, the Ant-
* Erika Lennon is a J.D. candidate, May 2008, at American University, Washing-
ton College of Law. 
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arctic Treaty provided a framework for internationalizing and 
demilitarizing the continent to protect it for future generations.5 
Initially a preventative agreement to deflect conflict and the 
spread of a nuclear arms race, the Antarctic Treaty has adapted 
to protect the environment.6  
In the scramble to increase their influence in the world, 
including sovereign control of Antarctica, seven nations staked 
their claims on land in Antarctica 
based on “discovery, exploration, 
or geographic propinquity,” and 
still more had engaged in explo-
ration.7 However, the United 
States and the Soviet Union 
refused to recognize other coun-
tries’ claims, but still reserved 
their rights to claim land.8 At the 
time of the treaty negotiations, 
none of these claims resulted in 
violent conflicts, but uncertainty 
loomed. This instability was 
only increased by possibilities of 
natural resources existing on the frozen continent. These uncer-
tainties and the potential for the movement of nuclear weapons 
to the southern polar region prompted international action and a 
group of nations came together to discuss the status and future 
of Antarctica.9 
The Antarctic Treaty firstly declared that countries and peo-
ple could use the continent for “peaceful purposes only,” thus 
demonstrating that arms limitation was a motivating factor in 
the treaty creation.10 However, the Treaty further allows for sci-
entific investigation in the region, and encourages cooperation 
amongst the nations engaging in scientific research.11 The nego-
tiating countries wanted to promote scientific research, though 
did not want to allow the land grab to continue. Thus, the Treaty 
specifies that, while it is in force, no country shall claim sover-
eignty or attempt to create rights of sovereignty in Antarctica.12 
By preventing sovereign claims, the signatories ensured the 
continued existence of a peaceful Antarctic and also prevented 
future conflict over the control of potential resources. Further, 
the Treaty purports to cover the geographic region of Antarc-
tica including ice shelves, but does not attempt to go beyond 
the limits of the land, therefore excluding the high seas from the 
Treaty.13 
Thirty years after signing the Antarctic Treaty, parties 
adopted the Madrid Protocol.14 The Madrid Protocol expanded 
on the Antarctic Treaty by determining that, in addition to ensur-
ing that Antarctica would be used for peaceful purposes and sci-
entific research, the Antarctic’s ecosystem should be protected 
and so it designated the region as a “natural reserve.”15 This 
Protocol recognized that Antarctica occupied a unique posi-
tion in the world, including prior designations of the region as 
a conservation area, to support its claims that protection of the 
Antarctic ecosystem served all mankind’s interests.16 Therefore, 
the Madrid Protocol designated the Antarctic, “a natural reserve, 
devoted to peace and science.”17 To ensure this, the Madrid Pro-
tocol contains specific goals to avoid harming the environment, 
including limiting adverse effects on climate patterns and air and 
water quality, and avoiding activities that would be detrimental 
to the environment, further endanger already threatened species, 
or significantly alter the environment of the region.18 Addition-
ally, like the Antarctic Treaty, the Madrid Protocol calls for 
cooperation amongst the states to promote scientific research 
while maintaining the underly-
ing goal of keeping Antarctica a 
neutral area with no single coun-
try having sovereignty.19 
The Madrid Protocol high-
lighted the importance of the 
Antarctic ecosystem protection 
and transformed the Antarctic 
Treaty System from a Cold War 
era anti-arms race agreement 
to an environmental protection 
one. The Antarctic Treaty ini-
tially served to promote peace 
and prevent nations, primarily 
the United States and the Soviet Union, from using the Antarctic 
as a place to stockpile weapons, and while trying to accomplish 
this, it created a protected area for research and exploration that 
was free from division because no country could claim sover-
eignty. This also meant that no country could completely exploit 
the resources of the region. Then, the Madrid Protocol used these 
goals, namely its freedom from sovereignty claims, to declare 
the area a nature reserve and to promote the environmental pro-
tection of Antarctica and its fragile ecosystem.
The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals and 
the Convention of Antarctic Marine Living Resources govern 
two very specific areas of importance in Antarctica. These two 
conventions were enacted under the Antarctic Treaty to help fur-
ther protect Antarctica.
The ArcTic council 
In contrast to the legal regime in place in the Antarctic, the 
Arctic remains an area uncontrolled specifically by one inter-
national treaty. Currently, several treaties, such as the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”),20 the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships (“MARPOL 73/78”),21 the Polar Bear Treaty,22 and vari-
ous other bilateral and multilateral agreements govern certain 
aspects of activity in the Arctic. However, these treaties do not 
address all of the potential issues that are likely to arise in the 
Arctic, including which country will have sovereign control over 
some of the central most regions of the ocean or how to protect 
the environment specifically. Instead of a treaty system, there is 
the Arctic Council. 
The Arctic Council is a soft law regime that has no actual 
ability to make binding law, thus it serves as an advisory body. 
In 1991, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (“AEPS”) 
came into being as one of the first agreements to address the 
importance of protecting the Arctic environment.23 In develop-
ing the AEPS, the participating countries recognized the need to 
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work together to protect the Arctic since environmental problems 
and impacts were neither caused, nor felt by, just one country.24 
The drafting nations, now the Arctic Council, acknowledged that 
the vulnerability of the ecosystem necessitated protection of the 
Arctic. Further, the AEPS created several of the working groups 
that have since been incorporated into the Arctic Council, which 
is tasked with implementing the AEPS. 
Five years after creating the AEPS, in 1996, several states 
formed the Arctic Council.25 Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), 
Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and 
the United States of America, along with the permanent partici-
pants, which currently consists of six indigenous peoples groups, 
the Aleut International Association (“AIA”), the Arctic Athabas-
kan Council (“AAC”), Gwich’in Council International (“GCI”), 
Inuit Circumpolar Council (“ICC”), the Russian Association 
of Indigenous Peoples of the North (“Raipon”), and the Saami 
Council, comprise the Arctic Council.26 These six groups, repre-
senting the indigenous people that live in the Arctic, have further 
banded together to form the Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat to 
support the groups and ensure their role in the Arctic Council.27 
However, their role is limited because the indigenous peoples 
groups are not voting members. Additionally, the Arctic Council 
allows other non-Arctic nations, inter-governmental organiza-
tions, and non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) to play a 
role in the Arctic Council, though with observer status rather 
than actual power.28 These countries and groups can apply or be 
nominated to obtain Observer status.29 Thus, though not fully 
inclusive the Arctic Council does allow for participation by non-
Arctic countries. 
The Arctic Council is a soft law regime created to address 
environmental protection and sustainable development30 and 
includes countries with any land in the Arctic, though this is a 
larger group then those likely to be able to gain sovereignty over 
sea areas under UNCLOS.31 Additionally, unlike many trea-
ties, the Arctic Council has a rotating Secretariat.32  Every two 
years, the new chair determines objectives and develops a plan 
to achieve them.33 This presents a problem since it means that 
goals can change every couple years, which could hinder real 
work from getting done. However, Norway, the current chair, 
along with Denmark and Sweden, the next two chairs, realized 
that the ability to get things done required more then two years. 
In response, these countries created a plan with common objec-
tives and priorities, which will help promote Arctic protection 
through the continuation of programs designed to fight climate 
change through the implementation of ACIA recommendations, 
integrated management of resources, and implementation of pol-
icies stemming from IPY research, and create stability over the 
course of six years.34 Thus, the Arctic Council conducts research 
designed to enhance Arctic environmental protections, oversees 
activity in the Arctic, and works to protect it, but does so without 
creating any binding laws.
Further, the Arctic Council has six working groups each 
focusing on a various aspect of Arctic conservation. The work-
ing groups are the CAFF (the Conservation of Arctic Flora and 
Fauna working group), PAME (the Protection of the Arctic 
Marine Environment working group), SDWG (the Sustainable 
Development Working Group), AMAP (the Arctic Monitoring 
and Assessment Program), ACAP (the Arctic Contaminants 
Action Program), and EPPR (the Emergency Prevention, Pre-
paredness, and Response Working Group).35 Each of these 
working groups functions as an individual entity with its own 
secretariat, own meetings, and own mechanisms for conducting 
scientific research and carrying out the plans of the Arctic Coun-
cil.36 The CAFF and the PAME primarily focus their efforts on 
protecting the Arctic ecosystem, while SDWG focuses on the 
protection of the economic well-being and overall health of 
the Arctic people while promoting their lifestyle and economic 
development in an environmentally sustainable way.37 The new-
est working group, the ACAP, focuses on limiting and reducing 
the number of pollutants released into the environment.38 Thus, 
by focusing research on specific areas of conservation, these 
working groups promote environmental protection of the Arctic, 
and help the Arctic Council implement the AEPS.39
Each of these working groups has created environmental 
protection programs. For example, the CAFF created the Cir-
cumpolar Protected Area Network (“CPAN”), which is designed 
to promote biodiversity through the protection of a network of 
areas each of which has “a high probability of maintaining eco-
system health and dynamic biodiversity.”40 Thus, the CPAN 
links areas, akin to nature reserves, and preserves them so as to 
ensure continued biodiversity. Other working groups have insti-
tuted projects as well. The AMAP, which monitors and reports 
on the effects of numerous pollutants, ozone depletion, and cli-
mate change on the Arctic, reports back to the Arctic Council in 
an effort to influence its policies.41 These two programs demon-
strate how the working groups influence the Arctic Council and 
the diversity of programs they implement to protect the Arctic 
environment. 
The Arctic Council can create policies, though cannot 
enforce them as binding law. For example, the Arctic Council 
established Arctic Environmental Impact Assessments (“EIA”) 
Guidelines to help create uniform policies to promote sustain-
able development.42 These Arctic EIA Guidelines were not 
designed to replace any national or international EIA guidelines, 
but rather to create specific guidelines for issues faced when 
implementing projects in the Arctic.43 Further, the Arctic EIA 
Guidelines focus on cooperation, flexibility, and inclusiveness 
in an effort to ensure that all countries can participate and will 
work to ensure Arctic protection.44 The primary focus of these 
guidelines is to point out that the Arctic environment is unique 
necessitating different threshold levels and sensitivity criteria.45 
Here, the Arctic Council has tried to create a uniform system for 
all countries to use when conducting Arctic area EIAs; however, 
countries do not need to follow them.  
Through its working groups and draft guidelines for activi-
ties like EIAs, the Arctic Council works to govern activity in 
the Arctic. However, the Arctic Council remains disjointed since 
each working group has its own secretariat and its own home 
city, and the Arctic Council itself lacks a permanent secretariat. 
Additionally, as a soft law regime, the Arctic Council lacks the 
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power to create legally binding documents. Therefore, while the 
Arctic Council is a good start, it may be insufficient to protect 
the Arctic environment.
compariSon of the polar regionS
While the Antarctic and the Arctic are often linked together 
in discussions and projects such as the IPY, the two regions are 
far apart in legal protections. As the IPY framework document 
points out, the Polar Regions are “integral components of the 
Earth system” since they not only drive environmental changes 
around the world, but also respond to changes, such as global 
warming.46 Thus, the IPY is designed to take a scientific and 
research approach to learning 
more about these regions. How-
ever, it seems that other new 
projects focused on implementa-
tion and not just research must be 
undertaken to ensure the protec-
tion of the Arctic environment. 
The Antarctic has been 
accessible for exploration for 
longer than the Arctic has, given 
that much of the Arctic is an 
ocean covered in ice for large 
parts of the year, and therefore impassable by ships. However, 
the rapidly increasing melting ice indicates that soon the Arctic 
will be more accessible and navigable which will make natural 
resources more attainable. These environmental changes have 
created urgency to extend environmental protections and clarify 
political control of the Arctic. As the Norwegian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Jonas Støre stated in January 2008, “develop-
ments in our polar regions are both a serious warning and a call 
to action.”47 This is less of a problem in the Antarctic, where 
the Antarctic Treaty System implements the treaty’s provision 
ensuring that the region would be used for peaceful, scientific 
purposes48 and the Madrid Protocol ensuring that these activities 
do not harm the Antarctic environment.49 In contrast, the Arctic 
does not have an overarching legal regime in place governing all 
activity, but rather is governed by many different sources of law, 
both domestic and international, as well as by proposed stan-
dards such as the Arctic EIA Guidelines. 
Geographically, the sheer distance of the Antarctic from 
other countries diffuses the interests of any one nation, while 
the Arctic Ocean directly abuts the territory of individual nations 
and the Arctic region includes territories of several sovereign 
nations. Thus, treaties like UNCLOS, which governs much of 
the activity in the Arctic, do not play a large role in the Antarc-
tic.50 UNCLOS allows countries to claim sovereignty over an 
exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”), which is the area extending 
two hundred nautical miles from the coast. Therefore, the Arc-
tic, almost completely surrounded by various countries, is sub-
ject to division by nations trying to assert control of the natural 
resources there by claiming that areas are within their EEZ. 
Currently, though the Antarctic has more binding protec-
tions than the Arctic does, the increasing effects of global 
warming might cause this to change. Forty years ago, when the 
Antarctic Treaty came into being, the Antarctic was the land 
with resources the world wanted. Now, the focus is on Arctic 
resources, and as the Antarctic did prior to the treaty negotia-
tion, the Arctic lacks a binding regime not only to protect the 
environment, but also to determine which countries have control 
over the area. 
Unlike in the Antarctic where, under the Antarctic Treaty, 
countries were prevented from making further claims of sover-
eignty over the region, the Arctic is now facing a potential land 
or seabed grab. In summer 2007, Russia planted its flag on the 
Lomonosov Ridge on the basis that it was a continuation of its 
continental shelf.51 While this 
has little legal impact, it dem-
onstrates the potential conflicts 
that could arise. UNCLOS pro-
vides a mechanism for determin-
ing which country has sovereign 
control, but that mechanism 
requires scientific information 
about the ocean floor that is not 
easy to obtain.52 To date, the 
Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf has yet 
to approve either of the two proposals it has received involving 
regions in the Arctic.53 Therefore, UNCLOS may not be the best 
mechanism for determining which country controls which part 
of the Arctic. Recently, an article by Scott Borgerson warned 
that the increased access to Arctic resources and lack of legal 
regime could cause the Arctic to “erupt in an armed mad dash 
for its resources.”54 Thus, he recommended that the Arctic coun-
tries meet to create a treaty to address how to extract resources 
including an agreement on “how to carve up the region’s vast 
resource pie.”55 Antarctica, on the other hand, does not face 
this conundrum because the Antarctic Treaty prevents countries 
from making sovereign claims over the region.56
Additionally, without binding legal standards it is hard to 
ensure environmental protections. Each country has its own 
standards for shipping, air quality, and other similar environment 
related issues, however, no guarantee exists that these standards 
are the same across borders. While several treaties, including 
ones governing the law of the sea, the release of pollutants, and 
the protection of species, exist, none of these treaties specifically 
addresses Arctic environmental protection in and of itself. The 
Arctic Council works to protect the region; however, it lacks 
the enforcement mechanism and power to make the participat-
ing countries alter their actions. In contrast, the Antarctic is 
protected by the Madrid Protocol, a binding legal regime. Thus, 
the Antarctic really is an area of peaceful, scientific research as 
opposed to these goals being merely aspirational.
OptiOns fOr the future
Despite the urgency to act, the way to protect the Arctic 
is still unknown. The Antarctic Treaty System provides a very 
good model for environmental protection; however, the feasibil-
ity of a similar system working in the Arctic is unclear. The Ant-
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arctic Treaty focuses on using Antarctica for peaceful, scientific 
purposes and preventing any country from making sovereign 
claims.57 This works in Antarctica since it is an isolated, unpopu-
lated land mass, unlike the Arctic, which is not as isolated and is 
populated. Thus, to some extent the Arctic resources will have to 
be used, however, this can be done sustainably. While the Ant-
arctic is a natural reserve, political conflicts and the desire for 
natural resources might prevent the Arctic from being declared 
one as well. However, the Arctic Council has set up the CPAN to 
ensure the environmental protection of large portions of the Arc-
tic.58 Thus, the Antarctic Treaty System could inform a potential 
Arctic Treaty even if it cannot serve as a direct model. 
In contrast, some view the Arctic not as an environment 
to protect for the good of the world, but rather as a potential 
battleground for nations wanting the hidden natural resources.59 
As melting ice increases access to the region, more countries 
are likely to lay claim over areas with natural resources, such as 
petroleum. While a treaty may be necessary to prevent fighting, 
this approach could overlook the necessity of creating environ-
mental protections. Although, an Antarctic Treaty-like regime 
could come about to prevent the potential land grab. Regardless, 
the increased focus on the melting Arctic sea ice seems to indi-
cate that a more binding legal regime than the Arctic Council 
needs to be created. In creating this regime though, a primary 
focus should be on environmental protections, rather than on 
natural resources harvesting, because the world as a whole needs 
to ensure that climate change will not wreak havoc on the Arctic 
environment, and consequently the rest of the worlds.’
ConCluSion
While the Antarctic and the Arctic share similar attributes 
and are often referred to together, they differ in many respects. 
The Arctic lacks the comprehensive legal framework that has 
protected the Antarctic environment. Currently, the Arctic envi-
ronment has become a focus of concern as climate change, and 
the rapid rate at which the ice cap is melting, becomes a more 
prominent issue. However, there is not this level of concern for 
the Antarctic. Thus, now might be time to create binding laws, 
similar to those that protect the Antarctic environment, to protect 
the Arctic environment, and consequently the rest of the world.  
The Antarctic currently has relatively well-established 
protections, but the Arctic does not. Thus, as competition for 
emerging natural resources fuels new interest in the Arctic, and 
simultaneously climate change and IPY draw attention to envi-
ronmental concerns in the region, there is a unique opportunity 
for both progress and peril. While environmental concerns could 
get lost in a battle for resources, it is also possible that the cur-
rent political system will focus on pushing forward environmen-
tal agreements to prevent environmental change and protect the 
world. To not lose this battle, environmental protection plans 
must be developed and readied to be introduced in the interna-
tional arena either on their own or as part of another agreement 
when the time comes to act in the Arctic.
Endnotes: A Tale of Two Poles continued on page 65
mental harm in the Antarctic is increased. It will, I believe, 
in the long run exacerbate the likelihood of a scramble for impor-
tant, scarce and economically viable resources. 
Preventing Dis st  
as the arctic seas  
OPen fOr Business   
by Michael W. Lore*
Vessels navigate freely in the port of Helsinki, Finland this winter as the usually busy icebreakers standby idle.1 The retreating ice is creating the once-fabled Northwest 
Passage, allowing goods to travel between Western Europe and 
Eastern Asia with a 4,000-mile shortcut through the Canadian 
Arctic.2 The Russian Northeast Passage is also becoming more 
accessible, creating a huge potential for increased shipping and 
fishing traffic throughout the entire Arctic region. As traffic 
increases, countries with jurisdiction over the Arctic should con-
sider international agreements to protect against catastrophic oil 
or chemical spills in the region’s fragile ecosystems.
A looming environmental concern is that to save time and 
fuel, irresponsible or inexperienced crews on vessels of unregu-
lated countries could crash single hulled containers in the shal-
low Arctic waters and spill oil or hazardous chemicals into the 
fragile sea and land ecosystems. A huge oil or chemical spill, 
under existing circumstances, would be difficult to prevent and 
practically impossible to clean up. Moreover, Arctic wildlife 
consists of a few varieties of species that are found nowhere else 
on Earth.3 These species mainly breed in clustered groupings, 
which expose them to extremely high risks from potential oil or 
hazardous chemical spills.4
In anticipation of the melting ice, Russia has staked its claim 
to a huge area of the Arctic for oil and gas exploration,5 and 
Canada has asserted sovereignty over the Northwest Passage.6 
However, the Arctic environment requires more protection than 
any individual state or existing international legal arrangements 
provide.7 Russia does not possess the capacity to clean up oil 
spills in temperate areas,8 let alone in the more difficult condi-
tions that exist for oil clean-ups in the frigid Arctic waters.9 Can-
ada is constructing three new ships to monitor the Arctic and has 
plans to lay a cable to detect passing vessels this summer, but 
these resources may not be adequate to monitor all vessels and 
will not greatly help in alleviating shipping accidents.10 Maps of 
the shallow Arctic seafloor are improving but they are far from 
adequate.11 Furthermore, there are no international environmen-
tal agreements to set standards to safeguard against the rising 
threat of hazardous shipping disasters in the Arctic. 
Unlike Antarctica, which the UN declared non-commercial 
international territory with an enforceable protocol, the Arctic 
does not have an international protected status.12 The United 
* Michael W. Lore is a J.D. candidate, May 2009, at American University, Wash-
ington College of Law.
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States has been actively pushing the international community 
to consider the Canadian Arctic waters an ‘international strait,’ 
permitting international commerce to pass through the Cana-
dian waters freely under international law, while Canada argues 
that the environmental protection of the Arctic is better in their 
hands.13 International law defines an international strait with 
geographical and functional qualifications. The geographical 
standard is not so much in dispute as the functional qualification, 
which would require international travel between the Canadian 
straits.14 However, Canada does not currently have the resources 
to patrol the waters adequately to deter international usage.15 
Therefore, Canada may lose sovereignty over the waters as 
usage increases with the melting ice and there are insufficient 
enforceable international standards to protect the Arctic waters. 
The Ministers of Arctic countries in 1993 signed a ‘non-
binding’ declaration in Nuuk, Greenland to address the “special 
role and responsibilities of the Arctic Countries with respect to 
the protection of the Arctic environment.”16 In the draft decla-
ration, the United States emphasized the “Arctic uniqueness” 
in the effort to protect “the integrity of the aquatic, terrestrial, 
atmospheric and ice environments of the Arctic and their inter-
dependent ecosystems as whole to the region itself and to the 
global environmental processes.”17 Swedish officials proposed 
an Arctic Sustainable Development Strategy and noted that the 
future of the Arctic environment requires that environmental 
pressures and emergencies be prevented rather than reacted to.18 
This proposal was not adopted, however, and the actual Decla-
ration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council dropped its 
connection with the environment and stated that the declaration 
Polar bear tracks found near the Kapitan Dranitsyn. 
only “is directed to the unique aspects of the  Arctic and the spe-
cial relationship and contribution of indigenous people and their 
communities.”19 In order to prevent the foreseeable environ-
mental pressures and emergencies stemming from the increasing 
traffic in the Arctic, Arctic countries should formulate binding 
multilateral environmental agreements. 
The eminent increased human activity in the Arctic should 
spur Arctic countries to collectively create and monitor enforce-
able environmental regulations to mitigate the impending envi-
ronmental pressures on the Arctic. Prevention of ecological 
disaster in the Arctic must be actively pursued. A reactionary 
response to an oil or chemical spill in the Arctic will amount to 
a frantic endeavor that will teach us how careless we must have 
been to allow the accident to occur in the first place. Failing to 
prevent this foreseeable environmental disaster would be inter-
national negligence.
Endnotes:
1 Jesper Hansen, No Ice in Southern Finland, Arctic Council, Feb. 21, 2008, 
available at http://arctic-council.org/article/2008/2/no_ice_in_the_southern_ 
finland (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
2 Erica Westly, Arctic Land Grabs Could Cause Eco-Disaster, Discover,  
Aug. 30, 2007, available at http://discovermagazine.com/2007/aug/arctic-land- 
grabs-could-cause-eco-disaster (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
3 Davor viDas, Protecting the Polar Marine environMent 11 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2000).
4 viDas, id.
5 Westly, supra note 2.
6 Westly, supra note 2.
7 Monica tennberg, arctic environMental cooPeration 6 (Ashgate Publish-
ing Co. 2000). 
8 rick steiner sPeaks with John YDstie, Russia Not Prepared to Clean Oil 
Spill, NPR, Nov. 20, 2007, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=16452566 (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
9 Oil Spills, Air & Waste Management Association, May 1, 2000, available at 
http://www.awma.org/enviro_edu/fact_sheets/oil_spills1.html (last visited  
Feb. 22, 2008).
10 CBS News, Canada to monitor water traffic in Northwest Passage  
(Sept. 24, 2007), available at http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/09/24/ 
technology-passage.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Canada to 
monitor Northwest Passage].
11 Jesper Hansen, Mapping creates new scientific results, Arctic Council,  
Feb. 18, 2008, available at http://arctic-council.org/article/2008/2/mapping_
creates_new_scientific_results (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
12 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4, 1991, 
30 I.L.M. 1455 (entered into force Jan. 14, 1998).
13 Doug Struck, Dispute Over NW Passage Revived, Nov. 6, 2006, A18, 
wash. Post, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2006/11/05/AR2006110500286.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
14 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 38, Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
15 Canada to monitor Northwest Passage, supra note 10.
16 Nuuk Declaration, 1993, available at http://arcticcircle.uconn.edu/
NatResources/Policy/nuuk.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
17 tennberg, supra note 7, at 95. 
18 tennberg, supra note 7, at 85. 
19 Arctic Council, Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council,  
Sept. 19, 1996, available at http://www.arcticcouncil.org/filearchive/ 
Declaration%20on%20the%20Establishment%20of%20the%20Arctic%20
Council.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
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Hydrocarbon development and  
maritime  SHipping for tHe circumpolar  
arctic in tHe context of tHe arctic council 
and climate cHange
by Magdalena A K Muir*
introduction
The Arctic sea ice cover is undergoing an unprecedented transformation—sea ice thinning, a reduction in extent, and a reduction in the area of multi-year ice in the central 
Arctic Ocean. The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (“ACIA”)
Scientific Report documents overall changes, and also provides 
sea ice projections for the next 
century, which show increas-
ing ice-free areas in the coastal 
zones and increases in marine 
access throughout the Arctic 
Ocean.
One of the consequences 
of climate change for the Arc-
tic is the greater opportunity for 
hydrocarbon development and 
maritime shipping.1 This is in 
part due to climate change as a 
result of thinner ice and higher 
overall temperatures. Recent 
energy prices have increased political and commercial interest in 
exploiting these resources.2 Increased economic activity in this 
region, together with the current retreat of Arctic sea ice facili-
tates developments such as the Northern Sea Route around Scan-
dinavia, Russia, and Asia, and the Northwest Passage through 
the North American Arctic.3 Continued sea ice reductions will 
lengthen the navigation season in all regions and increase mari-
time access to the Arctic’s natural resources
climate change and arctic development
These changes represent both a challenge and an opportu-
nity for governments and local Arctic communities as traditional 
ways of life and natural ecosystems have been partially pro-
tected by the remote and extreme Arctic environment. Oppor-
tunities for resource development and marine transportation are 
additional challenges. Climate change may increase the fragility 
and decrease the resilience of sensitive Arctic environments, as 
well as the adaptability of its residents and indigenous peoples. 
Climate changes have been extensively documented in the 
ACIA Scientific Report, while the impacts of climate impacts on 
Arctic people are discussed in the Arctic Human Development 
Report, of both 2004. The ACIA Scientific Report is already 
well known,4 and its results have been incorporated in the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment 
Report.5
The Arctic Human Development Report is the first over-
view of human well-being covering the entire Arctic region.6 
Sponsored by the Arctic Council and published in 2004, the 
report was mandated under the 
Arctic Council’s 2002 Minis-
terial Declaration as a priority 
project designed to provide the 
knowledge base for the sustain-
able development work of the 
Council.7 The report contains 
eleven substantive chapters, and 
offers a wide-ranging scientific 
assessment of achievements and 
challenges relating to human 
development in the Arctic.8 Arc-
tic societies are resilient in 
response to change. Today they 
are facing an unprecedented combination of rapid and stressful 
changes involving environmental forces like climate change and 
socioeconomic pressures associated with global and regional 
development. At the same time, this report recognizes that the 
Arctic has become a leader in the development of innovative 
political and legal arrangements, including co-management 
regimes governing the use of natural resources, collaborative 
arrangements designed to facilitate cooperation between public 
governments and indigenous peoples organizations, and trans-
national arrangements like the Northern Forum and the Arctic 
Council itself. These regimes will also apply to hydrocarbon 
development and maritime shipping.9
* Magdalena AK Muir is a Research Associate, Arctic Institute of North America, 
University of Calgary, Canada and an Advisory Board Member, Climate, EUCC–
The Coastal Union (EUCC), Leiden, Netherlands. She has been engaged in cli-
mate issues since 2000 in the Arctic, Europe, and globally. She was Executive 
Secretary at Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna International Secretariat 
from 2002 to 2004, and in this capacity was involved with coordination and writ-
ing of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Scientific Report. Since 2004, she 
has been involved in European and global oceans and climate issues, including as 
an expert reviewer for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth 
Assessment.  Ms. Muir can be reached at makmuir@ieels.com.
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Circum-arctic assessments of hydrocarbon development 
and marine shipping are now occurring, which provide state of 
the art reviews of hydrocarbon development and marine ship-
ping in the context of this climatic and socio-economic change. 
Two of these assessments, the Arctic Oil and Gas Assessment 
and the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (“AMSA”), will be 
completed for the end of 2008, and are briefly reviewed in this 
Article. All these documents and policy initiatives have occurred 
under the sponsorship of the Arctic Council, and the eight cir-
cum-arctic governments and six international indigenous orga-
nizations that make up this Council. 
The member states of the Arctic Council are Canada, Den-
mark-Greenland-Faroe Islands,10 Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
Sweden, the Russian Federation, and the United States of Amer-
ica.11 The Council also includes international indigenous organi-
zations, which are also known as Permanent Participants. They 
are the Aleut International Association, the Arctic Athabaskan 
Council, Gwich’in Council International, the Inuit Circumpo-
lar Conference, Raipon and the Saami Council.12 The Arctic 
Council is a political organization but the scientific work of the 
Council, including the assessments discussed here, are carried 
out by six expert working groups that focus on issues such as 
monitoring, assessing, and preventing pollution in the Arctic, 
climate change, biodiversity conservation and sustainable use, 
emergency preparedness and prevention, and the living condi-
tions of Arctic residents.13 
arctic oil anD GaS aSSeSSment
In 2002, Arctic Council Ministers requested its working 
groups collaborate on an assessment of hydrocarbon activities 
in the Arctic, with the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Pro-
gramme (“AMAP”) Working Group coordinating the work.14 
The objective of the assessment is to present a holistic assess-
ment of the environmental, social, economic, and human health 
impacts of current oil and gas activities in the Arctic, and to 
evaluate the likely course of development of Arctic oil and gas 
activities and their potential impacts in the near future.  The 
assessment is intended to offer a balanced and reliable document 
for future management of oil and gas activities in the Arctic and 
is intended to be completed for 2008. 
The hydrocarbon assessment includes chapters on oil 
and gas activities; socio-economic impacts; input and fate of 
hydrocarbons in the environment; toxicity and organism-level 
impacts, including impacts on human health; and ecosystem-
level impacts. The final chapter provides an overall assessment 
and presents recommendations for scientific follow-up. Simi-
larly to the ACIA Scientific Report, there is an overview report 
for policy-makers and the general public. Earlier documents and 
two draft chapters on present on the AMAP website.15 
Key findings of the Arctic Oil and Gas Assessment are that 
extensive oil and gas activity has occurred in the Arctic, with 
much oil and gas produced and much remaining to be produced. 
Natural seeps are the major source of petroleum hydrocarbon 
contamination in the Arctic environment, and petroleum hydro-
carbon concentrations are generally low. On land, physical dis-
turbance is the largest effect. In marine environments, oil spills 
are the largest threat. The impacts on individuals, communities, 
and governments can be both positive and negative. Human 
health can suffer from oil and gas pollution and social disrup-
tion, but revenues can improve health care and overall well-
being. Technology and regulations can help reduce negative 
impacts, but responding to major oil spills remains a challenge 
in remote, icy environments. For the future, more oil and gas 
activity is expected, and many risks remain. However, planning 
and monitoring can help reduce risks and impacts.16
arctic marine ShippinG aSSeSSment
The Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment arises from the 
Arctic Marine Strategic Plan, which was adopted in 2004 by the 
Arctic Council. At that time the Protection of the Arctic Marine 
Environment Working Group was requested to conduct the 
assessment. This assessment is ongoing, and will be presented 
to the Arctic Council at the end of 2008. The assessment reviews 
existing marine shipping and projected marine shipping for 2020 
and 2050. The assessment will also include a discussion of the 
environmental, social and environmental impact on present mar-
itime activity and will project future activity. Last, the assess-
ment will provide analysis and recommendations. Additionally, 
there is a focus on AMSA datasets including datasets on ship-
ping, traditional and indigenous marine and ice uses, accidents, 
and ice conditions. A variety of interim documents are present 
on the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment website. The 
most recent discuss the future of navigation by the mid-century, 
and possible future scenarios for development, exploitation, and 
political stability.17 The combination of all these documents and 
datasets will facilitate a coherent approach to Arctic shipping 
and any development of regional or circum-arctic shipping, such 
as the Northeast or Northwest Passage.
concluSion
This Article has very briefly reviewed assessments of hydro-
carbon activity and marine shipping in the context of the Arctic 
Council and climate change. These assessments are part of an 
ongoing and extensive program of action of the Council, and 
will conclude by 2008. Like the Arctic Climate Impact Assess-
ment Scientific Report, each assessment will conclude but also 
contain the seeds of their continuance. These assessments form 
the groundwork of integrated approaches to hydrocarbon devel-
opment and maritime shipping that may be national, regional, 
circum-Arctic, or global. They also illustrate some of the unique 
approaches to resource management that are evolving in the 
Arctic. Parties interested in Arctic resource development and its 
management should follow these assessments, and related activ-
ities of the Arctic Council and its working groups through the 
websites and related news services and feeds.
Endnotes: Hydrocarbon Development and Maritime Shipping 
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mental harm in the Antarctic is increased. It will, I believe, 
in the long run exacerbate the likelihood of a scramble for impor-
tant, scarce and economically viable resources. 
Po ar Bears, il, and the ChukChi sea: 
the Federal Government sells mineral riGhts in Polar Bear haBitat  
in alaska  by Matt Irwin*
* Matt Irwin is a J.D. candidate, May 2009, at American University, Washington 
College of Law.
Recent developments in the Chukchi Sea in the Arctic Circle have pitted environmentalists and indigenous peoples against the federal government and the oil 
industry. The Department of the Interior’s Minerals Manage-
ment Service (“MMS”) has recently completed the lease sale 
of tracts of seabed located on Alaska’s continental shelf in the 
Chukchi Sea.1 The lease sale, which took place on February 6, 
2008, evidenced an increased interest by the oil industry in the 
Chukchi Sea, with a record setting 667 bids on 488 blocks of 
seabed and $2.6 billion in total high bids.2 The MMS estimates 
that the area contains approximately 15 billions barrels of con-
ventionally retrievable oil and 77 trillion cubic feet of conven-
tionally retrievable natural gas.3 
Drilling for oil and natural gas in the Chukchi Sea has 
numerous potential negative environmental effects. One of the 
most pressing environmental issues in light of the lease sale will 
be the plight of the polar bear.4 Oil extraction in the Chukchi 
Sea has a threefold impact on polar bear survival. First, because 
the Chukchi Sea area is home to approximately one-tenth of the 
world’s polar bears, drilling for oil and natural gas in the Chukchi 
Sea poses potential harm to polar bear survival from threats like 
oil spills and damage to the local ecosystem from the oil and 
gas extraction.5 One environmentalist’s estimate of the potential 
for an oil spill was as high as fifty percent.6 The second means 
by which oil extraction in the Chukchi impacts the survival of 
polar bears, and other Arctic wildlife, is perpetuating reliance 
on fossil fuels that contribute to climate change. Climate change 
poses perhaps the largest threat to polar bear survival because 
the break up of Arctic ice sheets due to higher temperatures in 
the Arctic diminishes the range for polar bears to hunt, decreases 
the ability of mothers to search for proper den sites, and reduces 
the availability of den sites.7 Finally, the amount of accessible 
oil and gas in the Chukchi Sea perpetuates the economic viabil-
ity of the Trans-Alaska pipeline and forestalls the end of easy 
oil extraction in Alaska.8 The recent rise of oil prices has made 
investment in the difficult terrain of the Chukchi Sea and extend-
ing the lifetime of the Trans-Alaska pipeline attractive to oil 
companies and investors, despite fears and protests by environ-
mental groups and Native Americans.9 
By an interesting, if not suspicious, coincidence, the polar 
bear was to have the final decision of its listing under the Endan-
gered Species Act (“ESA”) publically released before the lease 
sale on January 8, 2008. However, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service (“FWS”) declared on January 7, 2008 that it would post-
pone the release of the final decision for approximately thirty 
days.10 As of March 23, 2008, this decision has not been pub-
lished. Listing polar bears as endangered or threatened under 
the ESA creates many difficulties in creating a recovery plan on 
the macro level due to the role of global climate change.11 In 
regards to the potential listing of the polar bear under the ESA 
and the recent lease sale in the Chukchi Sea, the director of the 
FWS has stated that the oil companies that have bid on tracts in 
the Chukchi Sea will have to comply with the potential listing 
of the polar bear under the ESA.12 The MMS has also stated 
that it will not allow oil exploration to take place within fifty 
miles (eighty kilometers) from shore to limit the potential harm 
to wildlife habitat in the Chukchi region.13
A group of plaintiffs, including Indigenous groups and local 
towns in the Chukchi region along with environmental advocacy 
groups, filed suit against the MMS and the FWS in the Federal 
District Court in Juneau, Alaska on January 31, 2008.14 The 
suit alleges, among other things, that the current environmental 
impact statement submitted by the MMS has failed to assess the 
impact of climate change and other potential impacts resulting 
from oil and gas extraction in the Chukchi region.15 The next 
few months and possibly years will no doubt see intense litiga-
tion and scientific inquiry as to the impact of mineral extraction 
in the Chukchi Sea on the survival of polar bears.
Endnotes: Polar Bears, Oil, and the Chukchi Sea
 continued on page 67
Polar bear with cub.
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Mitigating Black carBon as a MechanisM  
to Protect the arctic and Prevent aBruPt 
cliMate change 
by Marcel De Armas & Maria Vanko*
introDuction
Climate change is impacting the Arctic earlier and more intensely than any other area of the planet. Win-ter temperatures have increased as much as three-to-
four degrees Celsius in the past fifty years1 and are projected 
to increase four-to-seven degrees Celsius over land areas and 
seven-to-ten degrees over the Arctic Ocean by the end of the 
century.2 One industry that looks likely to benefit, at least in the 
short term, from the effects of the diminished Arctic sea ice is 
shipping. 
As the region warms, there is an expec-
tation of increased industrial develop-
ment and resource extraction, as 
well as tourism, including the 
cruise industry.3 The open-
ing of Arctic shipping lanes 
will reduce global ship-
ping time and costs, 
shortening the journey 
between Japan and the 
United Kingdom by 
as much as five thou-
sand miles.4 
Over the past 
century, Arctic sea ice 
has diminished con-
siderably and contin-
ues to decline, making 
shipping and increased 
resource development in 
the Arctic a reality. A direct 
human influence that decreases 
reflectivity of Arctic and other ice 
is the soot, or black carbon (“BC”), that 
is produced when fossil fuels are burned.5 
BC emissions significantly contribute to the 
melting Arctic, and reducing such emissions 
may be “the most effective way we know to 
retard Arctic warming.”6
Because BC is relatively-short lived in 
the atmosphere, regulation of this pollutant 
is an important strategy to prevent abrupt climate change. BC 
produced from burning conventional fuels is largely unregulated 
and plays a significant role in climate change. As increased ship-
ping and industrial development in the Arctic becomes a reality, 
there is an urgency to include the shipping industry under a com-
prehensive global climate change agreement and to include BC 
in such an agreement. This Article explores the need to include 
reducing BC emissions and the shipping industry in a post-2012 
comprehensive climate change regime.
the arctic thaw
In 2007, the Arctic summer sea ice extent reached a record 
minimum level, with coverage twenty-three percent lower than 
it was relative to the previous record set in 2005 
and thirty-nine percent lower than the long 
term average from 1979 to 2000.7 
NASA reports that perennial sea 
ice, the thicker, older ice that is 
less-prone to melting, steeply 
decreased over the 2008 
winter season, despite 
cold temperatures.8 This 
perennial ice once cov-
ered as much of fifty 
percent of the Arctic, 
and now covers less 
than thirty percent.9 
Sea ice researchers 
now believe that the 
Arctic summers could 
be completely ice free 
in as early as 2030, con-
sequently opening both 
the Northwest and North-
east Passages.10 
Arctic sea ice plays a partic-
ularly important role in global warm-
ing because its reflectivity helps reduce 
the absorption of solar radiation, thereby 
reducing atmospheric temperature.11 The 
loss of sea ice results in greater heat absorp-
tion due to the decreased reflectivity of the 
surface. Humans influence the reflectivity of 
snow and ice by burning fuels—e.g., coal, oil, 
* Marcel De Armas & Maria Vanko are J.D. candidates, May 2008, American 
University Washington College of Law.
Image of the potential  
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gas, waste, and wood—and creating BC that settles on the snow 
and ice.12 BC darkens the surface of the ice which decreases 
reflectivity and increases the absorption of solar radiation, thus 
resulting in faster heating and melting.13 A thawing Arctic will 
in turn lead to additional greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions as 
carbon dioxide (“CO2”) and methane that are stored in the per-
mafrost are released as it melts.14 
Black carBon 
A recent study has found 
that BC provides the second 
strongest contribution to cur-
rent global warming, after CO2 
emissions.15 Fortunately, BC is 
short lived in the atmosphere, 
usually lasting a few days to a 
couple of weeks in the atmo-
sphere compared to CO2, which 
has a lifetime of one hundred 
or more years.16 Unfortunately, 
BC is a highly forcing agent of 
climate change,17 and has perni-
cious localized impacts that are 
not exclusive to the Arctic. BC exacerbates desertification and 
flooding,18 hastens melting of ice sheets and glaciers,19 perturbs 
monsoon season,20 and contributes to hundreds of thousands of 
deaths a year and adverse health effects for many more.21 While 
most aerosols have a global cooling effect by reflecting sunlight, 
BC absorbs sunlight, thus heating the surrounding air and con-
tributing to regional heating and climate change.22 Even though 
BC is not always emitted with other aerosols, it tends to inter-
mingle with them, thus masking BC’s radiative forcing. Thus, 
a targeted effort to reduce BC would be important even if other 
aerosols continue to exist in atmospheric brown clouds.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) 
estimated BC’s global warming potential between 0.2 and 0.4 
watts per square meter (“W/m2”).23 However, recent studies 
suggest that this amount is underestimated and inaccurate. A 
recent study found climate forcing of BC is 0.9 W/m2; this “is as 
much as 55% of the CO2 forcing and is larger than the forcing 
due to the other [greenhouse gases] such as CH4, CFCs, N2O or 
tropospheric ozone.”24 The effects of BC have previously been 
underestimated because BC is emitted with other aerosols—e.g., 
sulfate particles.25 These aerosols mixed with BC reflect sun-
light; as a result they increase the probability that the light will 
be absorbed by soot particles nearby, hence they are reflecting 
the light to the BC.26 Furthermore, when BC gets into the upper 
atmosphere, it absorbs light reflected by the surface—especially 
snow, glaciers, and ice sheets—and clouds, thus contributing 
to the warming of the planet.27 This highlights BC’s warming 
potential because not only does it absorb heat from the sun, but it 
absorbs heat that was to be reflected back to outer space. 
Historically North America and Western Europe were 
responsible for BC emissions, however, developing nations, par-
ticularly in Asia, are now the main source of BC emissions.28 
China and India alone account for twenty-five to thirty-five per-
cent of global BC emissions.29 BC emissions and its effects vary 
by region. For example, the “majority of soot emission in South 
Asia is due to biofuel cooking, whereas in East Asia, coal com-
bustion for residential and industrial uses plays a larger role.”30 
China highlights the rapid growth of BC emissions in developing 
countries; between 2000 and 2006 China doubled its BC emis-
sions.31 In comparison, the United States emits about twenty-one 
percent of the world’s CO2, but 
only 6.1 percent of the world’s 
soot.32
One reason for the reduced 
BC emissions in North Amer-
ica and Western Europe is air 
quality standards, technology 
standards, and restrictions on 
particulate emissions.33 These 
standards are lacking in the 
shipping industry and typically 
in the developing world. Out-
side of the shipping and power 
generation industries, the major 
sources of BC include: (1) bio-
mass burning—burning of forests and savannas; (2) residential 
biofuels and coal—used for heating and cooking; (3) diesel 
engines—emits 25 to 400 times the amount of particulate matter 
than a gasoline engine.34 
Black carBon controls May Prevent  
aBruPt cliMate change and Provide localized 
PuBlic health Benefits
By reducing BC emissions the world may buy some addi-
tional time before severe effects of climate change are felt, 
possibly allowing for the reduction in GHG emissions to a sus-
tainable level. If unchecked, Arctic warming has the potential 
for catastrophic global impacts, such as sea-level rise; a com-
plete melting of the Greenland ice sheet would raise ocean levels 
by seven meters.35 Implementing controls to limit BC emissions 
may help prevent the climate system from passing the tipping 
points for abrupt climate changes, such as the disintegration of 
the Greenland and/or Antarctic ice sheets.36 The quickest impact 
on reducing BC emissions and to provide climate benefits would 
be to focus on the shipping and power generation sectors in East 
Asia that have the potential for the BC to settle in the Arctic. 
Tackling the agricultural and residential sources will require 
addressing the underlying cause of poverty. 
Tackling biomass burning, and residential cooking and heat-
ing may prove to be difficult, since sources involve thousands 
or millions of individuals with limited resources.37 However, 
there is the possibility of increased financial and development 
assistance to otherwise reduce the emissions through technolo-
gies such as low-cost fuel-efficient stoves, and the development 
of electricity grids. Reducing BC emissions would also provide 
strong positive benefits for public health in developing nations. 
Exposure to BC from cooking over open fires has been linked to 
pneumonia in young children, chronic bronchitis in women, and 
increased blood pressure.38 Switching to non-BC emitting cook-
A recent study has 
found that BC provides 
the second strongest 
contribution to current 
global warming, after  
CO2 emissions.
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ers, such as solar or bio- or natural gas may result in a seventy 
to eighty percent reduction in BC heating over South Asia; a 
twenty to forty percent reduction in East Asia; and potentially 
reduce 400,000 annual fatalities among women and children that 
are attributed to smoke inhalation.39 These preventable deaths 
are in addition to the thousands of cardiopulmonary and lung 
cancer deaths attributed to particulate matter (“PM”), including 
BC, emissions from ships near the coastlines of Europe, East 
Asia, and South Asia, in 2002 estimated at 60,000.40 
the Global climate treaty reGime,  
the ShippinG inDuStry, & black carbon
The UniTed naTions Framework ConvenTion  
on ClimaTe Change and kyoTo ProToCol
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (“UNFCCC”) was adopted in 1992 and entered into force 
in 1994 as a framework for action and cooperation on the issue 
of climate change.41 The Objective of the UNFCCC and any 
related legal instrument is the “stabilization of GHG concentra-
tions in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”42 While 
the UNFCCC does not currently limit BC emissions or identify 
BC as a defined GHG, its framework sets forth principles and 
mechanisms that enable it to address BC emissions, even as the 
science underpinning BC and its contribution to climate change 
is refined. Furthermore, the Kyoto Protocol does not regulate the 
shipping industry, thus undermining its goal of emission reduc-
tions while allowing a large emitter to keep emitting.
The Kyoto Protocol is a product of the UNFCCC and sets 
binding limits of CO2 and other greenhouse gases for developed 
country parties for the period of 2008–2012.43 Under the Kyoto 
Protocol, developing nations do not have to reduce their emis-
sions, but can participate in the Clean Development Mechanism 
(“CDM”), which enables the developed member countries to 
invest in emission-reductions in developing countries, result-
ing in credits, that can count toward their emission goals.44 BC 
emissions are not regulated under the Kyoto Protocol,45 thus 
developing country reduction activities will not qualify for CDM 
credits. However, some CDM projects have incidental BC emis-
sion reductions so long as they also qualify for CO2 credits.
46 
With its limited time frame and participation, the Kyoto 
Protocol was meant as only a first step to solving the climate 
problem.47 With the Kyoto Protocol set to expire in 2012, it is 
important to consider controlling global BC emission, as well as 
recognize the role of the shipping industry, as the Conference 
of Parties (“COP”) to the UNFCCC crafts a post-2012 climate 
agreement is written.
inCorPoraTing BC inTo a PosT-2012 ClimaTe TreaTy 
Under The UnFCCC
Currently, BC is not included in the UNFCCC framework, 
but with the new research surrounding BC, it is imperative that 
it is included in the post-Kyoto framework. This may include 
amending the UNFCCC to include BC as a GHG. BC reduc-
tions can provide important climate insurance, particularly with 
respect to slowing the melting of the Arctic. As a framework 
agreement, the UNFCCC is the institutional framework for suc-
cessive protocols and amendments. The UNFCCC sets forth a 
series of principles to guide successor agreements, which will be 
revised as time and science progresses. One of the overarching 
principles to the UNFCCC is the precautionary principle, which 
urges parties to take precautionary measures to “anticipate, pre-
vent, or minimize the causes of climate change and prevent its 
adverse effects.”48 The principle provides that where there are 
“threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such 
measures.”49 The growing scientific knowledge surrounding 
BC’s contribution to anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system combined with the precautionary principle embodied in 
the UNFCCC is grounds to incorporate BC regulations into the 
successor-Kyoto agreement.
Addressing BC emissions under the Kyoto Protocol is also 
salable under the common-but-differentiated responsibilities 
principle embodied in the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC requires 
parties to be guided “on the basis of equity and in accordance to 
their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities.”50 Accordingly, under the UNFCCC, full consid-
eration is to be given to the specific needs and circumstances of 
developing country parties. 
Under the common-but-differentiated responsibility prin-
ciple, as implemented in the Kyoto Protocol, developing country 
Parties do not have to make any binding emission reductions. 
This approach would not necessarily be successful for control-
ling global emissions of BC. In particular, the developed (Annex 
I) Parties to the Kyoto Protocol generally have already imple-
mented strategies to reduce PM emissions, through domestic 
statutes like the U.S. Clean Air Act. Since the bulk of BC emis-
sions comes from the developing world and economically viable 
and tested technology already exist to reduce BC emissions from 
stationary sources, both developed and developing countries 
should take steps to reduce BC emissions and hopefully prevent 
abrupt climate change events. 
There is the ability to control BC emissions from the devel-
oping country Parties available through the mechanisms that 
bind all Parties, developed and developing, to the UNFCCC. 
The UNFCCC provides that all Parties will, inter alia, imple-
ment national plans that include measures to mitigate climate 
change51 and promote and cooperate in technology transfer.52 
The framework also provides that the extent to which develop-
ing country Parties will implement their commitments is linked 
to developed country’s commitment of financial resources and 
technology transfer, taking into account that social develop-
ment and poverty eradication are the paramount priorities of the 
developing country Parties.53 
The Bali Action Plan, agreed upon by the 13th Conference 
of Parties to the UNFCCC, encourages the development and 
transfer of technology to developing country Parties in order to 
promote access to affordable environmentally sound technolo-
gies.54 The process should recognize the climate benefits and 
poverty eradication, social development, and health co-benefits 
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of providing technology assistance to developing country Par-
ties to limit their BC emissions. Such environmentally sound 
technologies may include lower-BC emitting stoves for heating 
and cooking, scrubber technology for power plants, and better 
fuel refining technology. This may open a viable mechanism 
to promote technology transfer of 
cooking stoves to address the cli-
mate impacts, as well as the health 
and development benefits of the 
world’s poor.
The Shipping induSTry 
As mentioned earlier the Kyoto 
Protocol does not set limitations on 
BC emissions, nor does it set any 
limitations on the global shipping 
industry. Ocean going vessels are 
instead regulated under the Inter-
national Maritime Organization 
(“IMO”), which has been slow to place any GHG measurement, 
monitoring, or limitations on the industry. Indeed, there is no 
current, comprehensible and reliable data on global GHG emis-
sions from international shipping.55 However, reports indicate 
GHG emissions from the shipping industry are not insubstantial. 
For example, one study estimates GHG emissions from ocean-
going vessels are at least three percent of the world’s total,56 an 
aggregate total higher than many of the developed-country Par-
ties to the Kyoto Protocol. The study suggests that amount may 
be underreported as the estimates are based upon sales of bun-
ker fuel, which is suspected to be underreported.57 Indeed, that 
suggestion seems to have validation in a report that was leaked 
to the press from the International Association of Independent 
Tanker Owners (“INTERTANKO”). INTERTANKO’s report 
suggests that emissions are twice what previously believed, and 
may total 1.2 billion tons per year, or as much as six percent of 
the world’s total.58
In fact, these reports and estimates are worse than they 
appear, because ship emissions are usually released in clean 
environments.59 Some of these environments suffer dispropor-
tionately from shipping’s emissions, such as the Arctic ecosys-
tem with its ice and snow loss. As the Arctic loses ice-cover, 
even small amounts of emitted and deposited BC will further 
exacerbate Arctic melting. 
The few GHG regulations on the shipping industry that the 
IMO has proposed are still in its nascent stages, particularly for 
BC. The IMO International Correspondence Group on Green-
house Gas Related Issues noted the high Global Warming Poten-
tial (“GWP”) of BC, however, deferred to the ongoing revision 
of MARPOL Annex VI to address this issue. Unfortunately, 
the revised MARPOL Annex VI does not as of yet address BC. 
The revised proposal, which can be adopted by member govern-
ments in October 2008 and entered into force by 2010, would 
cap the sulfur content of marine fuels by 0.5 percent world wide 
by 2020; limitations would fall in stages to 3.5 percent by 2012, 
currently sulfur limit is 4.5 percent.61 This is clearly insufficient 
and counterproductive to all the efforts the global community 
has put into reducing acid rain and GHG emissions. Moreover, 
it avoids the issue of PM, including BC, which kills thousands 
of individuals annually and would be one of the most destruc-
tive forces aiding global warming in the Arctic, if the shipping 
industry increases it presence 
in the Polar Regions. The 
Arctic would be the more 
susceptible of the two poles 
because of the interest in the 
Northwest and Northeast 
Passage shipping routes. 
Either through the IMO, 
the post-Kyoto framework, 
or at the very least at the 
national level the shipping 
industry should be required 
to implement some easy and 
practicable steps to reduce 
BC emissions. The simple installation of scrubbers on ships or 
reducing to an ultra-low sulfur fuel would be a step in the right 
direction to reduce ships’ BC emissions.62 Additionally, even 
without technology changes, shipping companies could require 
their fleets to reduce their speed—ships that slow down by ten 
percent use twenty-five percent less fuel.63 Ports should encour-
age (or require) ships to reduce their engine use as they approach 
the shore and the port, and once the ship is at the port, the port 
should require ships to rely on shore power instead of their 
engines—relying on shore power will reduce particulate emis-
sions because of regulations in many industrialized countries and 
will eliminate carbon and particulate emissions if shore power is 
generated by renewable sources, such as wind or solar.64 
Moreover, countries and the shipping industry need to 
keep innovating ways to reduce emissions and copy successful 
approaches by other companies. Two items shipping industry 
should keep an eye on to reduce emissions and fuel costs is the 
use of high tech kites to harness the winds, thus reducing fuel 
consumption,65 and the possibility of switching to alternative 
fuels for short routes or for routes that can quickly develop the 
infrastructure to supply alternative fuels.66 
ConCluSion
With the increasingly ice free Arctic and the increase in 
under-regulated shipping undermining the efforts of many 
countries to reduce emissions, there needs to be a change in the 
approach taken to regulate shipping. It seems as if the indus-
try is unwilling to regulate itself, and its regulatory body, the 
IMO, is moving to slow and ignoring global action on climate 
change. In addition, we are rapidly learning about BC’s threat 
to our  climate and planet, luckily we can do something about 
it now. BC is proving to have negative effects on human health 
and fragile ecosystems, such as the Arctic. Yet industrialized 
countries have been reducing their BC emissions for many years 
and should encourage and assist developing countries to do the 
same. 
By reducing BC emissions 
the world may buy some 
additional time before 
severe effects of climate 
change are felt.
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 The concern for the Arctic is particularly acute, because 
climate change’s impacts are disproportionately felt at the poles 
and because of the large amounts of sea ice loss. This ice loss 
implicates shipping due to its interest in the Northwest Passage 
and the Northeast Passage. Ships without appropriate control 
technology would emit large amounts of BC that would rest 
on the Arctic ice, speed up ice and snow melting, and reduce 
surface albedo; this would speed up the cycle of Arctic melt-
ing and global warming overall.67 Because BC can have such 
a disastrous effect on the Arctic, and predictions that it is the 
second or third largest warming agent, behind CO2 and meth-
ane, it is necessary for the IMO or any post-Kyoto framework 
to include shipping and BC, because every reduction helps. Cur-
rently the technology exists to reduce BC emission from industry 
and shipping, which would create an immediate benefit for the 
global fight against climate change due to its short atmospheric 
lifespan. The question remains, however, if the political will to 
require some changes is available.
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The ForgoTTen norTh: PeoPles and lands in Peril
By Ursula Kazarian*
introduction
Arctic indigenous peoples are extremely susceptible to the immediate impacts of climate change. While many indigenous groups face serious battles over rights 
to land and resources, the Arctic groups face the impending, 
compounding factor of some of the most drastic impacts from 
climate change. Their dependence on the integrity of local eco-
systems for their survival as autonomous groups makes them 
even more vulnerable to the melting of ice and permafrost and 
to the decline of local animal and fish species.1 This Article pro-
vides a broad overview of Arctic countries’ legal relationship 
to their respective indigenous groups and discusses legal tools 
available to Arctic indigenous groups to protect their traditional 
existence from the impacts of climate change in light of compet-
ing national interests.
defining indigenouS environmental rightS  
in the arctic  
in the climate change context
The preservation of indigenous culture and traditional 
knowledge in the Arctic is both directly and indirectly threat-
ened by the rapid and dramatic environmental changes occur-
ring in the region. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (“IPCC”), warmer temperatures and unpredict-
able weather patterns have already caused increased incidences 
of non-fatal heart attacks and respiratory diseases. In addition, 
the residual effect of climate change—such as a reduction in tra-
ditional sources of food—has led to a shift to western diets and, 
consequently, to an increase in diet-related diseases including 
diabetes and obesity.2 Therefore, beyond encouraging environ-
mental protection in the Arctic solely for its own intrinsic value, 
it is important to recognize the distinct challenges that climate 
change and the warming Arctic have created, and will continue 
to create, for the indigenous peoples whose survival as such is 
so intricately tied to the environmental integrity and health of 
the region. 
While the right to self-determination of peoples was clearly 
codified in 1984,3 the details of the “group rights” that fall under 
this rubric vary depending on the structure of national legal 
systems and the integrity of national enforcement mechanisms. 
There are international legal tools for the protection of minor-
ity groups against ethnocide,4 for individuals against cruel treat-
ment, and for indigenous peoples.5 
The United Nations Special Rapporteur to the Sub-Com-
mission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, Indigenous Groups defines communities, peoples 
and nations as
. . . those which having a historical continuity with pre-
invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on 
their territories, consider themselves distinct from other 
sectors of societies now prevailing in those territories, 
or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant 
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, 
develop, and transmit to future generations their ances-
tral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis 
of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance 
with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and 
legal systems.6
This definition, or a closely related variation of it, has been used 
in numerous legal contexts as human rights law develops.
The continued traditions and cultural fabric of the Arctic 
indigenous peoples are clearly distinct from the cultures of the 
nation-states in which they reside. These peoples are generally 
not integrated into the cultural fabric of the rest of the nation-
state, at least in part, because of the extreme physical conditions 
that have led to geographic isolation of the groups and less phys-
ical intrusion by foreign populations. Their livelihoods depend 
on the ecosystems that surround them. Thus, if the preservation 
of their culture and traditions is recognized by relevant national 
legislation, according to international legal principles, an obli-
gation exists to respect the natural systems upon which those 
peoples survive. 
* Ursula Kazarian is a J.D. candidate, May 2009, at American University, Wash-
ington College of Law.
figure 1: eStimate of arctic population, 1990.
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Nonetheless, creating consensus to solve the climate change 
crisis has proven a formidable task. Competing interests include 
inter alia countries’ right to development,7 fair trade principles,8 
and indigenous rights. Climate 
change litigation invites the addi-
tional difficulty of proving causa-
tion for recoverable harms. While 
filing individual claims in national 
and international courts certainly 
increases attention to a subject, if 
the causation is impossible to pin-
point, then the resulting precedent 
would not be particularly useful 
in repairing the harms caused by 
global warming. It will thus take 
the adoption of new attitudes 
in the courts of Arctic countries 
to enforce the laws already in 
place to protect their indigenous 
groups, as well as the continued 
development of new legal regimes 
in the region, to create the case for compensating—and just as 
importantly, for preventing—those harms that are either a direct 
or indirect result of climate change.
While courts and committees battle over how to address the 
global impacts of climate change on local levels, the very nature 
of the problem is progressing more quickly than had been antici-
pated. Ice sheets in Antarctica and Greenland are melting faster 
than predicted, and in the latter case, the topographical nature 
of the glaciers may result in the ice sheet sliding into the North 
Atlantic Ocean, with devastating consequences.9 While scien-
tists have debated the cumulative impacts of the disintegrating 
ice sheet in western Antarctica and the apparent thickness of the 
ice on the eastern side of the continent,10 the landless Arctic is 
clearly disappearing at an alarming rate. Scientists predict that 
the summer presence of the Arctic ice cap will completely disap-
pear by 2050, if not sooner.11 Along with the changing physical 
landscape, the growing geopolitical significance of the Arctic 
and its resources is unequivocally clear.12 National governments 
are well aware of the accelerated melting rates in the Arctic and 
thus the increased access to previously inaccessible hydrocarbon 
reserves, and they may be preparing to exploit the rapid change 
in environmental conditions for energy stores and economic 
gain. Thus, national and international climate change law must 
progress to prevent irreparable harm to the region and the people 
who live there, as well as address any grievances related to cli-
mate change, when, not if, they occur.
aDDreSSing the effectS of climate change  
in the arctic
IndIgenous RIghts: CuRRent natIonal legIslatIon 
and Case law 
Every Arctic country has a different legal and custodial rela-
tionship with its respective indigenous peoples. However, it is 
clear that defending indigenous rights in light of climate change 
will be directly linked either to past national precedent or else by 
international cooperation. Given the frequent and obvious con-
flict between protecting indigenous rights and the national right 
to development, it is no won-
der that the greatest hope to 
preserve indigenous rights lies 
generally through international 
mechanisms.
Thus, a brief overview of 
each Arctic country’s relevant 
legal systems and the histori-
cal development of opportuni-
ties for indigenous peoples on a 
national level is helpful.
Norway
According to Scott For-
rest of the University of North-
ern British Columbia, Norway 
has adopted the most “assimi-
lationist” policy towards its 
indigenous peoples out of all of the Nordic countries. He writes,
Whereas Sweden-Finland made a legal distinction 
between land uses based on herding and those of agri-
culture, originating with the establishment of taxlands 
. . . Norway acknowledged no such difference. Nor-
way’s attitude toward the Sami is evidenced in a 1902 
law, which granted land ownership only to Norwegian 
speakers. The effects of Norwegian legislators’ nega-
tive attitudes towards the Sami way of life are seen in 
the various statutes designed to regulate the practice.
 The Reindeer Herding Acts (RHA) of 1854 and 
1933 were not designed to protect reindeer herding and 
the Sami way of life, but to ensure that herding did not 
interfere in the development of other ‘culturally and 
economically superior’ land uses such as farming and 
forestry.13
Forrest therefore views Norwegian policy as putting the coun-
try’s right to development ahead of indigenous rights. 
Sweden
According to Forrest, Sweden has taken progressive steps 
with regard to Sami rights, but only when they are in alignment 
with protecting the rights of non-Sami Swedes:
Swedish law makers took a narrow interpretation of 
Sami ethnicity based almost exclusively on economic 
activity. Those that participated in a ‘traditional Sami’ 
livelihood (primarily reindeer herding) were classi-
fied as Sami. Likewise, Sami that pursued agriculture 
were considered Swedes or Finns. Paternalism thus 
only applied to reindeer herders, while Sami who chose 
other activities were legally and culturally assimilated.
 The Reindeer Herding Act (“RHA”) of 1886 
embodied this philosophy as it granted hunting and 
fishing rights on designated lands only to herding Sami. 
These activities were considered as supplemental to the 
Warmer temperatures 
and unpredictable 
weather patterns have 
already caused increased 
incidences of  
non-fatal heart attacks 
and respiratory diseases.
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primary Sami activity of reindeer herding. Non-herders 
who previously had once enjoyed land use for subsis-
tence purposes were now prevented from doing so. The 
long term effect of these instruments has been to cause 
factionalism among the Sami between herders and non-
herders. The 1886 and 1898 RHAs also specified that 
the Sami’s right to the land was usufruct (right of use), 
not ownership.
 Worse was to come in the 1928 RHA, which cre-
ated a Lapp sheriff administration to regulate Sami 
reindeer herding. This marked a new era in state-Sami 
relations in Sweden. The motivation for herding leg-
islation in this period was not the protection of herd-
ing, but of the new agricultural settlements that were 
developing in the north. A policy of segregation was 
thought to be the best approach to minimize herder-
settler conflicts.14
Forrest, while critical, concedes that Sweden has, in fact, 
been cognizant of the Sami’s right to herd reindeer, an activity 
that is critical to their cultural survival. In the 1988 case, Kitok v. 
Sweden, the UN Human Rights Committee considered a Swedish 
decision to uphold a Sami village’s denial of letting a member 
back into the village after he had left his work in reindeer hus-
bandry.15 Under Swedish law, a Sami who undertakes another 
occupation for three years loses membership rights to herd rein-
deer, unless the village votes to return membership status to that 
person. In this case, the village denied Ivan Kutok that privilege 
after he had abandoned reindeer husbandry due to economic 
misfortune and then later wished to return. The Committee held 
that Sweden did not violate Kitok’s rights under Article 2716 of 
the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights. The Committee further upheld the reasoning from a 
Canadian case, Lovelace v. Canada,17 that collective survival for 
an indigenous group may take priority over the individual rights 
of a single member. This may not build a clear or direct founda-
tion for future climate change cases, but the deference given to 
Sami self-governance may play a factor when considering argu-
ments to preserve the Sami way of life through environmental 
protection.
Finland
Unlike Norway and Sweden, reindeer herding is not legally 
reserved as a Sami right. One of the first significant changes to 
reindeer herding in Finland was the transformation of the tra-
ditional siida system into government defined reindeer districts 
under Russian rule in 1898.18 Under this arrangement, herders 
were required to be registered in one of these districts, and the 
state had the right to limit the number of reindeer in each dis-
trict. As in Norway and Sweden, the objective of this adminis-
trative restructuring of Sami territory was to provide a system 
of compensation for damage done by reindeer.19 This system 
had the unintended effect of allowing the herds to safely wander 
throughout the district for much of the year without attention. 
This encouraged many non-Sami farmers to adopt reindeer herd-
ing either as a secondary or primary economic activity.20 The 
1948 Reindeer Husbandry Act granted every Finnish citizen the 
right to breed reindeer in an appropriate district, and the Sami 
lost what rights to the land they had occupied under the siida 
system. Now, reindeer herding in Finland is flourishing, but the 
Sami are now a minority among herders and must seek legal 
means to exercise their claim to their land.21
In addition to allowing all Finnish citizens to compete with 
the Sami in the field of reindeer herding, the Finnish government 
has encroached upon Sami territory through logging and mineral 
exploitation. In Landsman v. Finland, the UN Human Rights 
Committee did not find a violation of Article 27 under a self-
determination analysis, although it noted that an increase in such 
activities would merit a reconsideration.22 In the precedent case, 
Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, the Committee had found similar 
activities to violate cultural integrity guarantees under Article 
27.23 As a result, the Finnish government has come under criti-
cism for violating the Samis’ rights.
Greenland and the Faeroe Islands (Denmark)
Despite a self-ruling Greenlandic government, the Queen of 
Denmark is still the head of state for both Greenland and the 
Faeroe Islands. Although the government of Denmark has put 
forward a strategy on protecting indigenous rights,24 there has 
been very little information about the implementation of the 
strategy or the enforcement of any indigenous rights laws. 
Russia
The Russian Federation lists forty-four distinct indigenous 
peoples with populations under 50,000 as having special rights 
and protections under the Constitution and federal laws and 
decrees.25 Article 69 of the 1993 Constitution for the first time 
explicitly established the guaranteed rights of small indigenous 
peoples “in accordance with the generally accepted principles 
and standards of international law and international treaties of 
the Russian Federation.”26 The Constitution effectively over-
rides any regional or federal legislation that might endanger 
small indigenous groups; however, federal and regional legisla-
tion can be used to expand these rights.27 
A 1992 Presidential decree ordered the councils of minis-
ters of the republics of the Russian Federation and all local and 
regional authorities to demarcate the territories inhabited and 
used by indigenous minorities for their traditional activities.28 
Additionally, the 1999 Law on Guarantee of Rights of Indig-
enous Minorities guarantees socio-economic and cultural devel-
opment to all indigenous minorities of the Russian Federation, 
protection of nature in the traditional places they inhabit, their 
traditional way of life, economic activities, and occupations.29 
However, despite these laws, enforcement and implementation 
have been cited by numerous groups as the key problems to actu-
ally protecting indigenous rights. It is becoming ever more pop-
ular to take human rights cases to the European Court of Human 
Rights (“ECHR”), although Russia has not always adhered to 
the decisions ECHR has handed down to it. 
Canada
Canada is home to many indigenous groups, with the Inuit 
covering the most territory. A significant achievement for the 
Inuit was the creation in 1999 of the territory of Nunavut, which 
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means “Our Land” in the Inuit language, Inuktitut. As land is 
considered a fundamental right to the preservation of culture and 
identity, it is important to note that aboriginal title in Canada can 
be extinguished in two ways: by constitutional amendment, and 
by agreement of the aboriginal people concerned.30 Although the 
creation of Nunavut appears to be a victory in self-government, 
the Inuit have in fact ceded their aboriginal rights and title in 
exchange for a grant of rights from the Canadian government—
something that could, in theory, open the door to a future consti-
tutional amendment that would revoke the viability of Nunavut’s 
semi-autonomy.31 This is significant in that the Inuit must take 
great care as to how they proceed within Nunavut’s internal 
structure as well as with regard to Nunavut’s political relations 
with the Canadian federal government. 
Finally, while the Inuit comprise the largest ethnic majority 
in the Canadian north, they are actually the smallest group of 
aboriginal people in Canada. Other northern indigenous peoples 
include the Tlingit, Innu, Cree, Gwich’in, and Metis, who inhabit 
and claim aboriginal titles to Northern Territories.32 There have 
been the usual conflicts over land rights, and the overlap between 
indigenous rights and environmental protection will surely be an 
increasingly pursued topic in Canadian courts.
United States
The United States has historically dealt with its Alaskan 
natives in a very different manner from the native tribes living in 
the continental United States. When the United States acquired 
the territory of Alaska from Russia in 1867, Alaskan natives 
had a functioning relationship with the Russian Empire. There 
were very few ethnic Russians living in Alaska at that time, and 
the few settlements they did inhabit were generally imperma-
nent.33 When the United States took possession of the vast ter-
ritory, Alaskan natives were clearly able to see the strife that 
had plagued the natives of the continental United States since its 
inception and sought to avoid similar problems concerning title 
and rights to land and resources. 
The 1884 Organic Act for the Territory of Alaska acknowl-
edged the aboriginal right to possession of traditional territory 
until Congress passed such legislation as to specify the terms of 
future title acquisition.34 The Supreme Court later found that the 
Organic Act did not recognize absolute aboriginal title but did 
acknowledge and preserve continuing aboriginal rights, subject 
to Congressional action.35 
Fearing legal entanglement that would lead to termination 
and thus non-recognition of their special status, native groups 
joined together to push forward the Alaska Native Claims Settle-
ment Act (“ANCSA”) in 1971, through which Alaskan natives 
traded aboriginal claims to vast tracts of land for recognized title 
to smaller tracts of land and a total monetary compensation of 
$962.5 million.36 However, the passage of ANCSA caused ambi-
guity in the status of native hunting and fishing rights and was 
followed in 1980 by the 1980 Alaska National Interest Lands 
Conservation Act (“ANILCA”). ANILCA, in turn, included pro-
visions for a preference for subsistence rights over commercial 
and sport interests on federal public lands in Alaska, although it 
did not limit the subsistence preference to natives.37 
Although ANILCA helped to clarify some of the concerns 
left by ANCSA, the fight to clarify native subsistence rights con-
tinues. For instance, in Amoco Production v. Village of Gambell 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the outer continental shelf was 
outside the boundary of Alaska as defined by ANILCA and there-
fore was not subject to the subsistence provisions of  ANILCA.38 
By this decision, the Court favored the interests of oil production 
over the competing indigenous hunting and fishing rights. This 
is a perhaps ominous indication of the difficulties the Alaskan 
natives will encounter in bringing climate change-related claims 
to U.S. federal court.
Thus, no established precedent has yet been set in any of these 
countries to directly link climate change, environmental protec-
tion, and indigenous rights to self-determination in the Arctic. 
However, the tide may be turning, as creative new uses of estab-
lished legal tools are being developed to address the direct causal 
link between climate change and rights to cultural preservation.
The Use of The U.s. Alien TorT ClAims ACT To 
hold mUlTinATionAl CorporATions ACCoUnTAble
The use of Alien Torts Claims Act (“ATCA”)39 against 
multinational corporations (“MNCs”) to address wrongs suf-
fered by individuals or groups has become increasingly popu-
lar in U.S. courts in recent years. Long after its awakening in 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,40 the ATCA has become a new tool to 
bring MNCs that abuse human rights to justice. In Aguinda v. 
Texaco, the New York federal court heard claims by citizens—
mostly indigenous tribal leaders—of Ecuador’s rainforest region 
that Texaco’s operation of an oil pipeline through their lands 
caused environmental degradation that resulted in illness and 
destroyed their traditional way of life in the forest, and there-
fore destroyed their livelihood. Finding in favor of Texaco, the 
Court dismissed the claim under ATCA on the basis of forum 
non conveniens, allowing the case to go to the Ecuadorian court 
system.41 The Court did not, however, claim that the case should 
not have been held in the United States; it merely held that in 
that particular case, Ecuador was the proper jurisdiction. In fact, 
in 2003 the federal district court in New York looked to Agu-
inda when deciding to hold Talisman Energy, Inc. responsible 
in the United States under ATCA for human rights violations in 
Sudan, stating: 
in deciding the forum non conveniens motion, the Sec-
ond Circuit [in Aguinda] painstakingly weighed the 
various factors militating for and against trying the 
action in the United States. Such analysis would have 
been wholly superfluous if there was no subject matter 
jurisdiction to try the case in federal court in the first 
place. Thus, the recent Aguinda decision adds credence 
to the notion that corporations may be held liable for 
international law violations under the ATCA . . . 
 While the Second Circuit has not explicitly held 
that corporations are potentially liable for violations of 
the law of nations, it has . . . acknowledged that corpo-
rations are potentially liable for violations of the law of 
nations that ordinarily entail individual responsibility, 
including jus cogens violations.42
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 The Court in Talisman thus helped to further the growing 
judicial consensus that MNCs can and will be tried in U.S. courts 
under ATCA for human rights violations.43 Thus the ATCA is a 
potential tool for Arctic indigenous populations residing outside 
of the United States who are adversely impacted by U.S. MNCs 
violations.
The Use of The PUblic NUisaNce DocTriNe To holD 
MUlTiNaTioNal corPoraTioNs accoUNTable
Since the ATCA cannot apply to U.S. citizens,44 the indige-
nous peoples of Alaska would be unable to file a tort claim under 
ATCA. However, the Inupiat Eskimo tribe of Kivalina in north-
ern Alaska recently filed a complaint under public and private 
nuisance law and conspiracy in District Court for the Northern 
District of California against several oil and gas companies. The 
village is suing the companies for their role in causing and deny-
ing global warming and thereby causing the massive ice melt 
that threatens their traditional existence and is forcing them to 
relocate their village.45 A positive result for Kivalina could sig-
nal the emergence of a devastating trend for oil and gas compa-
nies in the United States.
Moreover, at least theoretically, the non-U.S. jurisdictional 
Arctic indigenous groups could file claims under ATCA against 
any number of corporations that are large emitters of greenhouse 
gases, for contributing to climate change and thus destroying 
their traditional ways by means of environmental degradation. 
The main issue would be to prove that actively contributing to 
climate change through sustained emissions is either in contra-
diction to a U.S. treaty, or is contrary to customary international 
law on the basis of jus cogens. At present, proving either of these 
claims would be extremely difficult if not impossible; however, it 
is one option to consider as jurisprudence regarding the impacts 
of climate change continues to develop. Finally, even if future 
case law acknowledges the causal link between climate change 
and self-determination rights of Arctic indigenous peoples, the 
focus may shift to the question of proper compensation. 
In 1997, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied damages 
to Alaska natives from the Exxon Valdez oil spill, finding that 
although the natives were more severely affected by the oil spill 
than non-natives, the actual injury to their cultural, spiritual, and 
psychological benefits was no different than that of non-native 
Alaskans.46 Whether such reasoning is applied to Kivalina’s 
complaint may signal the legal trend for climate change-related 
damages. However, the policy question of enforcing corporate 
responsibility may support Kivalina’s position. For instance, 
the payment for the relocation of a tribe, as the Kivalina village 
requests, may not be enough to promote a change in the poli-
cies of oil companies that would actually halt the environmental 
degradation from business activities; it would simply compen-
sate the tribe for the displacement. Punitive damage awards may 
offer one possible method to help promote the change of cor-
porate business ethics that impact global warming and climate 
change; however, how courts will respond to complaints such as 
that of Kivalina remains to be seen.
oTher Tools for NaTioNal reMeDies Via  
iNTerNaTioNal coUrTs
Aside from seeking a decision on the national level, and 
while regional instruments such as the Arctic Council47 are under 
development, indigenous groups also have the option of utiliz-
ing more broadly based international mechanisms. The binding 
level of the decisions of international bodies, however, depends 
on whether a given country has agreed to supranational jurisdic-
tion. For instance, Russia has not ratified several of the Protocols 
specifying particular types of human rights, and this has fueled 
widespread controversy in addition to existing criticism over its 
compliance with European Court of Human Rights decisions.48 
The vast expanse of Russia’s northern territory, coupled with a 
marked deficiency in official information pertaining to the rights 
of indigenous peoples, results in extreme uncertainty as to how 
the rights of Russia’s indigenous groups will be respected in the 
future.
Another example is the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (“IACHR”). Unlike the European human rights system, 
an individual cannot bring a claim directly into the system; he or 
she must first file the claim with the Commission, and upon its 
approval it may be forwarded to the Court. A substantial portion 
of the cases heard so far has been from indigenous groups, and 
the jurisprudence has leaned in favor of enforcing indigenous 
rights throughout the Americas.49 
However, the decisions are only binding in countries that 
have ratified the Convention and submitted to the contentious 
jurisdiction of the Court either on a blanket or individual case 
basis. The two Arctic countries in the Americas, Canada and the 
United States, have ratified the Convention, but they have not 
submitted to the Court’s jurisdiction. In 2005 the Inuit Circum-
polar Conference submitted a petition to the Commission that 
called for an investigation into the United States’ contributions 
to global warming and for action to be taken.50 It is an encour-
aging step forward in increasing awareness, but it is question-
able whether it will encourage any change in U.S. activity. If 
the Court is to have any “teeth” in addressing Arctic indigenous 
claims regarding climate change, the jurisdiction of the Court 
over both of the Arctic countries presents a critical necessity.
In sum, securing jurisdiction over the countries of the Arctic, 
including Russia, the United States and Canada, remains a major 
hurdle for the two regional institutions. Until national level leg-
islation opens itself to international influence, enforcement of 
any of the decisions of international courts is less likely. The 
same holds true for the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”): 
while it will not be able to hear a case unless a country submits 
to its jurisdiction, the Court can still give an Advisory Opinion 
which can serve the same purpose as the non-binding opinions 
of the regional human rights courts. It is thus up to the appropri-
ate UN agencies to bring cases to the ICJ for such opinions.
The recently released IPCC report lists policies, instru-
ments, and co-operative arrangements to mitigate the impacts of 
climate change worldwide.51 These recommendations are gener-
ally aimed at economic incentives and strategies at the nation-
state level. While this is probably the most effective direction 
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to take at the international legal level, the best national-level 
mitigation strategy for the peoples whose lives are effectively 
outside of the nation-state system, remains a question. The 
patchwork of different fora for discussion of these issues offers 
promise that at least the Arctic’s ecosystems and its peoples will 
not be ignored; however, the need for a streamlined approach 
for the region—cutting across Russia, Scandinavia, Canada, and 
the United States—is arguably apparent. Petitions to the IACHR 
for one set of tribes and to the ECHR for another set, with little 
to no recourse for groups in Russia, results in a dispersed and 
weakened minority group that threatens to be forgotten in the 
maelstrom of increasing state economic activity in the region. 
concluSion
International law is developing more quickly than domestic 
law in addressing the needs of indigenous peoples, particularly 
with respect to climate change. International legal institutions 
recognize the overlap between environment and human rights as 
a critical factor to protecting cultural and traditional integrity, as 
indigenous peoples are viewed as particularly vulnerable to eco-
logical degradation. The most dramatic effects of climate change 
are being seen in low-lying coastal areas in the tropics as well 
as in the polar regions, and especially in the Arctic. Not only 
are the ice melting and the ecosystem changing; countries are 
clamoring to stake their claims to exploration for oil and gas on 
the now navigable continental shelf. Such new industrial activity 
would bring even more change to the places Arctic indigenous 
peoples call home. 
Though the dialogue on the international level may be more 
willing to acknowledge the moral responsibility to protect indig-
enous culture and tradition, the real implementation and enforce-
ment of such principles must necessarily come from binding, 
national-level initiatives and legislation. International pressure 
to strengthen existing national laws or to create new ones that 
properly reflect the relationship between indigenous cultures 
and global warming induced environmental changes will cer-
tainly play an important role in the coming years; however, until 
national governments take the definitive step to expressly rec-
ognize and protect these rights, the future of these northernmost 
indigenous communities remains uncertain.
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mental harm in the Antarctic is increased. It will, I believe, 
in the long run exacerbate the likelihood of a scramble for impor-
tant, scarce and economically viable resources. 
T e GreaT Thaw: NaTioNal SecuriTy aT The Top of  
a MelTiNG world  by Matthew Padilla*
* Matthew Padilla is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University, Wash-
ington College of Law.  
During the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-zation (“NATO”) sought to contain the Soviet Union’s territorial expansion. After a period of calm, which cul-
minated in the fall of the Soviet Union, the world is once again 
witness to national claims over disputed territory and resources. 
In August of 2007, the Rus-
sian Federation became the first 
nation to literally place their flag 
on and claim the North Pole and 
the resources that are believed to 
exist underneath.1 “The Arctic 
is Russian” said Artur Chilin-
garov, a Russian leader of the 
expedition returning from the 
thawing pole.2 To which coun-
try the Arctic belongs to is at the heart of the current debate, 
and the contest has real national security implications which will 
have to be dealt with as the great thaw in the north continues.
Climate change has led to significant ice reduction in the 
Polar Regions.3 The resulting thaw has led to competition over 
what the U.S. Geological Survey estimates to be a quarter of the 
planet’s remaining energy reserves.4 In addition, newly opened 
shipping routes, specifically the Northwest Passage near Canada 
and the Northern Sea Route near Russia are adding to the com-
plexity of claims between the nations.5 
The five Arctic countries vying for recognition of their 
claims are the United States, Canada, Russia, Denmark, and 
Norway. The Law of the Sea Treaty allows for Arctic countries 
to map out their territorial claims within ten years of submission. 
The northern countries have been making their claims, but not 
without controversy over where the boundaries actually should 
lie because of the great latent wealth which may exist under the 
ocean floor.6 The United States, however, is at a disadvantage 
in regards to staking its economic claims because it not a party 
to the Law of the Sea Treaty. Despite support from a biparti-
san majority of the Senate, President Bush, the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, and the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard, some 
Senate Republicans have continued to stall the United States’ 
ratification of the treaty because they believe that the treaty 
would hinder U.S. sovereignty.7
Many national security experts do not believe that this mod-
ern race for territorial acquisition will resort to military force.8 
Scott Borgerson, a Fellow for the Council on Foreign Relations, 
believes that there are historical reasons for optimism and he 
cites the Antarctic treaty as an example in which despite a con-
tentious time during Cold War, parties were able to negotiate 
territorial claims peacefully.9 Nonetheless, the report also notes 
that while “armed confrontation remains unlikely, tensions over 
territorial waters hearken back to the kinds of border disputes 
that once led to interstate war.”10
The U.S. military has recognized the national security 
implications due to global warming. In a report commissioned 
by the U.S. Navy, titled “National Security and the Threat of 
Climate Change,” eleven retired 
Admirals and Generals recog-
nized that global climate change 
and national security are inter-
twined.11 The report cited the 
Arctic as a “region of particular 
concern” because of the added 
operations which will be con-
ducted as shipping increases and 
more resources are mined from 
the ocean depths.12 In addition, the report calls global warming 
a “threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile 
regions of the world.”13 
The U.S. Coast Guard has been at the frontline of polic-
ing Arctic resources. Admiral Gene Brooks has called the Ber-
ing Strait the “new Strait of Malacca” because of an anticipated 
increase in shipping traffic between Europe and the Pacific as 
the northern passages open.14 The Strait of Malacca is the nauti-
cal passageway and chokepoint through which shipping passes 
from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. Such increased traf-
fic will add to the strain of missions already undertaken by U.S. 
vessels underway.15
It is important to view these events in the grand scheme of 
international order and balancing. Whichever country acquires 
the bulk of the Arctic resources will likely be at a strategic eco-
nomic advantage over other national powers. Russia has already 
used its growing gas and oil resources to influence its neighbors 
and other countries in a manner contrary to U.S. security goals.16 
Furthermore, the melting ice in the Arctic should be viewed as a 
symptom of the global disruptions which will occur worldwide 
due to increased temperatures, affecting regimes large and small 
and creating a host of new security problems for states.17 The 
United States in particular may be drawn into more “stability 
operations” such as those undertaken during Hurricane Katrina 
and the Asian Tsunami.18 The United States’ national security 
issues arising from melting Arctic ice can be ameliorated, but 
the first step is to engage the global community through trea-
ties, such as the Law of the Sea, while making strides to reduce 
carbon emissions.19 
Endnotes: The Great Thaw continued on page 68
Climate change has led  
to significant ice reduction 
in the Polar Regions.
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Litigation Update
new Jersey v. epa
by Nathan Borgford-Parnell*
introDuction
On February 8, 2008 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia vacated two Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) actions, the first to delist mercury emitting coal and 
oil-fired electric utility steam 
generation units (“EGUs”) from 
section 112 of the Clean Air Act 
(“CAA”), and the second to limit 
mercury emissions, under the 
much less restrictive, CCA sec-
tion 111 with the new Clean Air 
Mercury Rule (“CAMR”).1 The 
suit was filed by the state of New 
Jersey, along with thirteen other 
states, environmental organiza-
tions, and industrial groups.2
legal backgrounD  
anD argumentS
In 1970, Congress amended 
the Clean Air Act, adding sec-
tion 112, requiring EPA to list 
and regulate hazardous air pol-
lutants (“HAPs”) that “cause, or 
contribute to, an increase in mortality or an increase in serious 
irreversible or incapacitating reversible illness.”3 In response to 
the EPAs extremely slow application of section 112, Congress 
returned to the issue of HAPs in 1990 by strengthening section 
112 to require EPA to list and regulate over one hundred specific 
HAPs. The amended section 112 required that EPA regulate 
all new and existing sources of HAPs to reflect the “maximum 
reduction in emissions which can be achieved by application of 
the best available control technology.” 4 Additionally, section 
112(c)(9) restricted EPAs ability to delist a HAP source without 
first determining that “emissions from no source is the category 
or subcategory concerned . . . exceed a level which is adequate 
to protect public health with an ample margin of safety and no 
adverse environmental effect will result from emissions from 
any source.”5
In 2000, in response to an EPA study linking anthropogenic 
releases of mercury with methylmercury levels in fish, EPA 
Administrator announced as “appropriate and necessary”6 the 
listing of coal- and oil-fired EGUs as source categories for HAPs 
under section 112.7 Coal and oil 
EGUs are the largest anthropo-
genic source emitters of mercury 
in the United States. In 2004 
EPA revisited its decision of 
listing coal- and oil-fired EGUs. 
After reviewing a number of 
alternatives EPA decided to del-
ist coal- and oil-fired EGUs as 
HAP sources under section 112 
and institute the less restrictive 
Clean Air Mercury Rule. Under 
the CAMR, EPA proposed to 
limit mercury emissions from 
new and existing coal and oil 
EGUs, and develop a volun-
tary cap-and-trade program to 
reduce mercury emissions.8
The petitioners in the 
case contended that EPA, in delisting coal and oil EGUs, vio-
lated the plain text and structure of section 112(c)(9) delisting 
 requirements. During the trial the EPA admitted that it had not, 
and could not make the findings required under CCA Section 
112(c)(9) for delisting a HAP source. However, EPA offered 
three arguments for the legitimacy of its decision, regardless of 
the section 112(c)(9).
First, EPA contended that its decision was justified through 
its interpretation of section 112(n)(1)(A) which requires EPA 
Administrator to conduct a study of each HAP listed in section 
112. Following the study, EPA determines whether it is “neces-
sary and appropriate,” to regulate EGU as HAP sources. EPA 
contended that section 112(n)(1)(A) does not restrict the agency 
from reviewing previous decisions of “necessary and appropri-
*Nathan Borgford-Parnell is a J.D./M.A. candidate, May 2009, at American Uni-
versity, Washington College of Law.
The court found no 
ambiguity in section 112 
and held that the  
EPA’s argument  
“deploys the logic of 
the Queen of Hearts, 
substituting EPA’s desires 
for the plain text…”
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ate” listings of EGUs. If EPA finds that a listing of source EGUs 
had not in fact been “necessary and appropriate,” it contended 
that it could delist those sources without meeting the delisting 
requirements of section 112(c)(9). Secondly, EPA argued that 
the court should defer to the agency’s interpretation of section 
112, stating that it is ambiguous and calls into question whether 
EGUs should be regulated at all. Finally, EPA pointed out that 
it has previously delisted HAP sources without satisfying the 
requirements of section 112(c)(9).
HoldingS
As for EPA’s first argument, the court agreed that typically 
agencies may reverse a previous “administrative determination 
or ruling where the agency has a principled basis for doing so.”9 
However, Congress has the power to restrict an agency’s ability 
to reverse its self. The Court found that the delisting restriction 
in section 112(c)(9) represented an expressed limit on EPA’s 
discretion to delist HAP sources. Furthermore, the Court found 
that EPA’s position would nullify section 112(c)(9) and allow 
the agency to delist any source without regard for the statutory 
delisting process.10
In analyzing EPA’s request for judicial deference the court 
utilized the two-pronged test laid out in Chevron. Under the first 
prong of the test the court looked to determine if “Congress has 
directly spoken to the . . . issue.”11 Looking at the plain lan-
guage of the statute, the court pointed to section 112(c)(6) where 
Congress expressly discusses regulation of EGUs.12 The court 
found no ambiguity in section 112 and held that the EPA’s argu-
ment “deploys the logic of the Queen of Hearts, substituting 
EPA’s desires for the plain text . . .”13 Finally, the court found 
EPA’s third argument unconvincing, pointing out that previous 
examples of statutory violations are not an excuse for current 
violations.14
Finding all three of EPAs arguments without merit, the court 
vacated the delisting of coal- and oil-fired EGUs. Under EPAs 
own interpretations, the mercury regulation under CAMR cre-
ated within CCA section 111 cannot be used to regulate sources 
listed in section 112. With this in consideration, the Court also 
vacated CAMR and remanded it to EPA for reconsideration.
ConCluSion
Environmental groups have hailed the Court’s ruling as a 
victory for the health of all Americans by invalidating an attempt 
by EPA to get around the much stricter standards required by 
CCA section 112 with a weak cap-and-trade program under 
CAMR.15 The petitioners contended that the cap-and-trade pro-
gram would have done little to cap mercury in the short term 
and would have delayed any actual reductions by a decade or 
more.16 After the decision, one petitioner’s attorney stated, “We 
hope the administration will gain some new respect for the law 
in its last year and start working to protect Americans from pol-
lution and stop working to shield polluters from their lawful 
cleanup obligations.”17
1 See New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
2 Press Release, New Jersey Office of the Attorney General, Federal Appeals 
Court Rules in Favor of NJ and Vacates EPA Mercury Rules (Feb. 8, 2008), 
available at www.nj.gov/oag/newsrelease08/pr20080208b.html (last visited 
Apr. 25, 2008).
3 New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 578.
4 New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 578.
5 New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 579.
6 New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 579.
7 New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 579.
8 New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 579.
 New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 582.
10 New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 583.
11 New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 580.
12 New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 580.
13 New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 582.
14 New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 583.
15  Press Release, Environmental Defense Fund, Court Rules EPA Violated 
the Law by Evding Required Power Plant Mercury Reductions (Feb. 8, 2008), 
available at http://www.edf.org/pressrelease.cfm?ContentID=7630 (last visited 
Apr. 25, 2008).
16 New Jersey Office of the Attorney General, supra note 2.
17 Environmental Defense Fund, supra note 15.
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The environmental community is at a crossroads. After decades of advocating for safeguards for nature and con-servation of resources, the entire movement has exhausted 
its traditional methods of achieving victories. The inability to 
implement a widely accepted system of capping global carbon 
emissions is an example of this dead end. If the movement is to 
continue on and make further progress, then it will need to break 
out of its interest group mode and seek alliances to advocate for 
ideas that environmentalism has been unfamiliar with thus far.
Nordhaus and Shellenberger caused a controversial stir 
with their 2004 article “The Death of Environmentalism.” Break 
Through seeks to expand upon those ideas, demonstrating how 
the environmental movement has fallen into the trap of becom-
ing just another interest group, and outlining a path towards pro-
gressive, effective policy making. Nordhaus and Shellenberger 
state that their ultimate goal is to help the community reach its 
desired end. 
The first half of the book, ‘The Politics of Limits,’ explains 
how for decades, the movement has been driven by concern for 
one issue and utilizing a single, unoriginal approach. Viewing 
their mission as the stewards of the environment, environmental 
advocates have sought to staunch human activity in the name of 
preserving our lands, water, and air. Advocates have acquired 
these goals by pushing through lawsuits and legislation, claim-
ing that public support is on their side by citing poll after poll 
where a majority of Americans state that the environment is a 
top concern for them. Victories such as the Clean Water Act and 
the Clean Air Act have instilled in the environmental commu-
nity the belief that these small-scale methods will continue to be 
effective against massive problems, such as global warming. 
Nordhaus and Shellenberger argue that environmentalists 
are mistaken on several points, and are wasting valuable time 
and resources as a result. The authors argue that environmental-
ists are far off base regarding the human aspect of their cause. 
By championing the rights of nature over the rights of human 
progress, the community does not recognize the fact that the 
movement got its start as a ‘post-material need’ for humanity. 
Book Review
BReak ThRough: 
FRom The DeaTh oF enviRonmenTalism To The PoliTics oF PossiBiliTy
by Ted Nordhaus & Michael Shellenberger
Reviewed by Emily Alves*
* Emily Alves is a J.D. Candidate, May 2011, at American University, Washing-
ton College of Law.
Having satisfied the minimal levels of need—food, shelter, and 
physical safety—citizens of the Western world have shifted their 
focus to post-material ones, such as self-fulfillment and a sense 
of belonging. These post-material instincts are what trigger the 
desire in people to invest in our natural surroundings. Humans 
have achieved this level of need due to the immense progress 
made in the last few centuries. Therefore, it is extremely coun-
ter-intuitive for most people when environmentalists proclaim 
that the only way to preserve nature is to halt the human prog-
ress that has brought them to a point where they are even able to 
consider nature as a priority. 
The authors use a case study of Brazil to illustrate this point. 
Environmentalists are constantly trying (and failing) to stem the 
deforestation of the Amazon. The authors contrast these efforts 
with the millions of direly poor Brazilians living either in the 
overcrowded favelas of Rio de Janeiro and San Paulo or in the 
secluded villages of the Amazon. The message that nature is 
superior and in perfect harmony, and we humans must not dis-
rupt this harmony, does not resonate with those seeking to make a 
living for themselves. Even in the United States, demanding that 
citizens curtail the very activities that have brought them secu-
rity in the name of maintaining or restoring the damage inflicted 
on nature while we were evolving is counter-intuitive and dif-
ficult to sell. For all the small scoped victories environmentalists 
have achieved in the name of nature, tackling the global issues 
simply cannot be done with these overtones and tactics that are 
not winning over the hearts and minds of the majority of the 
population.
Nordhaus and Shellenberger then spend the second half of 
the book, “The Politics of Possibility,” proposing methods that 
the environmental community can still pursue in order to achieve 
their more lofty goals. As with all single interest groups, envi-
ronmentalists must seek to expand their appeal. The best way to 
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do this is to take up issues that will achieve environmental qual-
ity while allowing humans to do what they do best—innovate 
and progress. The doomsday scenarios of fatal weather patterns 
must be set aside, and replaced with promising predictions of the 
innovative future that will ameliorate these conditions. Alliances 
must be formed with groups traditionally unallied with the envi-
ronmentalists, such as the United Auto Workers or the insurance 
industry, to advance fuel efficiency standards and increase pub-
lic health awareness. Concessions will have to be made in order 
to meet the majority of the environmentalists’ goals. The new 
path will have to entail engaging in progressive, market based 
solutions that will allow citizens to feel that they are working to 
improve their standards of living. 
The authors then suggest their plan for an Apollo project for 
clean energy, a proposal that would invest $300 billion in energy 
technologies over the next ten years. This proposal would simul-
taneously generate an additional $200 billion in private capital 
and add about three million new jobs to the market, all while 
discovering the most efficient environmentally friendly fuel 
technology. It is solutions such as these that will allow environ-
mentalists to leave their single issue, superior politics in the past 
and embrace a multifaceted, progressive politics of the future. 
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World NeWs
by Sarah Melikian & Addie Haughey*
AfricA
South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe experienced major 
blackouts in early 2008.1 In South Africa, the hardest hit country, 
the mining sector had to temporarily suspend operations, while 
industry, commerce, and telecommunications were affected in 
Zimbabwe.2 
South African President Thabo Mbeki admitted that the 
government failed to plan for shortages after warnings several 
years ago.3  Recent economic growth has resulted in demand 
exceeding a capacity, which has not increased much in the last 
twenty years.4 South Africa is the continent’s largest economy, 
and some regions of the country were dark for up to five hours a 
day, affecting all sectors of the economy.5 The country accounts 
for more than half of the electricity used in sub-Saharan Africa.6 
Most of the electricity goes to manufacturing, mining, and com-
mercial users, with about twenty percent used by households and 
five percent exported to neighboring countries.7 Major losses 
were felt in dairy and egg production, the wine crop, and tour-
ism, especially the restaurant business.8 Neighboring countries 
that usually rely on South Africa for energy supply had to turn to 
other sources in the region.9
The most talked about casualty was the mining industry, the 
largest employer of South Africans. The sector employs almost 
a half million people and indirectly supports five million.10  
Accounting for fifteen percent of South Africa’s electricity 
demand, the largest gold, platinum, coal, and diamond producers 
halted operations for five days when electricity supply could not 
be guaranteed.11
AmericAs
Even within a single country the regional impact from cli-
mate change varies. Recent studies have found that the west-
ern states of the United States are facing more drastic and rapid 
warming than the rest of the country. Over a five year time span, 
the world climate warmed about one degree Fahrenheit,12 but 
eleven western U.S. states warmed 1.7 degrees on average over 
the same time13 and in some parts of the west, the warming was 
as much as 2.2 degrees.14
Data suggests that this trend will not only continue, but it 
will also accelerate.15 Economic impacts on recreation, skiing, 
hunting, and fishing are already being felt and will only increase 
with higher temperatures.16 A total of $2.7 billion in lost crops 
have also been attributed to the temperature increase.17
Unlikely supporters from western states are pushing for a 
federal climate bill with the teeth to slow these changes in cli-
mate as members of Congress from the West realize the dis-
* Sarah Melikian is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, American University, Wash-
ington College of Law. Addie Haughey is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, American 
University, Washington College of Law.
parate impacts their states face.18 State governments are also 
responding by joining together to create a regional compact to 
curb emissions that aggravate climate change.19 
AsiA
Biofuels, long considered a green alternative to oil, are being 
criticized for their environmental and social consequences. Inter-
national environmental groups are claiming that biofuel produc-
tion in Indonesia is leading to human rights abuses.20 According 
to a report published by Friends of the Earth, LifeMosaic, and 
Sawit Watch, increased global demand for palm oil is resulting 
in the clearing of millions of hectares of forests, which in turn is 
threatening the livelihoods of sixty to ninety million indigenous 
people in Indonesia.21
More than eighty-five percent of the world’s palm oil is 
produced in Indonesia and Malaysia.22 Studies recently released 
by researchers at Wetlands International and Delft Hydraulics 
note that Indonesia is now the world’s third leading producer 
of carbon emissions.23 Friends of the Earth also estimates that 
between 1985 and 2000, eighty-seven percent of the deforesta-
tion in Malaysia was due to new palm oil plantations and that in 
Indonesia, the land devoted to palm oil has more than doubled in 
the last eight years.24 Scientists are also finding that biofuel pro-
duction may create more harmful emissions than fossil fuels.25 
The concern has EU governments rolling back the once gener-
ous subsidies for biofuels.26
AustrAliA
While the polar bear has become the furry spokesmen of the 
environmental movement when it comes to climate change, other 
animals are also feeling potentially devastating impacts from 
global warming. One example of such a creature is the koala 
bear. These Australian marsupials live off of eucalyptus leaves 
but their diet is in danger as nutrients in the leaves decrease 
because of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gasses.27 
Professor Bill Foley of the Australian National University 
says that “the staple diet of these animals is being turned to 
leather.”28 As carbon dioxide increases, the amount of vital pro-
tein in the leaves decreases and the levels of toxins in the leaves 
can reach dangerous levels.29
The koala’s food chain is finely balanced and the decrease 
in nutrients and protein in the eucalyptus leaves requires them to 
eat more leaves.30 This increase in consumption exacerbates the 
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impacts of toxins in the leaves and also increases competition 
for food between the koala bears and other animals and insects 
that also feed off the eucalyptus.31
Other animals will be impacted by the change in the eucalyp-
tus, but the Koala is particularly vulnerable. The name “koala” 
comes from an aboriginal word that means “doesn’t drink.”32 
The bears get almost all of the moisture they require from their 
diet of leaves, making them even more dependent on the eucalyp-
tus than other species.33 There are currently fewer than 100,000 
koalas living in the wild in Australia, and that small population 
is at great risk with increasing climate change.34
EuropE
The largest cod fishery on Earth, the Northeast Arctic cod, 
is facing a growing threat from illegal fishing.35 The Norwegian 
government estimates that in 2005 over 100,000 tonnes of illegal 
cod were caught in the Barents Sea, a value of over $350 mil-
lion.36 Norwegian, Russian, and EU fishers take the majority of 
the Barents Sea catch, which then gets distributed globally, thus 
allowing efforts along the supply chain may help reduce illegal 
catches.37 Unfortunately some EU member states are opposing 
the European Commission’s proposals to address illegal fish-
ing.38 Thus, the possibility of over fishing in conjunction with 
climate change may be to large of a stress on the fishery causing 
it to collapse like the North American cod fishery.39
In response to illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing 
several retailers are working to raise consumer awareness of sus-
tainable seafood.40 Some supermarkets are now providing fish 
that are certified by the Marine Stewardship Council, the global 
environmental standard for sustainable and well-managed fish-
eries.41 However, this is only the first step of many necessary 
along the entire seafood distribution chain to ensure that fisher-
ies are available to feed us today and tomorrow.     
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